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I. INTRODUCTION
What inventions are eligible for utility patent protection in the
United States? The question, as simple as it appears, has been a
topic of much heated debate. Courts have wrestled with the issue
and have struggled to offer a cohesive and definitive standard.1 As
a result, judicial decisions in this area have varied wildly,
particularly with respect to determining what constitutes an
unpatentable “abstract idea.”2 Fundamental disagreements remain.
Even when ostensibly applying the same standards, judicial
opinions reveal a deep, underlying ideological divide about
fundamental purposes of patents, the ends they advance, and who
should benefit from them. In a practical sense, the most
problematic claims for subject matter eligibility analysis are those
that raise the perennial question of overbreadth,3 in which a
relatively insignificant (or nonexistent) “inventive” contribution is
recited (and therefore a monopoly secured) in relatively broad
claims that greatly surpass the scope of the inventive
contribution—or simply recite a result rather than the actual
solution to the underlying technical problem.4

1

E.g., CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd., 717 F.3d 1269 (Fed. Cir.
2013) (en banc) (per curiam), cert. granted, 82 U.S.L.W. 3131 (U.S. Dec. 6,
2013) (No. 13–298).
2
E.g., compare Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 722 F.3d 1335 (Fed. Cir.
2013), with CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366 (Fed.
Cir. 2011).
3
Bernard Chao, Moderating Mayo, 107 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 82, 89–
90 (2012).
4
Results- or effect-based claiming frequently arises through the use of
functional (rather than structural) language, or through the recitation of method
steps that relate to the physical world in only a vague, abstract way. It is,
nonetheless, a problem that has existed for well over a hundred years, beginning
with the introduction of claims in patent applications along with pre-grant
examination in 1836. See, e.g., Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 156, 173
(1852) (“A patent is not good for an effect, or the result of a certain process, as
that would prohibit all other persons from making the same thing by any means
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Some key questions repeatedly arise when the patentability of
business methods and other nontechnological activities are
considered. Will protections of business methods displace
technological endeavors, as historically understood? Should the
grant of business method patents accommodate economic
transitions that are alleged to flow from the so-called “postindustrial” economy, or does the Constitution, statutory language,
or judicial gloss preclude patents from extending outside of the
realm of “technology,” more narrowly defined? Can patents on
business methods ever be clearly distinguished from practical
technology? These sorts of questions are central to an
understanding of the deep ideological divide in the judiciary as
evidenced by what are clearly conflicting patentable subject matter
decisions. These inquiries illuminate the subtext of many disputes
about the proper bounds of patent-eligible subject matter.
The Supreme Court has analyzed exceptions from patent
eligibility under the doctrine of “preemption.”5 Yet determining
what does and does not constitute “preemption” remains a
contentious issue.6 The lower courts and the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office (“USPTO”) still struggle when patents and
patent applications recite methods having tenuous links to tangible
yet commonplace things like general purpose computers. In this
legal quagmire, some degree of clarity might be found through
reference to efforts in one of the last places patent attorneys look:
the social sciences.
The present paper presents a possible extension of standards
for patent eligibility based upon theories developed by economist
Thorstein Veblen, who elaborated a dichotomy between
whatsoever. This, by creating monopolies, would discourage arts and
manufactures, against the avowed policy of the patent laws.”).
5
E.g., Mayo Collab. Servs. v. Prometheus Labs, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1294
(2012); Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 595 (1978).
6
Indeed, it is not clear that judges in lower courts are actually applying the
preemption standard at all. See, e.g., Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 722 F.3d
1335, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (Lourie, J., concurring).
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economically productive and unproductive activity, extended from
classical economics.7 This follows from Veblen’s observations that
patents represent ways of segregating the gains and transmission of
technology, even though “in the case of [such] intangible assets
there is no presumption that the objects of wealth involved have
any serviceability at large, since they serve no materially
productive work, but only a differential advantage to the owner in
the distribution of the industrial product.”8 While Veblen did not
offer a precise test for determining patent subject matter eligibility,
or even approach that question directly, he did provide a broad
conceptual framework that can help illuminate a path toward a
suitable patent eligibility standard, and, perhaps most importantly,
can help evaluate various tests proffered to assess patent eligibility.
The hope here is that a unification of many rationales given in
judicial decisions over a period of centuries is possible by
reclaiming the notion that patents must serve the social good,9 and
that such a task can be accomplished using a Veblenian economic
7

Veblen is generally credited with coining the phrase “evolutionary
economics.” That term has taken on somewhat different meanings over time,
and it now encompasses both orthodox and heterodox economic schools. The
three leading schools of economic thought today are Neoclassical, Keynesian,
and Marxist. See generally RICHARD D. WOLFF & STEPHEN A. RESNICK,
CONTENDING ECONOMIC THEORIES: NEOCLASSICAL, KEYNESIAN, AND MARXIAN
(2012). Neoclassical economics is considered “orthodox” while all others are
considered “heterodox.” Id. Veblen’s work is considered heterodox; he was a
critic of orthodox economics. He is variously described as either an evolutionary
economist or an institutionalist economist.
8
THORSTEIN VEBLEN, THE INSTINCT OF WORKMANSHIP AND THE STATE OF
THE INDUSTRIAL ARTS (1914), reprinted in WHAT VEBLEN TAUGHT 178–79
(Wesley C. Mitchell ed., Viking Press 1936) [hereinafter THE INDUSTRIAL
ARTS]; Thorstein Veblen, On the Nature of Capital: Investment, Intangible
Assets, and the Pecuniary Magnate, 23 Q.J. ECON., 104, 115 (1908), available
at http://archive.org/details/jstor-1883967 [hereinafter On the Nature of
Capital].
9
An excellent discussion of just such a proposal is found in Dana R. Irwin,
Paradise Lost in the Patent Law? Changing Visions of Technology in the
Subject Matter Inquiry, 60 FLA. L. REV. 775 (2008); see also Bilski v. Kappos,
130 S. Ct. 3218, 3232, 3239–46 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring).
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theory that aligns with the preemption doctrine that the Supreme
Court has repeatedly relied upon.
The new theory presented here sets up a Veblenian dichotomy,
whereby the productive functions of “technology” (or “industry”)
and unproductive “pecuniary” (or “ceremonial”) functions are
distinguished with respect to patent eligibility. The former
provides means to support life processes in an evolutionary sense,
whereas the latter merely deals with invidious human social
relations—perhaps more broadly termed sociopolitical or
socioeconomic endeavors.10 Patent claims directed to no more than
accumulating or distributing wealth, manipulating confidence,
exerting influence, avoiding regulation, structuring a business or
legal organization, leveraging social position, speculating, and the
like, would fall into the latter category, while patent claims
directed to articles of manufacture, knowledge of the use of tools,
application of “matter-of-fact” scientific knowledge, and the like,
would fall into the former category. Key here is that any invention
for which utility is contingent upon social context would not be
patent-eligible. However, inventions that relate, in the very
broadest sense, to applied physics and engineering with results that
are repeatable, are independent of social context (i.e.,
transcultural), and bear some reasonable connection to creating an
economic surplus based around overcoming the scarcity of labor,
energy or materials in a causal sequence of development, would be
patent-eligible. In short, this paper suggests using a Veblenian
technological/pecuniary dichotomy to evaluate the constitutionality
of judicial tests for patent eligibility, and further that such
evaluations should be applied at the point of inventive
10

See, e.g., THORSTEIN VEBLEN, THE THEORY OF THE LEISURE CLASS 232
(MacMillan 1899) (“The substantial canons of the leisure-class scheme of life
are a conspicuous waste of time and substance and a withdrawal from the
industrial process; while the particular aptitudes here in question assert
themselves, on the economic side, in a deprecation of waste and of a futile
manner of life, and in an impulse to participation in or identification with the life
process, whether it be on the economic side or in any other of its phases or
aspects.”); MICHAEL HUDSON, THE BUBBLE AND BEYOND 415 (2012).
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contribution, that is, by looking at where, in a given patent claim, a
technical problem is alleged to be solved or a technical advance is
otherwise alleged to be made. Such an approach is contrasted
against other observations on patent eligibility, such as a
suggestion by Thomas Cotter that a “Burkean” approach—based
on the political outlook of Edmund Burke—be employed.11
A Veblenian context for the patentable subject matter debate
provides a way of evaluating proposed patentability tests. In other
words, this provides a lens that can be used to test the tests for
patent-eligible subject matter, by exploring the ideological and
economic impacts of patent subject matter eligibility tests. Rather
than force judges to evaluate an abstract question of degree (such
as evaluation of the sufficiency of connections to tangible things)
or make hypothetical comparisons (such as assessing whether a
process could be performed purely mentally or whether other,
unstated mechanisms can provide the same result), a shift toward a
more functionally-oriented metric may allow more consistent
outcomes by providing a shared sense of purpose in resolving the
ambiguities that arise with the consideration of individual patent
claims. Of course, the precise formulation of a bright-line
functional metric is not the goal of this paper. Yet it is proposed
that an evaluation of the contingency of a patent claim on social
context to determine a relationship to a productive contribution to
matter-of-fact technical knowledge may be a more useful form of
analysis than one requiring a determination of whether a given
invention could hypothetically be performed with purely mental
steps, or whether there is a sufficient link to a machine or
transformation of matter, as is often used to evaluate troublesome
method claims in patents today.12

11

Thomas F. Cotter, A Burkean Perspective on Patent Eligibility, 22
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 855 (2007).
12
See, e.g., id. at 855, 884–94.

[5:211 2014]

CYBARIS®, AN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW REVIEW

218

II. A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF VEBLEN
Thorstein Veblen was a political economist raised in
Minnesota, who has been called “one of the most important social
thinkers of the last century[.]”13 He is frequently described as
13

Ian Rappel, Fight the Power, SOCIALIST REV., July 2005, available at
http://www.socialistreview.org.uk/article.php?articlenumber=9461 (statement by
Noam Chomsky). For background and other general information on Thorstein
Veblen, see generally KEN MCCORMICK, VEBLEN IN PLAIN ENGLISH: A
COMPLETE INTRODUCTION TO THORSTEIN VEBLEN'S ECONOMICS (2006);
GEORGE SOULE, IDEAS OF THE GREAT ECONOMISTS 184–92 (1952); RICK
TILMAN, THE LEGACY OF THORSTEIN VEBLEN (Rick Tilman ed., 2003); RICK
TILMAN, THORSTEIN VEBLEN AND HIS CRITICS 1891–1963 (1992); THORSTEIN
VEBLEN: CRITICAL ASSESSMENTS (John Cunningham Wood ed., 1993);
THORSTEIN VEBLEN: ECONOMICS FOR AN AGE OF CRISES (Erik S. Reinert &
Francesca Lidia Viano eds., 2012); John Patrick Diggins, Thorstein Veblen and
the Literature of the Theory Class, 6 INT’L J. POL. CULTURE & SOC’Y 481
(1993); William M. Dugger, Radical Institutionalism: Basic Concepts, 20 REV.
RADICAL POL. ECON. 1 (1988), reprinted in 4 EVOLUTIONARY THEORY IN THE
SOCIAL SCIENCES 124 (Dugger et al. eds., 2003); Adil H. Mouhammed, A
Critique of A Marxist Critique Of Thorstein Veblen, 6 AM. REV. POL. ECON.,
June 2008, at 19, available at http://arpejournal.com/ARPEvolume6number1/
Mouhammed.pdf; Rick Tilman, Thorstein Veblen (1857–1929), in A
BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY OF DISSENTING ECONOMISTS 695 (Philip Arestis &
Malcolm Sawyer eds., 2d ed., 2000) [hereinafter Thorstein Veblen (1857–1929)]
(“His most famous book [was] The Theory of the Leisure Class, in which he
developed his theory of status emulation. In this satirical study of the leisure
class and the underlying social strata which emulate it, he argued that
conspicuous consumption, conspicuous waste and ostentatious avoidance of
useful work were practices by which social status was enhanced.”); Andrew B.
Trigg, Veblen, Bourdieu, and Conspicuous Consumption, 35 J. ECON. ISSUES 99
(2001) (linking Veblen to later theorists like Pierre Bourdieu); L. Randall Wray,
Veblen’s Theory of Business Enterprise and Keynes’s Monetary Theory of
Production, 41 J. ECON. ISSUES 1 (2007) (linking Veblen to later economists like
Keynes). Some earlier economists, like John Rae, worked along similar lines.
See, e.g., JOHN RAE, STATEMENT OF SOME NEW PRINCIPLES ON THE SUBJECT OF
POLITICAL ECONOMY: EXPOSING THE FALLACIES OF THE SYSTEM OF FREE
TRADE, AND OF SOME OTHER DOCTRINES MAINTAINED IN THE “WEALTH OF
NATIONS”
(1834),
available
at
https://archive.org/details/
statementofsomen00raejrich; Anthony Brewer, John Rae on the Causes of
Invention,
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/
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having held Midwestern values in the sense of valuing
workmanship, family, productivity and self-sufficiency, and
opposing avaricious accumulation of wealth and power on the
basis of social privilege, war, deception, sabotage, or looting. His
theories were very egalitarian,14 and they included arguments that
attacked misogyny, racism, jingoism, environmental destruction,
and Social Darwinism.15 Much of his novel theoretical framework
revolved around social drives toward unnecessary and wasteful
consumption (competitive spending), the accumulation of wealth
and other status-seeking actions brought about by invidious
comparison with other persons, and similar human habits,
motivations and social institutions, as distinguished from the way
most economists focused on productive forces and marginal
pricing.16 He is famously credited with introducing the terms
download?doi=10.1.1.23.2702&rep=rep1&type=pdf (last visited Sept. 16,
2013).
14
Phillip Anthony O’Hara, The Contemporary Relevance of Thorstein
Veblen's Institutional-Evolutionary Political Economy, 35 HIST. ECON. REV. 78,
83 (2002), available at http://www.hetsa.org.au/pdf/35-A-7.pdf (explaining that
Veblen’s critical analysis was conducted with a view toward “[s]haring . . .
[s]urplus product in a more egalitarian manner.”); Dugger, supra note 13;
VEBLEN, supra note 10, at 142 (“It may even be said that in the modern
industrial communities the average, dispassionate sense of men says that the
ideal human character is a character which makes for peace, good-will, and
economic efficiency, rather than for a life of self-seeking, force, fraud, and
mastery.”).
15
William Dugger, Veblen’s Radical Theory of Social Evolution, 40 J.
ECON. ISSUES 651 (2006); William M. Dugger, Veblen and Kropotkin on Human
Evolution, 18 J. ECON. ISSUES 971 (1984); Ross E. Mitchell, Thorstein Veblen,
Pioneer in Environmental Sociology, 14 ORG. & ENV’T 389, 394–98 (2001).
16
See BARBARA H. FRIED, THE PROGRESSIVE ASSAULT ON LAISSEZ FAIRE:
ROBERT HALE AND THE FIRST LAW AND ECONOMICS MOVEMENT (1998);
Michael Hudson, M for Marginalism, MICHAEL-HUDSON.COM (Jan. 22, 2014),
http://michael-hudson.com/2014/01/m-for-marginalism (“[The marginalist]
approach takes the technological and institutional environment as given rather
than making policy and social reform the major aim of economic analysis, as
was the case with classical political economy. The antitheses of marginalism are
thus institutionalism and Systems Analysis . . . . [M]arginalist analysis is a

[5:211 2014]

CYBARIS®, AN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW REVIEW

220

“conspicuous consumption” and “conspicuous waste” to describe
tendencies people have to make unproductive displays of their
exemption from “vulgar” (real, productive) work, in order to
reflect social status.17 However, Veblen saw more than just
negative “acquisitive instincts” in humans; he also emphasized
how the “parental bent” fostered care for future generations, “idle
curiosity” fostered a benevolent search for knowledge, and the
“instinct of workmanship” fostered the useful employment of
science and technology.18 He is therefore credited with introducing
the modern meaning of the term “technology” to popular discourse
in America.19
The conflict between “vested interests” dedicated to preserving
an existing social order against changing circumstances and
synonym for asocial analysis.”); see also L. Randall Wray, MMP #52
Conclusion: The Nature of Money, NEW ECON. PERSP. (June 27, 2012), http://
neweconomicperspectives.org/2012/06/mmp-51-conclusion-the-nature-ofmoney.html.
17
Veblen’s views here coincide surprisingly with later Freudian and
Lacanian theories of the human psychology of desire. See, e.g., Slavoj Žižek,
From Che vuoi? to Fantasy: Lacan with Eyes Wide Shut, HOW TO READ
LACAN, http://www.lacan.com/zizkubrick.htm (last visited Sept. 25, 2013) (“The
original question of desire is not directly ‘What do I want?’, but ‘What do others
want from me? What do they see in me? What am I for the others?’”). It is this
aspect that most clearly differentiates Veblen’s theories from the methodological
individualism of orthodox neoclassical economics.
18
THE INDUSTRIAL ARTS, supra note 8, at 25. Veblen saw the instinct of
workmanship rivaled only by the “parental bent” (with both competing with the
acquisitive instinct); see also Erik S. Reinert, Civilizing Capitalism: “Good”
and “Bad” Greed from the Enlightenment to Thorstein Veblen (1857–1929), 63
REAL-WORLD ECON. REV., Mar. 25, 2013, at 65, available at http://
www.paecon.net/PAEReview/issue63/whole63.pdf.
19
Eric Schatzberg, Technik Comes to America: The Changing Meanings of
Technology Before 1930, 46 TECH. & CULTURE 486, 487–88, 498–507 (2006);
see also Ronald Kline, Construing ‘Technology’ as ‘Applied Science’: Public
Rhetoric of Scientists and Engineers in the United States, 1880–1945, 86 ISIS
194, 217 (1995). Veblen has further been credited with inventing the term
“captains of industry,” at least in its modern usage. SOULE, supra note 13, at
188.
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incursions from newcomers was of particular importance to
Veblen. He assessed such conflicts through the interaction of
technical, instinctive, and institutional factors. His greatest
contributions arose from the warnings he issued about parasitic
“pecuniary” interests siphoning off wealth created by industry,
concluding that “a persistent excess of parasitic and wasteful
efforts over productive industry must bring on a decline.”20 He was
more astute than most at identifying the skillful sophistries of
businessmen who were engaged in zero-sum battles over price
differentials rather than contributing to production that benefitted
the “generic ends of life.” In that way he distinguished “the kind of
self-interest which contributes to wealth creation from that which
constitutes predatory wealth extraction.”21 By most accounts he
was a reform-minded iconoclast,22 who broke away from
neoclassical economics in large part because he found its methods
unscientific.23
20

THORSTEIN VEBLEN, THE THEORY OF BUSINESS ENTERPRISE 36 (photo.
reprint 2013) (1904); see also Dan Little, Thorstein Veblen's Critique of the
American System of Business, ECONOMIST’S VIEW (Nov. 13, 2013), http://
economistsview.typepad.com/economistsview/2013/11/thorstein-veblenscritique-of-the-american-system-of-business.html (“One of the central
impressions that emerges from reading [Veblen’s] The Theory of Business
Enterprise is this: the modern American industrial economy is a coordinated
system that requires many things to happen in sync with each other; but the
owners of the components of this system often have strategic interests that lead
them to take actions leading to de-synchronization and short-term crisis. There is
a serious conflict of interest that exists between the interests of the owner and
the needs of the system — and the public's interests are primarily served by a
smoothly functioning system. So owners are in conflict with the broader
interests of the public.”).
21
Reinert, supra note 18, at 58.
22
SOULE, supra note 13, at 184–86, 190–92 (calling Veblen “the Bad Boy
of American Economics”).
23
Veblen is credited with coining the term “neo-classical” to describe an
economic school. Thorstein Veblen, The Preconceptions of Economic Science –
III, 14 Q.J. ECON. 240, 261 (1900). Neoclassical economics denotes “[t]he
school that arose in the last quarter of the 19th century, stripping away the
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Those with visions of economics similar to Veblen’s are
frequently termed “institutionalist” economists, though the term
“institutional economics” was not Veblen’s and over time has been
applied to a variety of different economic theories that do not
always conform to Veblen’s own.24 Within the realm of legal

classical concept of economic rent as unearned income. By the late 20th century
the term ‘neoclassical’ had come to connote a deductive body of free-trade
theory using circular reasoning by tautology, excluding discussion of property,
debt and the financial sector’s role in general, taking the existing institutional
environment for granted.” Michael Hudson, N is for Neo-Serfdom, O for
Offshore Banking, MICHAEL-HUDSON.COM (Jan. 23, 2014), http://michaelhudson.com/2014/01/n-is-for-neo-serfdom-o-is-for-offshore-banking.
Veblen
was an early critic of the shift from classical economics toward the neoclassical
school.
24
Latter-day commentators generally describe Veblen as an institutionalist
economist, though that term was coined by Walter H. Hamilton, not Veblen
himself. Many later “new” or “neo-” institutionalists deviate significantly from
Veblen’s original theories. See, e.g., MALCOLM RUTHERFORD, THE
INSTITUTIONALIST MOVEMENT IN AMERICAN ECONOMICS, 1918–1947 (2011);
Malcolm Rutherford, Institutional Economics: Then and Now, 15 J. ECON.
PERSP. 173 (2001). Somewhat begrudgingly, Veblen’s theories are referred to
generally as institutionalist ones in this paper. The Association for Evolutionary
Economics is a contemporary organization that follows and extends Veblen’s
economic outlook. ASS’N FOR EVOLUTIONARY ECON., http://www.afee.net (last
visited Sept. 13, 2013). Veblen’s views are so pervasive, however, that some
writers largely recreate his work without attribution. See, e.g., CHARLES H.
FERGUSON, PREDATOR NATION: CORPORATE CRIMINALS, POLITICAL
CORRUPTION, AND THE HIJACKING OF AMERICA (2013). Economists involved
with post-Keynesian Modern Monetary Theory (MMT), such as those at the
University of Missouri-Kansas City, have taken a great deal from Veblen’s
theories and applied them to contemporary contexts. In particular, MMT takes
an endogenous view of money and suggests that acquisition of money is a goal
unto itself in a capitalist economy, because “Veblen recognized money as an
institution whereupon possession of money gives the holder power.” Samuel
Ellenbogen, Essays in Monetary Theory and Policy: On the Nature of Money
(5), NEW ECON. PERSP. (Dec. 25, 2013), http://neweconomicperspectives.org/
2013/12/essays-monetary-theory-policy-nature-money-5.html. This is echoed in
the comment, attributed to either Alfred P. Sloan, Jr. or Thomas Murphy but
possibly apocryphal, that General Motors is in the business of making money,
not cars.
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thought, some of his ideas were adopted by legal realists in the
original law and economics movement.25
Veblen was noted for taking an overtly Darwinian approach to
economics, and attempting to apply an evolutionary scientific,
sociological and anthropological approach to economic theory.26
That approach, combined with a special focus on the influence of
social context, set Veblen and the other institutionalist economists
apart from their orthodox, neoclassical counterparts.27 This also
25

Robert Lee Hale and Justice William O. Douglas were perhaps the most
noteworthy legal realists to rely on some of Veblen’s theories. See, e.g., FRIED,
supra note 16; Neil Duxbury, Robert Hale and the Economy of Legal Force, 53
MODERN L. REV. 421, 429-30 (1990); Ron Harris, The Encounters of Economic
History and Legal History, 21 LAW & HIST. REV. 297, 323 n.50 (2003); William
O. Douglas and the Growing Power of the SEC, SEC. & EXCHANGE
COMMISSION HIST. SOC’Y, http://www.sechistorical.org/museum/galleries/
douglas/academia.php (last visited Mar. 31, 2014). Certainly, many others were
strongly influenced by Veblen, such as Adolph Berle, Jr., who was part of
President Franklin Roosevelt’s “Brain Trust” and the author of a leading text on
corporate governance. Charles O.T. O’Kelley, Berle and Veblen: An Intellectual
Connection, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1317 (2011); ADOLPH A. BERLE, WIKIPEDIA,
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Adolf_A._Berle (last updated Feb. 4, 2014). To the
extent that the later critical legal studies (CLS) movement traces its origins to
legal realism, CLS lacks any coherent basis in Veblen’s theories. Cornel West
has remarked how this represents a failing of CLS. Cornel West, CLS and a
Liberal Critic, 97 YALE L.J. 757, 770 (1988).
26
Sophus A. Reinert, Darwin and the Body Politic: Schäffle, Veblen, and
the Biological Metaphor Shift in Economics, in ALBERT SCHAFFLE (1821–1903):
THE LEGACY OF AN UNDERESTIMATED ECONOMIST 129–52 (Jurgen Backhaus
ed., 2010); see also Geoffrey M. Hodgson, Darwin, Veblen and the Problem of
Causality in Economics, 23 HIST. & PHIL. LIFE SCI. 385 (2001).
27
“The institutionalists view human behavior as a process of cumulative
adaption to changing circumstances within the cultural context in which the
behavior takes place. This view is acknowledged to be tentative and subject to
change in the light of evidence to the contrary. Unlike the institutionalists, the
orthodox economists make an a priori assumption about the nature of human
behavior, and do not subject it to any testing process.” William T. Waller, Jr., The
Evolution of the Veblenian Dichotomy: Veblen, Hamilton, Ayres, and Foster, 16
J. ECON. ISSUES, 757 (1982); see also Erik S. Reinert, Neo-Classical Economics:
A Trail of Economic Destruction Since the 1970s, 60 REAL-WORLD ECON. REV.
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makes Veblen an appealing reference point with regard to patent
policy, which professes some relationship to scientific
methodologies. Indeed, Albert Einstein—a former patent examiner
no less—endorsed Veblen as a leading thinker on the philosophy
of science in an economic context, and one of the only economists
of his day worth reading.28 But readers should scrupulously avoid
making too many assumptions about Veblen's views on patents
from the present analysis, because his direct treatment of them was
limited.29

2 (2012), available at http://www.paecon.net/PAEReview/issue60/whole60.pdf.
Veblen’s views here are precisely the opposite of those expressed by former
British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, who once famously said, “And, you
know, there is no such thing as society. There are individual men and women,
and there are families.” Douglas Keay, Aids, Education and the Year 2000!,
WOMEN'S OWN, Oct. 31, 1987, at 8–10.
28
See, e.g., William T. Ganley, A Note on the Intellectual Connection
between Albert Einstein and Thorstein Veblen, 31 J. ECON. ISSUES 245 (Mar.
1997); ALBERT EINSTEIN, IDEAS AND OPINIONS 19 (Schilpp trans., Bonanza
1988), translated in THE PHILOSOPHY OF BERTRAND RUSSELL, VOL. V (Schilpp
ed., trans., Tudor 1944), reprinted in IDEAS AND OPINIONS 19 (Crown Publishers
1954).
29
In reading Veblen, although this boils down to idle speculation, one gets
a sense that he viewed patents as, at best, a tolerable evil—perhaps even as a
counterproductive mechanism for the pecuniary interests to sequester certain
knowledge away from public use for private gain—and (like loan credit), to
generally increase the costs of doing business at the inevitable expense of
engineering efficiency. See, e.g., Veblen, On the Nature of Capital, supra note
8, at 115 n.1; THORSTEIN VEBLEN, THE PLACE OF SCIENCE IN MODERN
CIVILISATION AND OTHER ESSAYS 186 (Ardzrooni et. al eds., 1919), available at
https://archive.org/details/placeofsciencein00vebl; VEBLEN, supra note 20; see
also Ken McCormick, Veblen and the New Growth Theory: Community as the
Source of Capital's Productivity, 60 REV. SOCIAL ECON. 263 (2002); Jonathan
Nitzan, Differential Accumulation: Towards a New Political Economy of
Capital, 5 REV. INT’L POL. ECON. 169, 187 (1998). He seemed to view invention
as something that would happen regardless of economic rent incentives. Richard
V. Adkisson, Ceremonialism, Intellectual Property Rights, and Innovative
Activity, 38 J. ECON. ISSUES 459, 461 (2004). Indeed, if the patent system
evolved from political bargains struck in England with the Statute of
Monopolies, discussed infra, then Veblen would have likely disapproved of
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One of the most distinctive aspects of Veblen’s writing is the
humorous, sarcastic and sardonic tone he frequently used, often to
render backhanded insults against the rich and powerful. This
made his writings, especially later ones, highly popular with
general audiences, though in equal measure exposed him to
criticism from his orthodox peers—many of whom, as apologists
for privilege, were at least indirectly the subject of Veblen’s
insults.30 His archaic tone can sometimes require some patience
and careful analysis. Unsympathetic readers often intentionally or
unintentionally misread his humor.31 Yet his work remains highly
relevant today, and is well worth reading first-hand.

patents on the basis of them giving too much weight to pecuniary interests. Still,
given his emphasis on the accumulation of collective knowledge being of
greater importance than any individual contributions, Veblen might have
cautiously accepted what Roberto Mazzoleni and Richard Nelson called
“Theory 2,” that patents induce inventors to disclose inventions that they would
otherwise tend to maintain in secrecy. Roberto Mazzoleni & Richard R. Nelson,
Economic Theories About the Benefits and Costs of Patents, 32 J. ECON. ISSUES
1031, 1033, 1038-40 (1998). For other compendiums of economic theories for
patents, see Peter S. Menell, Intellectual Property: General Theories, in
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS, VOLUME II. CIVIL LAW AND
ECONOMICS 129–48 (Bouckaert et. al eds., 2000); Patent Economics: Part 5 –
Theories, THE PATENT PROSPECTOR (Apr. 24, 2005), http://
www.patenthawk.com/blog/2005/04/patent_economics_part_5_theori.html;
Patent Economics: Part 4 – Incentives, THE PATENT PROSPECTOR (April 17,
2005),
http://www.patenthawk.com/blog/2005/04/
patent_economics_part_4_incent.html. It is also worth noting that Veblen
despised lawyers. He once wrote that “law schools belong in the modern
university no more than a school of fencing or dancing.” THORSTEIN VEBLEN,
THE HIGHER LEARNING IN AMERICA 211 (1918).
30
J.A. Hobson, The Economics of Thorstein Veblen, 52 POL. SCI. Q. 139
(1937).
31
All this makes quoting Veblen in brief passages an almost useless
endeavor, because his frequently sardonic and sarcastic tone requires that
readers absorb the context he develops fully only across numerous pages or
whole chapters of his writings. With that in mind, this paper often relies on
secondary sources to condense Veblen’s thought in a “drier” tone.
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The role of technology in society was crucial to Veblen’s
economic analysis,32 even if letters patents appear only
peripherally in his work. Yet Veblen and his followers still offer
practical theoretical frameworks that can inform the narrow
question of patent subject matter eligibility.33 But before reaching
those topics, a Veblenian and institutionalist approach requires the
establishment of some context for the present-day patent-eligible
subject matter debate, because quite clearly many specific social
and economic circumstances have changed since Veblen’s
lifetime.34

32

Due to his extensive analysis on the role of technology in economic
analysis, Veblen is sometimes wrongly characterized as having suggested, in a
reductionist, deterministic, and technocratic way that technology is always
positive. Olivier Brette, Thorstein Veblen's Theory of Institutional Change:
Beyond Technological Determinism, 10 EUROPEAN J. HIST. ECON. THOUGHT 455
(2003), available at http://thorstein.veblen.free.fr/index.php/documents/65thorstein-veblen-theory-of-institutional-change-beyond-technology-anddeterminism-olivier-brette.html. Instead, “[t]he material and technical conditions
are not an exogenous variable in Veblen's theoretical system. On the contrary,
they stand in a system of interdependence in which they exert both a
determining action on (individual and social) habits of action and thought and an
action determined by the prevailing instinctive and institutional factors.
Consequently, if technological progress is capable of leading to institutional
changes, it is itself conditioned by the institutional logic and the instincts which
prevail in society.” Id. “In Veblen's system, technological progress is thus really
an endogenous variable in the evolution process.” Id. A fair analogy of Veblen’s
views is this: “The industrial arts . . . are the motor of the system, but the motor
is fueled from outside, and the only controls that are applied from the inside are
brakes of uncertain strength and holding power.” Paul M. Sweezy, Veblen's
Critique of the American Economy, 48 AM. ECON. REV., 21, 22 (1958).
33
See Adkisson, supra note 29, at 465 (noting that Veblen and similar
thinkers offer insights to patent and other intellectual property policy); see also
WILLIAM B. BENNETT, THE AMERICAN PATENT SYSTEM, AN ECONOMIC
INTERPRETATION (1943).
34
Veblen died in 1929. Rick Tilman, Thorstein Veblen (1857–1929), supra
note 13, at 695.
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III. CHANGES IN THE MAKEUP AND CHARACTER OF THE UNITED
STATES ECONOMY
A. Why It Matters
In order to understand why judges, scholars, and practitioners
have struggled so deeply and persistently with the question of
patent eligibility in the present era, rather than another historical
period, it helps to understand the changing social and economic
context of the times. The U.S. economy has undergone great
changes since the early 1970s, which have shaped the landscape in
which the judiciary renders decisions in individual cases. In the
aggregate, those decisions represent the judiciary’s input on
important social and economic policy questions. Questions of
patent law are as bound to this economic context as any other area
of law. It has previously been suggested by John Duffy that the rise
of business method patents can be explained by the law following
technology, in a reactive sense.35 At the broadest level such a view
is compelling. But while Duffy astutely recognizes a new and
emerging perspective on patent eligibility, he omits the economic
context and therefore offers no critique of current patent policy
from an economic perspective.
Economic circumstances play a large role in shaping the course
of “invention” across an entire economy, and, in turn, shape the
course of patent activity. Inventive activity always precedes patent
activity. This rather straightforward observation merely
emphasizes that there must be some “inventive” subject matter
available to insert into a given patent application, as it were. But
inventive activity exists only within a context of larger

35

John F. Duffy, Why Business Method Patents?, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1247,
1263–68 (2011). This might be seen as a form of “cultural lag,” which is to say
that cultural institutions always lag behind current circumstances. Richard L.
Brinkman & June E. Brinkman, Cultural Lag: In the Tradition of Veblenian
Economics, 40 J. ECON. ISSUES 1009 (2006).
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socioeconomic forces.36 The availability of resources to support
and fund research often shape the development of inventions,
facilitating some while precluding others. It has been argued that
corporations, as entities that control significant resources,
eventually came to largely dictate the circumstances and context
for inventive activity.37 From there, it is hardly controversial to
think that a shift of research funding from one area to another
would have a corresponding impact on the degree of invention in
those areas. Indeed, it is possible to picture “technology as a
refractory yet periodically malleable expression of the distribution
of power in society.”38 The ways in which scientific and
engineering research is carried out have complex interactions with
social orders, and are deeply affected by social, cultural and
political biases and structures.39 From this perspective, changes in
the makeup of the U.S. economy as a whole can be seen to
influence what activities are (or are not) undertaken in significant
volume that might generate patent applications. Such economic
conditions can affect the gravitational pull, as it were, on trends in
patenting and the framework for associated legal analysis, at any
given time period.40
Historical examples can shed light on the economic contexts
for debates over patent policy through the present. Steven
36

See, e.g., THORSTEIN VEBLEN, IMPERIAL GERMANY AND THE INDUSTRIAL
REVOLUTION
(1915),
available
at
https://archive.org/details/
imperialgermany01veblgoog.
37
CATHERINE L. FISK, WORKING KNOWLEDGE: EMPLOYEE INNOVATION
AND THE RISE OF CORPORATE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, 1800–1930, at 177–210
(2009). This transition was fully realized during Veblen’s lifetime.
38
MICHAEL J. PIORE & CHARLES F. SABEL, THE SECOND INDUSTRIAL
DIVIDE 21 (1984); see also Langdon Winner, Do Artifacts Have Politics?, 109
DAEDALUS 121 (1980), available at http://zaphod.mindlab.umd.edu/
docSeminar/pdfs/Winner.pdf.
39
R.C. LEWONTIN ET AL., NOT IN OUR GENES: BIOLOGY, IDEOLOGY AND
HUMAN NATURE 8 (1984).
40
See PIERRE BOURDIEU, THE SOCIAL STRUCTURES OF THE ECONOMY 226–
27 (Chris Turner trans., Polity Press 2005) (2000).
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Usselman and Richard John wrote a fascinating study of how
tensions between railroad companies, farm interests, and
independent inventors—based in large part on competing
economic interests—shaped political battles over patent legislation
in the 1870s.41 Among other salient points, Usselman and John
note that for more than a hundred years independent proprietors
(including “patent sharks”) without first-hand access to expensive
existing technology have long tended to produce lower-quality
patent applications in the eyes of the “experts” who work for the
owners of that existing technology, and that the very basis of the
patent system has long been seen as a subsidy to urban regions to
the detriment of rural ones. Such analyses highlight the
sociopolitical aspects of how policies embedded in the patent
system can create winners and losers—with one group’s gains
coming at another group’s expense. The antebellum patent system
found itself at the center of a debate of over spheres of influence as
proprietary capitalism declined and corporate capitalism
emerged.42 Back then, the debate was driven by the shift of
economic opportunities from the Atlantic seaboard to the North
American interior (a region of expanded U.S. influence after
victory in the Mexican war of 1846-48).43 A similar struggle is
happening today, merely with different groups and regions playing
leading roles in the debate. As explored below, financial activities
currently occupy a dominant role in the U.S. economy, and related
business interests wield such significant influence that their
relationships to the patent system are in need of continued
analysis.44 These struggles are pronounced when considering the
question of the proper scope of patent-eligible subject matter.
41

Steven W. Usselman & Richard R. John, Patent Politics: Intellectual
Property, the Railroad Industry, and the Problem of Monopoly, 18 J. POL’Y
HIST. 96 (2006).
42
Id. at 120.
43
Id. at 98–99.
44
Much current study focuses on the roles of so-called “patent trolls.” See,
e.g., Michael D. Goldhaber, IP Insider: How Do You Say ‘Troll’ in Finnish?,
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B. Recent Expansion of the FIRE Sector
An extensive amount of analysis outside of the realm of patent
law has focused on transformations of the economy in the United
States in recent decades. Patent attorneys tend to ignore much of
that literature.45 In this sometimes overlooked history, the concept
of the “financialization” of the U.S. economy from the period of
the 1970s onward is discussed.46 These analyses, of course, are but

CORP. COUNS., Nov. 2013, at 53–54. One study found that a growing share of all
patent litigation brought by non-practicing entities involves business method
patents, reaching approximately 41% in 2011–2012. Investigations into NPE
Litigation Involving Business Method Patents, PAT. FREEDOM (Sept. 4, 2013),
https://www.patentfreedom.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/NPE-Ligitationsinvolving-Business-Method-Patents_Sept-4-2013.pdf. This study may be
underinclusive, in this author’s view, due to the use of a fairly narrow definition
of “business method.”
45
Indeed, legal scholars in general tend to ignore a great deal of economic
and sociological scholarship, particular those from the period before and during
the Great Depression that critiqued economic crises. Fred Block, Relational
Work and the Law: Recapturing the Legal Realist Critique of Market
Fundamentalism, 40 J.L. & SOC’Y 27, 28–29 (2013) (“Mainstream legal
thinking, particularly in the United States, has for some time faced a crisis in its
understanding of economic activity. This crisis results from the marginalization
of the key insights of legal realist scholars of the 1920s and 1930s who had
developed a theoretically sophisticated analysis of the actual workings of
markets.”). Block notes that despite occasional references to Veblen, there has
been relatively little work done in tracing out a historical lineage of economic
sociology within the United States. Id. It is sadly common for patent attorneys to
lack any familiarity with economists other than Joseph Schumpeter, and even
then only on a cursory basis.
46
See, e.g., Jacob Assa, Financialization and Its Consequences: The OECD
Experience, 1 FIN. RES., Jan. 2012, at 35 (summarizing empirical data on recent
financialization); Costas Lapavistas, Theorizing Financialization, 25 WORK,
EMP. & SOC’Y 611 (2011); Thomas I. Palley, Financialization: What It Is and
Why It Matters 2 (Levy Institute, Working Paper No. 525, 2007), available at
http://www.levyinstitute.org/pubs/wp_525.pdf. The asserted starting point for
financialization varies. Some commentators place the date in the 1980s, while
others indicate that it began in the 1970s and intensified in the 1980s.
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the latest in continued efforts to understand economic history.47
But to ignore these shifts in understanding is to potentially tether
an understanding of patent law to a bygone era that does not reflect
current situations and challenges.
Economists divide the overall economy into different sectors.
One sector is referred to as the finance, insurance and real estate
(FIRE) sector.48 Relative to other sectors, the domestic FIRE sector
has grown dramatically in recent years.49 These large-scale,
structural changes among different economic sectors are seen quite
dramatically in the relevant data, particularly because the FIRE
sector can “grow” by cannibalizing other sectors.50 Official U.S.
government data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis shows
that the FIRE sector overtook manufacturing in the 1980s in terms
of gross domestic product (GDP), and as a percentage of corporate
profits has begun to greatly surpass manufacturing since the 1990s.
These trends are illustrated in Figures 1-3, which annotate the
dates of the State Street Bank and Ex Parte Lundgren decisions
that each expressed very broad views of patentable subject matter

47

For a discussion of the economic changes in the United States from the
period of roughly World War I to 1970, see Michael Hudson, SUPER
IMPERIALISM: THE ORIGINS AND FUNDAMENTALS OF U.S. WORLD DOMINANCE
(new ed., 2003).
48
Michael Hudson, F is for FIRE Sector, MICHAEL-HUDSON.COM (Sept.
23, 2013), http://michael-hudson.com/2013/09/f-is-for-fire-sector.
49
Robin Greenwood & David Scharfstein, The Growth of Finance, 27 J.
ECON. PERSP., Spring 2013, at 3 (noting that FIRE sector growth is apparent
“[w]hether one measures the financial sector by its share of gross domestic
product, by the quantity of financial assets, by employment, or by average
wages”); Özgür Orhangazi, “Financial” vs. “Real”: An Overview of the
Contradictory Role of Finance 1 (Political Economy Research Institute,
Working Paper No. 274, 2011), available at http://www.peri.umass.edu/
fileadmin/pdf/working_papers/working_papers_251–300/WP274.pdf.
50
E.g., Reinert, supra note 27, at 7–11 (arguing that financial rents have
displaced productive rents since the 1970s, and that Veblen has been unfairly
ignored in analyzing that trend).
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that encompass business methods and the like.51 Over the same
time period, employment declined significantly in manufacturing
while increasing, albeit to a smaller degree, in the FIRE sector.52
Salaries and wages in the FIRE sector have also greatly outpaced
those in other sectors.53 Some key characteristics of the modern
economy are increased “rent based on privatized ‘common
knowledge,’ . . . the much stronger structural role of
unemployment,” and the reduction of salaried professions (experts,
administrators, public servants, doctors, lawyers, journalists,
intellectuals, artists, etc.) to subsistence on more basic wages.54
These trends are linked to what is often called the rise of a “postindustrial” economy.55 Yet for all the sociologists originally
51

BUREAU OF ECON. ANALYSIS, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, GDP BY
INDUSTRY / VA, GO, II, EMP (Dec. 15, 2011), http://www.bea.gov/industry/xls/
GDPbyInd_VA_NAICS_1947-1997.xls (containing statistics of industry value
added based on the North American Industry Classification System data). The
data illustrated in Figures 1–3 does not distinguish profits from financial
activities by nonfinancial companies, a concept discussed further below.
52
TAE-HEE JO & JOHN F. HENRY, TAKE THE MONEY AND RUN: THE
BUSINESS ENTERPRISE IN THE AGE OF MONEY MANAGER CAPITALISM 28–29
(2013), available at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/48782 (citing U.S. Bureau
of Economic Analysis data).
53
Greenwood & Scharfstein, supra note 49, at 4–5.
54
SLAVOJ ŽIŽEK, THE YEAR OF DREAMING DANGEROUSLY 8 (2012) (citing
JEAN-CLAUDE MILNER, CLARTÉS DE TOUT (2011)); see also PETER DRAHOS
WITH JOHN BRAITHWAITE, INFORMATION FEUDALISM: WHO OWNS THE
KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY? 1–3 (2002); Peter Drahos, Information Feudalism in
the Information Society, 11 INFO. SOC’Y 209 (1995), available at http://
www.anu.edu.au/fellows/pdrahos/articles/pdfs/1995infofeudinfodociety.pdf.
55
The term “post-industrial society” first arose in the 1960s to describe a
shift from a manufacturing-based economy to a more service-based economy,
and has been attributed to various commentators. See, e.g., Daniel Bell, Notes on
the Post-Industrial Society (I), 6 PUB. INT. 24 (1967), available at http://
www.nationalaffairs.com/public_interest/detail/notes-on-the-post-industrialsociety-i; ALAIN TOURAINE, THE POST INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY: TOMORROW'S
SOCIAL HISTORY (Leonard F. X. Mayhew trans., Wildwood House 1971) (1969).
It should be noted that Bell was a vocal critic of Veblen, while Touraine was,
relatively speaking, much more sympathetic. Similar terms like “information
society” also began to arise around this time. See, e.g., FRITZ MACHLUP, THE

[5:211 2014]

PATENT SUBJECT MATTER ELIGIBILITY

233

writing on the topic of the so-called “post-industrial society,” few
recognized the possible parasitic role of the FIRE sector in the
Veblenian sense.56 Certain economists working along Veblenian
lines have explored that aspect in greater detail.57 For instance,
economist Michael Hudson has said that recent circumstances
“could almost as well be called a lapse back into the pre-industrial

PRODUCTION AND DISTRIBUTION OF KNOWLEDGE IN THE UNITED STATES (1962);
YONEJI MASUDA, JOHO SHAKAI NYUMON [AN INTRODUCTION TO INFORMATION
SOCIETY] (Pelikan-sha, Tokyo 1968). Today, it is noted that “[m]ajor industrial
nations are, at the margin, moving away from the marketing of goods toward the
renting of ideas.” Robert T. Averitt, The Economics and Management of
Intellectual Property: Towards Intellectual Capitalism by Ove Granstrand, 34 J.
ECON. ISSUES 988, 989 (2000) (book review).
56
For instance, it has been shown that the present, second financial era
(following a first that overlapped with Veblen’s lifetime) had credit expansion
leading to crises and busts. Moritz Schularick & Alan M. Taylor, Credit Booms
Gone Bust: Monetary Policy, Leverage Cycles, and Financial Crises, 18702008, 102 AM. ECON. REV. 1029 (2012), available at http://www.nber.org/
papers/w15512. “More money in relation to the size of the economy means that
new money (i.e. new credit) is used mostly for buying up existing assets, not for
enhancing production capacity.” NORBERT HÄRING & NIALL DOUGLAS,
ECONOMISTS AND THE POWERFUL 79 (2012). Reference to the “post-industrial
economy” often obscures and obfuscates such data and any associated
conclusions. “The portmanteau term ‘postindustrial society’ failed to specify its
basically financial aspect . . . .” HUDSON, supra note 10, at 328; see also id. at
65, 67, 104, 156, 212, 219, 323, 410. The “post-industrial economy” is more
like a “perpetual motion machine” and “might more accurately be called a
rentier economy.” NORBERT HÄRING & NIALL DOUGLAS, ECONOMISTS AND THE
POWERFUL 212 (2012).
57
E.g., Michael Hudson, I is for Ideology, MICHAEL-HUDSON.COM (Nov.
24, 2013), http://michael-hudson.com/2013/11/i-is-for-ideology (defining
information economy as “[t]he strategy of financial populism is to convince
people that the economy’s bottom 90% are best served by pursuing policies that
favor the top 10%. Stated more bluntly, parasitism succeeds by lying.”).
Anthropologists deserve some credit here too. For instance, David Graeber
wrote a humorous article to this effect recently, discussing the rise of “bullshit
jobs,” among them administrative and finance jobs. David Graeber, On the
Phenomenon of Bullshit Jobs, STRIKE! MAGAZINE, Summer 2013, at 10–11,
available at http://www.strikemag.org/bullshit-jobs.
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usury and rent economy of European feudalism.”58 Similarly,
economist Hyman Minsky developed an alternative yet essentially
synonymous concept of “money manager capitalism” to describe a
stage arising out of welfare state capitalism that places industry in
a back seat relationship relative to finance.59 Whatever the name,
the effects are striking. As some hedge fund managers put it, “The
money that’s made from manufacturing stuff is a pittance in
comparison to the amount of money made from shuffling money
around . . . .”60 These conditions are prone to arise when there is an
58

Standard Schaefer, Who Benefited From the Tech Bubble?: An Interview
With Michael Hudson, COUNTERPUNCH (Aug. 30, 2003), http://
www.counterpunch.org/2003/08/29/who-benefited-from-the-tech-bubble-aninterview-with-michael-hudson; see also Michael Hudson, From the Bubble
Economy to Debt Deflation and Privatization, 64 REAL-WORLD ECON. REV. 21
(2013), available at http://www.paecon.net/PAEReview/issue64/whole64.pdf;
Slavoj Žižek, What Is an Authentic Political Event?, NEW STATESMAN (Feb. 12,
2014),
http://www.newstatesman.com/culture/2014/02/slavoj-zizek-whatauthentic-political-event (“[F]rom Balkan to Scandinavia, from the US to Israel,
from central Africa to India, a new Dark Age is coming, with ethnic and
religious passions exploding, and the Enlightenment values receding. These
passions were lurking in dark all the time, but what is new now is the outright
shamelessness of their display.”); Richard D. Wolff, US Political Dysfunction
and Capitalism’s Withdrawal, E-INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (Oct. 27, 2013),
http://www.e-ir.info/2013/10/27/us-political-dysfunction-and-capitalismswithdrawal (describing capitalism’s withdrawal from the “old centers” in the
United States and elsewhere); Reinert, supra note 27, at 11–15 (adopting the
term “post-industrial feudalism”); cf. VEBLEN, THE PLACE OF SCIENCE IN
MODERN CIVILISATION, supra note 29, at 13 (Russell & Russell, 1961) (1906);
DAVID MCNALLY, POLITICAL ECONOMY AND THE RISE OF CAPITALISM: A
REINTERPRETATION 3 (1990), available at http://ark.cdlib.org/ark:/13030/
ft367nb2h4 (providing a summary of the feudalist economy). A similar claim
has already been made specifically with respect to intellectual property by Peter
Drahos. DRAHOS WITH BRAITHWAITE, supra note 54; Drahos, supra note 54, at
209–10.
59
JO & HENRY, supra note 52, at 13 (citing Hyman P. Minsky, Schumpeter
and Finance, in MARKET AND INSTITUTIONS IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT:
ESSAYS IN HONOR OF SYLOS LABINI (Salvator Biasco et al. eds., 1993).
60
RAY DIALLO & AMIT SRIVASTAVA, BRIDGEWATER DAILY OBSERVATIONS,
THE MONEY SUFFLER’S VIG 1 (2004); cf. Veblen, On the Nature of Capital,
supra note 8, at 126–27 (“The dispassionate student of the current business
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imbalance between the expansion of credit versus expansion of
productive capacity, as has occurred since the early 1980s. 61 The
same happened in the 1920s during the run-up to the crash of 1929
and the Great Depression.62 Yet despite other historical periods in
which the FIRE sector was relatively large, the expansion of patent
eligibility to things like business methods only occurred with the
most recent, post-1970 FIRE sector expansion.
In the patent realm, the so-called post-industrial economy is
reflected by increasing patenting in areas of financial and other
business methods, information technology and software, and the
like.63 Such patenting tends to legitimate the activity, and to
traffic, who is not overawed by round numbers, will be more impressed by the
ease and simplicity of the maneuvers that lead to large pecuniary results in the
higher business finance than by any evidence of pre-eminent sagacity and
initiative among the pecuniary magnates [captains of industry].”); see also, e.g.,
Press Release, Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., FDIC-Insured Institutions Earned $42.2
Billion in the Second Quarter of 2013 (Aug. 29, 2013), available at http://
www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/2013/pr13075.html (explaining bank profits
rose more than ten times faster than loan growth during one quarter).
61
HÄRING & DOUGLAS, supra note 56, at 78–80 (citing RICHARD A.
WERNER, NEUE WIRTSCHAFTSPOLITIK: WAS EUROPA AUS JAPAN FEHLERN
LERNEN KANN (Vahlen 2007)). The recent phenomenon in which “banking, the
stock market and the rest of the financial sector” have become decoupled from
“the funding of new capital formation [can only] be analyzed by distinguishing
between wealth and overhead. And any such discussion rests ultimately on a
concept (or set of concepts) dividing the economy’s employment, investment
and lending into categories of ‘productive’ and ‘unproductive,’ or ‘earned’ or
‘unearned’ income.” HUDSON, supra note 10, at 67.
62
GEORGE SOULE, PROSPERITY DECADE 280–284 (1947); see also Darren
Prince, Essays in Monetary Theory and Policy: On the Nature of Banking (2),
NEW ECON. PERSP. (Dec. 23, 2013), http://neweconomicperspectives.org/2013/
12/essays-monetary-theory-policy-nature-banking-2.html.
63
See, e.g., Sara Dastgheib-Vinarov, A Higher Nonobvious Standard for
Gene Patents: Protecting Biomedical Research from the Big Chill, 4 MARQ.
INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 143, 165–68 (2000) (discussing the rise of biotech
patenting); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., ASSESSING FACTORS THAT
AFFECT PATENT INFRINGEMENT LITIGATION COULD HELP IMPROVE PATENT
QUALITY, GAO-13-465, 11–13 (2013), available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/
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displace certain other activities. As discussed below, commentators
like John Duffy and Thomas Cotter have argued that these trends
should be embraced, if only gradually, when patentability is
considered by the judiciary. But such views overlook—or turn a
blind eye toward—relationships between invidious pecuniary
activity and both economic instability and harm to the general
public good. In contrast, those who equate specific aspects of the
post-industrial economy with a resurgence of feudalism could
further see “patent trolls” (sometimes more benevolently, though
not always synonymously, called “non-practicing entities” or
“patent monetization entities”) as attempting to secure near-feudal
rent-extraction rights through patents.64 However, troll-like rent660/657103.pdf (discussing the rise in software patents, including business
method patents); John R. Allison & Emerson H. Tiller, The Business Method
Patent Myth, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 987, 991 (2003) (citing Michael J.
Meurer, Business Method Patents and Patent Floods, 8 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y
309 (2002) and Arti Rai, Addressing the Patent Gold Rush: The Role of
Deference to PTO Patent Denials, 2 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 199, 211 (2000))
(discussing the rise of software-implemented business method patents).
64
See DRAHOS WITH BRAITHWAITE, supra note 54, at 209; HUDSON, supra
note 10, at 410 (explaining that the “innovations [of today’s financial operators]
take the not-so-creative form of predatory destruction of the economy for their
own benefit . . . . Industrial technology plays little role in this post-industrial
creativity.”); see also, e.g., Cheryl Milone, Bad Patents, INTELL. PROP. ALM
SUPPLEMENT, Fall 2013, at 27–28 (distinguishing “the so-called patent troll
species of NPE, who manipulate the patent litigation process with poor-quality
patents to extort settlements from businesses . . . .”); PATENT FREEDOM,
INVESTIGATIONS INTO NPE LITIGATION INVOLVING BUSINESS METHOD PATENTS
(2013), available at https://www.patentfreedom.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/
09/NPE-Ligitations-involving-Business-Method-Patents_Sept-4-2013.pdf
(patent litigation by non-practicing entities increasingly involves “business
method” patents, reaching approximately 41% in 2011–2012). The present
author sometimes jokingly refers to this as the “Spanish method,” with patent
trolls akin to Spanish conquistadors simply planting a flag to claim vast tracts of
land—or in this case, “inventive” subject matter—solely on the basis of a desire
for resource (or economic rent) extraction, their “contribution” beginning and
ending with the act of planting the flag on territory that already exists. See
Austen Zuege, A New Era for Patent-Eligible Subject Matter, INTELL. PROP.
TODAY, May 2012, at 21. Data from the firm RPX indicates that approximately
25% of patent infringement defendants were sued by patent assertion entities in
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seeking patent activity is widespread, extending far beyond merely
non-practicing entities. In this sense, asserting claims for “business
methods” and the like, in which patent eligibility is questionable,
resembles the actions of feudal lords, who owned no means of
production but through social privilege extracted rent from those
who did.65 In much the same way, patents on financial and
business activities in an era when credit expansion outpaces
increases in productive capacity magnify the imbalances caused by
private control of credit creation and access, placing productive
industry at a further disadvantage vis-à-vis the financial sector.66
The important point here, as elaborated below, is that pressure to
expand patent eligibility is linked to the sorts of social contexts
Veblen highlighted, in which general welfare is disadvantaged by a
prevalence of invidious pecuniary activities over productive ones.
Such a Veblenian analysis suggests that recent trends are less about
technological innovation bringing forth a truly post-industrial
society and more about pecuniary activity parasitically displacing
real production in much same the way Veblen warned about so
long ago. Yet those economic factors have existed before albeit
without patent eligibility expansion. Therefore, we eventually turn
to a discussion of how those domestic economic factors coincided
with trends in intra-company management, shifts in global trade
and industrialization, and a period of judicial expansion of patent
eligibility triggered by the rise of (ostensibly) productive
technologies like biotechnology and computer software.

recent years. United States Government Accountability Office, supra note 63, at
17 n.36. The term “patent assertion entity” focuses “on entities whose business
model solely focuses on asserting typically purchased patents.” Id. at 2 n. 6.
65
MCNALLY, supra note 58.
66
See Wray, supra note 13, at 618 (noting Veblen’s observation that the
credit economy tends to dominate over the goods economy in the normal
course); see also HUDSON, supra note 10, at 156 (“If economic evolution is to
reflect the inner logic and requirements of society’s technological capabilities,
then finance capital must be subordinated to serve the economy, not be
permitted to master and stifle it.”).
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Figure 3
C. Blurring of Lines
The relative performance of different economic sectors is only
part of the story. There have also been changes within certain
sectors that tend to blur the lines between the FIRE and
manufacturing sectors. Traditional (real) industry has, in recent
times, fitfully moved into financial operations, which began to
represent a significant source of profits.67 Prominent recent
examples are General Electric (“GE”) and General Motors

67

DAVID HARVEY, THE ENIGMA OF CAPITAL AND THE CRISES OF
CAPITALISM 23 (2010) (“From the 1980s onwards reports have periodically
surfaced suggesting that many large nonfinancial corporations were making
more money out of their financial operations than they were out of making
things.”); see also Michael Hudson, Trade and Payments Theory in a
Financialized Economy, MICHAEL-HUDSON.COM (Oct. 26, 2011), http://
michael-hudson.com/2011/10/trade-theory-financialized; JO & HENRY, supra
note 52, at 27.
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Acceptance Corporation (“GMAC,” now Ally Financial).68 “[T]he
the most significant development for GE in the last twenty years
has been the expansion of the financial arm of the company - GE
Capital, which includes GE Commercial Finance, GE Consumer
Finance, GE Equipment Services, GE Insurance, and GE Energy
Financial Services. General Electric [in 2010] derive[d] half of its
revenue from financial services.”69 “Even corporations that did not
set up a financial branch still actively engage in financial
operations.”70 Those efforts were significant. Financial trading
“manipulations often decide the profits of the entire corporation.”71
These economic changes have shifted funding for research and
development. Economist Özgür Orhengazi studied the
financialization of the U.S. economy since about 1970, and found
empirical evidence suggesting that financial activities have
displaced research and development within ostensibly nonfinancial
companies.72 This suggests that in the larger economy, financial
68

Our Company, GECAPITAL.COM, http://www.gecapital.com/en/ourcompany/company-overview.html (last visited Aug. 21, 2013); Our History,
ALLY.COM, at http://www.ally.com/about/company-structure/history (last visited
Aug. 21, 2013).
69
Pao-yu Ching, Challenging the Conventional Wisdom on the Causes and
Cures of the Current Economic Crisis, INST. FOR POL. ECON. J. (July 2010),
http://
politicaleconomy.info/index2.php?option=com_content&do_pdf=1&id=46.
70
Id.
71
Id.; see also Robert R. Locke, Managerialism and the Demise of the Big
Three, 51 REAL-WORLD ECON. REV. 28, 38, 43 (2009), available at http://
www.paecon.net/PAEReview/issue51/Locke51.pdf;
Hyman
P.
Minsky,
Schumpeter and Finance, in MARKET AND INSTITUTIONS IN ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF SYLOS LABINI 111–13 (Salvator Biasco et
al. eds., 1993).
72
Özgür Orhangazi, Financialisation and Capital Accumulation in the
Non-Financial Corporate Sector: A Theoretical and Empirical Investigation on
the US Economy: 1973–2003, 32 CAMBRIDGE J. ECON. 863 (2008) (econometric
study finding support for the theory that increasing financialization of
nonfinancial companies NFCs “impeded real investment by allocating funds
away from real investment and by shortening the planning horizons of the
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activities are presently displacing technological ones. This affects a
balance between financial companies and ostensibly nonfinancial
companies, but also the balance of power within ostensibly
nonfinancial companies. After the economy became financialized,
“corporations were now run by accountants rather than by
engineers . . . .”73 Historically, “[e]ngineers on the shop floors and
in the manufacturing divisions of M-form [multidivisional]
corporations made artifacts. Top management, in which controllers
trained in accounting increasingly replaced the engineers, thought
about money, that is, about constantly improving return-oninvestment.”74 These changes naturally supported a growth in
financial activity.
Even when engineers still ran large
corporations—like GE’s former CEO Jack Welch, a trained
chemical engineer—they often displaced technical innovation with
an emphasis on financial speculation.75 In such a context, the
business planning cycle tends to become too short to produce
expected monetary returns through investment in research and
development effort directed toward technological advancements in
making artifacts, in comparison to financial actions like mergers
and acquisitions, stock buy-backs, etc.76 For those and other
[NFCs.]”); see also ÖZGÜR ORHANGAZI, FINANCIALIZATION AND THE US
ECONOMY (Edward Elgar ed. 2008); William Lazonick, The Financialization of
the U.S. Corporation: What Has Been Lost, and How It Can Be Regained, 36
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 857, 859–60, 870 (2013); Costas Lapavistas, Theorizing
Financialization, 25 WORK, EMPLOYMENT & SOCIETY 611, 620 (2011).
73
HARVEY, supra note 67.
74
ROBERT LOCKE & J.C. SPENDER, CONFRONTING MANAGERIALISM: HOW
THE BUSINESS ELITE AND THEIR SCHOOLS THREW OUR LIVES OUT OF BALANCE
5 (2011). “[I]ndustrial firms have been turned into essentially financial entities
since the 1980s.” HUDSON, supra note 10, at 104. “Corporate industry has been
taken over so thoroughly by the financial sector that there is little industrial
voice left as such.” Id. at 65.
75
JEFF MADRICK, AGE OF GREED: THE TRIUMPH OF FINANCE AND THE
DECLINE OF AMERICA, 1970 TO THE PRESENT 185–201 (2012).
76
William Lazonick has suggested, for instance, that pharmaceutical
companies have used inflated drug prices to engage in stock buybacks rather
than R&D expenditures. Lazonick, supra note 72, at 896–97; see also Fred
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reasons, financial speculation is being substituted, to some degree,
for investment in technology research and development (i.e.,
investment in the growth of productivity and the “real” economy).
Patent attorneys may be aware of this phenomenon, if only
obliquely. As the balance of power shifts within a given corporate
setting, “inventors” start to come from outside engineering
departments and pressure is exerted to have patent applications
omit technical details that are often not understood by “inventors”
from non-engineering sales and management departments.77 All
this is in line with Veblen’s original theories. He noted the blurring
of the relationship “between workmanship and salesmanship,”
complaining that “much of what appears on the books as
production-cost should properly be charged to the production of
saleable appearances.”78
D. Global Implications
Financial and business endeavors take a privileged position is
certain international negotiations. The United States and other
North Atlantic states (the “Global North”) identify key parts of the
Block, Relational Work and the Law: Recapturing the Legal Realist Critique of
Market Fundamentalism, 40 J.L. & SOC’Y 27, 44–47 (2013); F. Block & M.
Keller, Where Do Innovations Come From? Transformations in the US
Economy, 1970–2006, 7 SOCIO-ECONOMIC REV. 459 (2009); Lynne L. Dallas,
Short-Termism, the Financial Crisis, and Corporate Governance, 37 J. CORP. L.
265, 279 (2012). IBM, General Electric Co., Microsoft Corp. and other
companies have also been identified as promoting similar policies. HUDSON,
supra note 10, at 253-54. Of course, patenting is not an exact measure of
invention, and innovative activity varies widely across industries.
77
Add to this the growing trend that software companies’ “core consumer
product is now advertising.” Darwin Bond-Graham, Iron Cagebook: The
Logical End of Facebook's Patents, COUNTERPUNCH (Dec. 3, 2013), http://
www.counterpunch.org/2013/12/03/iron-cagebook. Bond-Graham actually
refers to the “tech industry” to describe the software industry, part of a troubling
trend whereby the two terms are treated as synonymous, sometimes even going
so far as to cast out things like roads, vehicles, and other artifacts from the scope
of the term “technology.”
78
THORSTEIN VEBLEN, ABSENTEE OWNERSHIP AND BUSINESS ENTERPRISE
IN RECENT TIMES: THE CASE OF AMERICA, 300 (1923).
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FIRE sector together with pharmaceutical, information technology,
agro-chemical and entertainment sectors as their core growth
engines today, with active efforts to protect comparative
advantages in global trade negotiations, such as in the Uruguay
Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(“GATT”).79 “Offshoring” of industrial production since the early
1970s had presented a glaring gap in the traditional economic
growth engines tied to industrial production, and treaties such as
The Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights (“TRIPS”) were negotiated with an eye toward preventing
states of the Global South (i.e., the nations of Africa, Central and
Latin America, and most of Asia) from advancing—by
leapfrogging otherwise necessary intermediate technological
stepping stones—in the Global North’s key growth sectors and
thereby undermining the illusions of the North Atlantic states’
comparative advantages.80 This is a function of industrialization
79

VIJAY PRASHAD, THE POORER NATIONS: A POSSIBLE HISTORY OF THE
GLOBAL SOUTH 105–11 (2012); see also Valéria Guimarães de Lima e Silva,
How to Reshape Treaties without Negotiations: Intellectual Property
Enforcement as a Case Study of Global Governance by Stealth, OXFORD
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RESEARCH CENTRE 13 (Apr. 16, 2013), http://
denning.law.ox.ac.uk/news/events_files/
Paper_IP_enforcement_VS_NYU_Global_Fellows_Forum_2013.pdf. For a
critique of the foundations of the classical, Ricardian theory of comparative
advantage, see Reinhard Schumacher, Deconstructing the Theory of
Comparative Advantage, 2 WORLD ECON. REV. 83 (2013), available at http://
wer.worldeconomicsassociation.org/article/download/59/41 (pointing out flaws
in the theoretical foundations of trade liberalization embodied in WTO
processes).
80
PRASHAD, supra note 79, at 105–11, 180–93; DRAHOS WITH
BRAITHWAITE, supra note 54, at 36 (noting the incongruity of including
provisions for the protection of creative monopolies that benefit North Atlantic
states in treaties ostensibly about global trade liberalization, and that states use
patent systems to cloak protectionist policies); Drahos, supra note 54, at 212;
see also MICHAEL HARDT & ANTONIO NEGRI, EMPIRE 284–89 (2000); NOAM
CHOMSKY, YEAR 501: THE CONQUEST CONTINUES 112–17 (1993); cf. THE
CHALLENGE OF THE SOUTH: THE REPORT OF THE SOUTH COMMISSION 109–13
(1990).
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occurring beyond the confines of the states in the Global North.
The use of patents by governments, and multi-national companies,
in promoting trade imbalances is well-explored.81 Indeed, an
analysis of the TRIPS agreement evidences the strong influence of
the Intellectual Property Group (“IPC”), comprised mainly of
pharma, software and entertainment industry representatives, on
the TRIPS negotiations, which resulted in efforts to enshrine
existing trade imbalances against potential disruption by
newcomers.82 Moreover, recent efforts of U.S. trade negotiators
have pushed in the direction of expanding protections on sectors of
comparative advantage that center around “business methods,”
pharma, and the like.83 Such efforts are thrown into sometimes
81

RONALDO FIANI, VEBLEN AND PATENTS: AN ASSESSMENT OF THE
STRATEGY OF MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES FOR PROTECTING INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS 8–9, available at http://www.academia.edu/3025654/
Veblen_and_Patents_An_assessment_of_the_strategy_of_multinational_enterpri
ses_for_protecting_intellectual_property_rights (last visited May 31, 2013) (“for
Veblen . . . pecuniary motives do not work in the mainstream economics ideal
world of perfect competition, but in the real world [of] competition where any
expedient provided by social institutions to assure an advantage in competition
will be taken.”).
82
Id. at 1–3, 15–17; DRAHOS WITH BRAITHWAITE, supra note 54.
83
Leaked drafts of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) treaty negotiations
by the United States show attempts to expand patent-eligible subject matter to
encompass protections for abstract concepts such as business methods, medical/
surgical procedures and the like, though the United States did abandon some
hardline positions during negotiations. TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP IP GROUP
COUNTRY
NEGOTIATORS,
TRANS-PACIFIC
PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT:
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY [RIGHTS] CHAPTER, ART. QQ.E.1 (Aug. 30, 2013),
https://wikileaks.org/tpp/static/pdf/Wikileaks-secret-TPP-treaty-IP-chapter.pdf
(“(a) patents shall be available for any new uses or methods of using a known
product, (b) a Party may not deny a patent solely on the basis that the product
did not result in enhanced efficacy of the known product when the applicant has
set forth distinguishing features establishing that the invention is new, involves
an inventive step, and is capable of industrial application.”) (emphasis added);
Trans-Pacific Partnership Intellectual Property Rights ch. 20, art. 8, §1, (Feb. 10,
2011),
available
at
http://keepthewebopen.com/assets/pdfs/
TPP%20IP%20Chapter%20Proposal.pdf; Secret Trans-Pacific Partnership
Agreement (TPP), WIKILEAKS (Nov. 13, 2013), https://wikileaks.org/tpp/
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stark contrast to the sorts of efforts taken by delegations from
lesser-developed nations of the Global South, who often seek
technology transfer, including “technologies” impacting finance
and business management.84 It seems clear that one aspect of
pressrelease.html (noting that “[n]umerous key Pacific Rim and nearby nations –
including Argentina, Ecuador, Colombia, South Korea, Indonesia, the
Philippines and, most significantly, Russia and China – have not been involved
in the drafting of the [TPP] treaty.”); James Love, KEI analysis of Wikileaks
leak of TPP IPR text, from August 30, 2013 (Nov. 13, 2013), http://
www.keionline.org/node/1825 (“An interesting example of how the US seeks to
change national and global norms are the provisions in the TPP over patents on
surgical methods. The WTO permits countries to exclude ‘diagnostic,
therapeutic and surgical methods for the treatment of humans or animals.’ The
US wants to flip this provision, so that ‘may also exclude from patentability’
becomes ‘shall make patents available.’”); TPP Exposed: WikiLeaks Publishes
Secret Trade Text to Rewrite Copyright Laws, Limit Internet Freedom
DEMOCRACY NOW! (Nov. 14, 2013) (interviewing Lori Wallach), http://
www.democracynow.org/2013/11/14/
tpp_exposed_wikileaks_publishes_secret_trade (Characterizing the TPP IP
chapter as being directed to “rent seeking—governments being lobbied by
special interests to set up special rules that give them monopolies to charge
higher prices.”); Risks of the Trans-Pacific Free Trade Agreement for Access to
Medicines, Briefing Memo: Analysis of the Leaked U.S. Paper on Eliminating
Patent Pre-Grant Opposition, PUBLIC. CITIZEN (July 7, 2011), https://
www.citizen.org/documents/analysis-of-leaked-US-paper-on-eliminatingpregrant-opposition.pdf (arguing that U.S. proposals target Indian practices that
curtail pharmaceutical patents). Although the leaked drafts still require
“industrial applicability” for patent eligibility, the fact that Mexico proposed to
explicitly exclude from patentability “the diagrams, plans, rules and methods for
carrying out mental processes, playing games or doing business, and
mathematical methods as such; software as such; methods to present information
as such; and aesthetic creations and artistic or literary works” highlights how
little agreement exists on what constitutes “industrial applicability” or
“usefulness.” As will be clearer in view of the discussion below, the draft terms
of the TPP are very anti-Veblenian.
84
See, e.g., Local Production of Pharmaceuticals and Related Technology
Transfer in Developing Countries, UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE
AND DEVELOPMENT (Sept. 19, 2012), http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/
diaepcb2011d7_en.pdf; STATEMENT ON THE URUGUAY ROUND: ADOPTED BY THE
SOUTH COMMISSION, AT ITS THIRD MEETING, COCOYOC, MEXICO 10 (1988)
(discussing “advances in corporate and financial management technologies”).
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contemporary international trade relations is a belief that the
United States can maintain its global position by imposing control
on industry located abroad through control of global banking and
finance, and ongoing trade negotiations have taken small steps to
facilitate and cement such imbalances through patents. In other
words, the U.S. strategy is to siphon off surpluses from productive
industry located abroad for the benefit of the domestic FIRE
sector.85 How this strategy benefits the general domestic
population, outside the FIRE sector, is scarcely discussed. But,
significantly, it departs from the long-standing policies in the
United States designed—at least on their face—to promote
industry through the patent system for the general public good.
IV. CHANGING JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS
A. Historical Overview
Standards on patentable subject matter have changed
dramatically through recent years without statutory (or
constitutional) changes.86 The most substantive change in the
85

See BOURDIEU, supra note 40, at 226–27; Karl Fitzgerald, Trade
Advantage Replaced by Rent Extraction, interview with Michael Hudson (Dec.
17, 2013), http://www.prosper.org.au/2013/12/17/the-road-to-unearned-income
(“You have really a financialisation of everybody’s income and it’s a rent theory
of international trade instead of a cost of production theory of international trade
competitiveness.”).
86
Rajnish Kumar Rai and Srinath Jagannathan, Do Business Method
Patents Encourage Innovation, B.C. INTELL. PROP. & TECH. FORUM 2–3 (2012),
available at http://bciptf.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/Business-MethodPatents-and-Innovation.pdf (summarizing the historical business method
exemption doctrine, followed by the expansion of patent subject matter
eligibility in the 1980s and 1990s, culminating in the effective elimination of the
business method exemption doctrine). The authors accurately summarize the
changes in patentable subject matter in broad strokes, but mistake the holding of
the eBay case as being a ruling on patentable subject matter, when that question
was not before the court—mentioned only in passing by Justice Kennedy in a
concurrence. It is nonetheless noted that, as summarized by Rai and
Jagannathan, the history of judicial expansion of patentable subject matter
standards corresponds quite closely with the rise of the neoliberal era and the
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patent laws came in 1952. Although the Leahy-Smith America
Invents Act of 2011 did reshape the patent laws, patent-eligible
subject matter and the strictures of 35 U.S.C. § 101 were left
untouched.87 Recent transformations in the analysis of patenteligible subject matters have been almost entirely judiciallydriven—with some administrative influence exerted by patent
office bureaucrats. The high water mark for broad patent eligibility
was when the Federal Circuit issued the State Street Bank decision
in 1998, indicating that business methods could be patentable.88
The Supreme Court has weighed in to try to address the issue, but
thus far only in limited areas that have barely scratched the surface
of the problem. Most emblematic of the ideological struggles
among the judiciary is the en banc ruling in the CLS Bank v. Alice
case,89 in which the Federal Circuit, the circuit court with exclusive
jurisdiction over appeals involving patent law, was unable to find
majority support for a cohesive methodology to analyze patent-

change in the makeup of the U.S economy described above. There are a
voluminous number of articles summarizing historical trends in patent-eligible
subject matter jurisprudence. See, e.g., John R. Thomas, The Patenting of the
Liberal Professions, 40 B.C. L. REV. 1139, 1142–63 (1999); Irwin, supra note 9,
at 788–89. However, the role of the 1952 patent law codification has been seen
as a driver of patentable subject matter expansion, because the 1952 statutes
may have rejected longstanding values underpinning the constitutional, statutory
and judicial bases for the patent system. Id. at 782–810.
87
See, e.g., Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, H.R. 1249, 112th Cong. §
18(e) (2011).
88
State Street Bank and Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, Inc., 149
F. 3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998). In large part State Street Bank was instrumental in
using the language of the 1952 patent law statutory codification, as well as the
Chakrabarty and Diehr decisions of the Supreme Court, to justify ignoring the
great weight of precedent finding business methods to be nonpatentable subject
matter. A Patent Office case that took a similarly broad view of patent eligibility
was Ex parte Lundgren, 76 USPQ.2d 1385, (B.P.A.I. 2005) (per curiam).
89
CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd., 717 F.3d 1269 (Fed. Cir. 2013)
(en banc) (per curiam), cert. granted, 82 U.S.L.W. 3131 (U.S. Dec. 6, 2013)
(No. 13–298).
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eligible subject matter.90 There was, for a long time, judicial
consensus that business methods were not patentable.91 However,
as technologies developed in the Twentieth Century, particularly
ones such as biotechnology and computer software,92 courts began
to expand the scope of patent-eligible subject matter93—some
might say haphazardly—and eventually the Federal Circuit
unilaterally lifted the long-established ban on patenting business
methods.94 However, in this era of expanding technological
development, the courts continued a rather open-ended expansion
of patent eligibility in what might be seen as rather unprincipled
ways. Judges opened the doors to new technologies by tweaking
the tests applied for subject matter eligibility to accommodate
some but not other endeavors, and in some instances lost sight of
core policies that seem to have been taken for granted since the
first patent statutes were passed in the United States. Not
surprising, the judicial expansion of patent eligibility to business
methods came precisely at a time when the economic clout of the
90

Michael S. Borella & Rory P. Shea, Not Just a Flook?: Consideration of
Prior Art When Evaluating Subject Matter Eligibility, INTELL. PROP. TODAY,
Sept. 2013, at 19 (summarizing the CLS Bank plurality, concurring, and
dissenting opinions).
91
Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3232, 3239–46 (2010) (Stevens, J.,
concurring); Irwin, supra note 86, at 794–95.
92
Sara Dastgheib-Vinarov, A Higher Nonobvious Standard for Gene
Patents: Protecting Biomedical Research from the Big Chill, 4 MARQ. INTELL.
PROP. L. REV. 143, 165–68 (2000) (providing evidence for the rise of biotech
patenting since the 1990s); U.S. Gov. Account. Office, supra note 63, (the
number of software patents, including business method patents, has risen
dramatically since the early 1990s and surpassed all other types of patents in
2011, though the numbers of nonsoftware patents has also increased over that
same time period); Allison & Tiller, supra note 63, at 991 (noting surge of
software-implemented business method patenting from the late 1990s).
93
Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981); Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447
U.S. 303 (1980); In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
94
State Street Bank and Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, Inc., 149
F. 3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Ex parte Lundgren, 76 USPQ.2d 1385 (B.P.A.I.
2005) (per curiam).
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FIRE sector surpassed that of the manufacturing sector.95 These
long-term changes eventually divorced the particular patent
eligibility tests from whatever widely (if only tacitly) accepted
ideological foundations they may have once had, particularly
before the 1952 patent law codification.96 In order to identify a
possible new footing, or even restore the old footing, it will be
helpful to first elucidate some of the competing theories.
Numerous articles have attempted to describe historical
examples of “business method” patents granted by the USPTO
decades or centuries before the modern business method patent
debate began.97 However, the isolated nature of those exceptions
tends to prove the rule that business methods were historically
deemed non-patentable subject matter. But the possibility that in
isolated incidences USPTO examiners have allowed patents to
non-patentable subject matter should be no more controversial than
to say that in some instances examiners have improvidently
95

See supra Parts III.B-C.
“The [1952] Act did not address the [historical patent eligibility]
exclusions—either to codify or to eliminate them.” Irwin, supra note 9, at 804;
see also Colin P. Marks, Opening the Door to Business Methods: State Street
Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, Inc., 37 HOUS. L. REV. 923,
934 (2000) (“The omission of excludable material makes the statute problematic
when considering business methods.”). In contrast, such exclusions from patent
eligibility are explicit under European practice. Convention on the Grant of
European Patents art. 52, Oct. 5, 1973, 1065 U.N.T.S. 199, art. 52 (“The
following in particular shall not be regarded as inventions . . . schemes, rules and
methods for performing mental acts, playing games or doing business, and
programs for computers”).
97
See, e.g., John R. Thomas, The Post-Industrial Patent System, 10
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 3, 8–27 (1999); James S. Sfekas,
Controlling Business Method Patents: How the Japanese Standard for Patenting
Software Could Bring Reasonable Limitations to Business Method Patents in the
United States, 16 PACIFIC RIM L. & POL. J. 197, 201–03 (2007); In re Comiskey,
554 F.3d 967, 975–80 (Fed. Cir. 2009); see also Michael Risch, America’s First
Patents, 64 FLA. L. REV. 1279 (2012) (giving examples of business method
patents from the early patent registration system, before pre-grant examination
of claims was introduced).
96
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allowed claims over prior art under the novelty and nonobviousness strictures of 35 U.S.C. §§ 102 and 103 or where
enablement was lacking under 35 U.S.C. § 112.98
A brief review of the most significant judicial precedents on
patent subject matter eligibility is instructive in understanding the
framework of current challenges. First, it is noted that exemptions
from patent eligibility have long been recognized. A key
formulation of the judicially-created exceptions from patent
eligibility is that “[p]henomena of nature, though just discovered,
mental processes, and abstract intellectual concepts are not
patentable, as they are the basic tools of scientific and
technological work.”99 A review of selected precedents in this area
shows clear limits imposed to restrict the permissible breadth of
patents, and the shaping of patent eligibility tests by concern over
naked attempts at rent-seeking that lack an associated contribution
to a collective pool knowledge of technological proficiency.
B. Relative Consistency in Supreme Court Decisions
The Supreme Court has been fairly consistent in its views on
patent eligibility. The articulation of the standards has evolved and
changed, and fell into some disorder in a few early 1980s cases,
but something akin to the “preemption” doctrine has been applied
since at least the Nineteenth Century. Without wishing to burden
98

In re Miller 418 F.2d 1392 (C.C.P.A. 1969) (Rich, acting C.J.); accord In
re Chatfield, 545 F.2d 152, 157 (C.C.P.A. 1976); In re Gulack, 703 F.2d 1381
(Fed. Cir. 1983), described a necessity for a functional relationship between
printed matter and a substrate to meet the patentable subject matter requirements
of § 101, that did not stop the USTPO from issuing a utility patent for
“Religious Soap,” which claimed “1. A bar of soap which is embossed with
religious markings.” U.S. Patent No. 3,936,384 (filed Jan. 14, 1975).
99
Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972); see also Mayo
Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S.Ct. 1289, 1293 (2012)
(“‘[L]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas’ are not patentable.”)
(quoting Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981)). Business method
(including medical treatment) and software inventions are generally analyzed as
a question of whether they relate to an unpatentable “abstract idea.”
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readers with extensive review of precedents, a select number of
Supreme Court cases are summarized here.100
The 1852 decision in Le Roy v. Tatham, involving a patent to
pipe forming machinery, held that “[a] principle, in the abstract, is
a fundamental truth; an original cause; a motive; these cannot be
patented, as no one can claim in either of them an exclusive
right.”101 But more importantly, the Court said that “[a] patent is
not good for an effect, or the result of a certain process, as that
would prohibit all other persons from making the same thing by
any means whatsoever.”102 Le Roy established a bedrock concept
for all later patent eligibility cases by stating that claims cannot be
framed so broadly and abstractly as to merely recite a result.103
Similarly, O’Reilly v. Morse struck down a claim that sought to
100

For further summaries, see Thomas F. Morrow, Challenging Patent
Subject Matter Eligibility in Patent Litigation, STATE BAR OF TEXAS, 26TH
ANNUAL ADVANCED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW COURSE 1–12 (Feb. 14–15,
2013), available at http://www.yettercoleman.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/
Challenging-Subject-Matter-Eligibility-In-Patent-Litigation.pdf; see also Bilski
v. Kappos, 130 S.Ct. 3218, 3239-52 (2009),
101
55 U.S. (14 How.) 156, 175 (1852). The syllabus of the Court’s opinion
restates the claim language at issue: “What we claim as our invention and desire
to secure by letters patent is the combination of the following parts, above
described, to-wit, the core and bridge, or guide piece, the chamber, and the die,
when used to form pipes of metal under heat and pressure in the manner set
forth or in any other manner substantially the same.” Id. at 171 (emphasis
added).
102
Le Roy, 55 U.S. at 175.
103
This idea of prohibiting claims directed merely to a result or effect is
fundamental to later Supreme Court cases, but it is not embodied in the present
patent statutes or even guidelines for patent examination promulgated by the
USPTO. In contrast, other jurisdictions, such as Europe, explicitly prohibit
result-based claiming by way of regulations that require: “As a general rule,
claims which attempt to define the invention by a result to be achieved should
not be allowed, in particular if they only amount to claiming the underlying
technical problem.” GUIDELINES FOR EXAMINATION IN THE EUROPEAN PATENT
OFFICE pt. F, ch. IV, § 4.10 (rev. ed. 2013). Yet the mere fact that other
jurisdictions prohibit this type of claiming is insufficient to explain why such
prohibitions are important, which is where a Veblenian perspective is helpful.
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provide monopoly protection over future inventions involving
electrical or galvanic current to transmit signals:104 “[W]hile he
shuts the door against inventions of other persons, the patentee
would be able to avail himself of new discoveries in the properties
and powers of electro-magnetism which scientific men might bring
to light. . . . The court is of opinion that the claim is too broad . . .
.”105 Yet again, the Court in Morse was concerned with claim
breadth.
Tilghman v. Proctor dealt with a process claim used to separate
compounds from fatty bodies using water at high temperatures and
pressures.106 The Court found Tilghman’s claim patentable, but in
reaching that conclusion noted that different processes for
achieving the same effect as that claimed by Tilghman were known
in the prior art and that Tilghman himself disclosed an unclaimed
lower temperature variation capable of achieving the same
result.107 Importantly, the Court’s rationale mirrored that in Le Roy
and Morse by finding that the claim language at issue was written
narrowly enough to correspond to the actual invention and did not
prevent others from utilizing different processes to achieve the
same result.

104

Claim 8 of Morse’s patent read: “Eighth. I do not propose to limit myself
to the specific machinery or parts of machinery described in the foregoing
specifications and claims, the essence of my invention being the use of the
motive power of the electric or galvanic current, which I call electro-magnetism,
however developed, for making or printing intelligible characters, letters, or
signs, at any distances, being a new application of that power, of which I claim
to be the first inventor or discoverer.” O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62,
86 (1854) (emphasis added).
105
Id. at 113.
106
Tilghman v. Proctor, 102 U.S. 707 (1880). There was only one claim in
the patent-in-suit: “Having now described the nature of my said invention and
the manner of performing the same, I hereby declare that I claim as of my
invention the manufacturing of fat acids and glycerine from fatty bodies by the
action of water at a high temperature and pressure.” Id. at 709.
107
Id. at 710, 720–22.
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Additionally, in Marchand v. Emken, the Court considered a
patent directed to mechanizing a known process for making
hydrogen peroxide.108
The question, then, seems to be narrowed down
to this: Does it constitute invention to stir, by a
well-known and simple mechanical device, what
had before been stirred by hand? The complainant
desired to manufacture in large quantities what had
before been produced chiefly in the laboratory. He
knew how hydrogen peroxide had been made; every
step in the formula was familiar. A mixture that
needed stirring, and a vessel provided with a
revolving stirrer, were ready at his hand. He put the
former into the latter. This was all. The object of
agitating the liquid while making hydrogen
peroxide, is to keep the barium, which is three times
as heavy as water, suspended in the acid, so that its
particles may come in contact with the particles of
acid. Whether they come in contact while going
round, rising, settling, or remaining stationary can
make no difference. Divest the case of the air of
mystery with which it is environed, and it seems
simple enough. The complainant's predecessors
knew that to keep the barium up in the solution they
must stir it. The complainant knew this. Unlike
them, however, he manufactured on a scale large
enough to make it essential to employ a power
108

Claim 1 of U.S. Patent No. 273,569 read: “1. The method of making
hydrogen peroxide by cooling the acid solution, imparting thereto a continuous
movement of rotation, as well in vertical as in horizontal planes—such, for
example, as imparted by a revolving screw in a receptacle—and adding to said
acid solution the binoxide in small quantities, while maintaining the low
temperature and the rotary or eddying movements, substantially as described.”
U.S. Patent No. 273,569 (filed Aug. 2, 1882); Marchand v. Emken, 132 U.S.
195, 198 (1889).
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shaft.109
The Court answered the patentability question in the negative:
There is here no sufficient foundation upon
which to rest a claim which, if construed as broadly
as the complainant insists it should be, practically
makes all pay tribute who stir the mixture in
question by machinery, and by hand also, provided
substantially the same movement can be produced
by hand-stirring, and this seems to be a disputed
question upon the proof. The complainant's claim to
be enrolled upon the list of inventors is based upon
propositions too theoretical and visionary for
acceptance.110
Without discussion, the Court held that on the “disputed
question upon the proof,” the mixture could be stirred by hand in
the same manner as with machinery.111 In essence, the claim was
struck down because it would have given too broad a patent
monopoly, one not tied to an inventive contribution to an
underlying technical problem. The Court found it impermissible to
patent the use of conventional machinery for large-scale
109

Id. at 199 (emphasis added).
Id at 200; see also In re Rundell, 48 F.2d 958 (C.C.P.A. 1931); cf.
CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1375 (Fed. Cir.
2011) (explaining that the incidental use of a computer to perform a mental
process does not impose a sufficiently meaningful limit on claim scope to confer
patent eligibility); SiRF Tech., Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 601 F.3d 1319, 1333
(Fed. Cir. 2010) (“In order for the addition of a machine to impose a meaningful
limit on the scope of a claim [to render the claim patent-eligible], it must play a
significant part in permitting the claimed method to be performed, rather than
function solely as an obvious mechanism for permitting a solution to be
achieved more quickly, i.e., through the utilization of a computer for performing
calculations.”).
111
Marchand, 132 U.S. at 200 (affirming the circuit court’s decision on the
factual question).
110
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commercialization of a known process, while still accepting that
large-scale commercialization of the particular process had not
previously been accomplished. But the Court’s rationale goes
further to say that the abstract concept (“theoretical and
visionary”112 ideas) that there are economies of scale associated
with mechanization within the field of endeavor at hand (making
hydrogen peroxide) is ineligible for patent protection.
Turning to relatively more modern cases, Funk Brothers Seed
Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co. reasoned that devising saleable
packaging—in that case for “the aggregation of select strains of . . .
several species” of inoculants—did not confer patent eligibility.113
The emphasis on “application of the law of nature to a new and
useful end” for patent eligibility resembles a requirement for an
economically productive technical contribution,114 a concept
discussed in detail below.115 The Funk Brothers opinion took a
very strict view of what constitutes mere saleable packaging
because the claimed invention sought to reduce a mutually
inhibitive effect that different strains root nodule bacteria used as
inoculants were previously thought to exert on each other.116
Though given a fair reading, there may be some merit to the
argument that an aggregation of inoculants provided no new
productive benefit but only a pecuniary benefit in how inoculants
were sold to end users. Although unfortunately not discussed in the
Funk Brothers opinion, it is significant that the claims at issue used
a negative limitation to provide preemptive coverage of a result
without limits as to the particular combinations of non-inhibitive
strains actually discovered (i.e., the essential element of the
inventive solution to the underlying technical problem). Claim 4
was illustrative: “An inoculant for leguminous plants comprising a
112

Id.
Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U. S. 127, 131 (1948).
114
Id. at 130.
115
See infra Part IV.
116
Funk Bros., 333 U.S. at 130.
113
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plurality of selected mutually non-inhibitive strains of different
species of bacteria of the genus Rhizobium, said strains being
unaffected by each other in respect to their ability to fix nitrogen in
the leguminous plant for which they are specific.”117 In
concurrence, Justice Frankfurter helpfully suggested that the
patentee’s problem was the failure to claim particular combinations
of bacterial strains that produced the non-inhibitive effect and that
reciting the particular strains of bacteria might have made a claim
patent-eligible.118 The Funk Brothers opinion did not articulate a
definitive standard for establishing patent eligibility, but it is an
important case in highlighting how aggressively broad claiming is
a problem that the Supreme Court has traditionally chosen to
address as a question of patent subject matter eligibility. Although
frequently viewed by patent practitioners as overly restrictive, the
Funk Brothers opinion was a piece with long-standing Supreme
Court precedent.119
In Gottshalk v. Benson, Justice Douglas analyzed claims to a
method for converting binary-coded decimal (BCD) numerals into
pure binary numerals on a general purpose digital computer in his
famous “nutshell” comment:
It is conceded that one may not patent an idea.
But in practical effect that would be the result if the
formula for converting BCD numerals to pure
binary numerals were patented in this case. The
mathematical formula involved here has no
substantial practical application except in
connection with a digital computer, which means
that if the judgment below is affirmed, the patent
would wholly pre-empt the mathematical formula
117

Id. at 128 n.1.
Id. at 133–34.
119
See Tilghman v. Proctor, 102 U.S. 707, 710 (1880); O’Reilly v. Morse,
56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 113 (1854); Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 156,
173 (1852).
118
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and in practical effect would be a patent of the
algorithm itself.120
This “nutshell” announced the “preemption” doctrine as a limit
on patent eligibility, encapsulating the rationale behind many prior
Supreme Court decisions. This limit on patent eligibility prevents
private monopolies over the common stock of ideas and scientific
concepts needed for any use of technical proficiency for public
benefit, that is to say, for use in any technical application. Yet the
articulation of the “nutshell” analysis in Benson is confusing, in
part because the remainder of the opinion sets off on an entirely
different analysis, and, frankly, is rather unconvincing in how it
120

Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 71–72 (1972). Although, curiously,
the claims at issue were not reproduced in the Benson opinion, they are found in
a lower court opinion: “8. The method of converting signals from binary coded
decimal form into binary which comprises the steps of (1) storing the binary
coded decimal signals in a reentrant shift register, (2) shifting the signals to the
right by at least three places, until there is a binary ‘1’ in the second position of
said register, (3) masking out said binary ‘1’ in said second position of said
register, (4) adding a binary ‘1’ to the first position of said register, (5) shifting
the signals to the left by two positions, (6) adding a ‘1’ to said first position, and
(7) shifting the signals to the right by at least three positions in preparation for a
succeeding binary “1” in the second position of said register. . . . 13. A data
processing method for converting binary coded decimal number representations
into binary number representations comprising the steps of (1) testing each
binary digit position i, beginning with the least significant binary digit position,
of the most significant decimal digit representation for a binary ‘0’ or a binary
‘1’; (2) if a binary ‘0’ is detected, repeating step (1) for the next least significant
binary digit position of said most significant decimal digit representation; (3) if a
binary ‘1’ is detected, adding a binary ‘1’ at the (i + 1)th and (i + 3)th least
significant binary digit positions of the next lesser significant decimal digit
representation, and repeating step (1) for the next least significant binary digit
position of said most significant decimal digit representation; (4) upon
exhausting the binary digit positions of said most significant decimal digit
representation, repeating steps (1) through (3) for the next lesser significant
decimal digit representation as modified by the previous execution of steps (1)
through (3); and (5) repeating steps (1) through (4) until the second least
significant decimal digit representation has been so processed.” In re Benson,
441 F.2d 682, 683–84 (C.C.P.A. 1971) (reproducing claims 8 and 13 of
Application Ser. No. 315,050), rev’d, 409 U.S. 63 (1972).
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asks from a policy perspective whether computer programs
constitute patent-eligible subject matter.121 However, the core of
the “nutshell” analysis regarding preemption becomes clearer if
viewed as barring patent eligibility for the mere recitation of a
computer to capture a portion of the saleable market for the
underlying algorithm (i.e., the abstract mathematical concept),
which is significant for the present patent eligibility theory.
Parker v. Flook found that a claim for which the asserted point
of novelty lay with a mathematical algorithm was not patenteligible.122 Consistent with Benson, the Court held that “[e]ven
though a phenomenon of nature or mathematical formula may be
well known, an inventive application of the principle may be
patented. Conversely, the discovery of such a phenomenon cannot
support a patent unless there is some other inventive concept in its
application.”123 In short, Flook held that adding a non-inventive
recitation to restrict a claim to a particular industry’s usage of an
abstract idea was not sufficient to confer patent-eligibility. Flook
reaffirmed the principle that abstract ideas and other basic tools of
scientific and technological work are treated as part of the prior
art.124 Although more detail was added to the rationale of Benson,
vague reference to the need for “applications” of abstract concepts
to confer patent eligibility makes it difficult to consistently apply
the Flook decision to other sets of facts.
121

An interesting comment here comes from Donald S. Chisum, who has
noted that the context for the Benson case was that vested interests in the
computer hardware industry did not significantly profit from software at the
time and sought to minimize disruptions from small newcomers in the software
market by minimizing protection of software. Donald S. Chisum, Patenting
Intangible Methods: Revisiting Benson (1972) After Bilski (2010), 27 SANTA
CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 445, 446–49 (2011). The complaint
Chisum raises here is whether patent standards cater to vested interests, and he
sees Benson as exacerbating that problem. Id.
122
Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 595 (1978).
123
Id. at 594.
124
Id. at 591–92 (citing O'Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62 (1854);
Neilson v. Harford, Webster’s Patent Cases 295, 371 (1844).
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Diamond v. Diehr was the third Supreme Court case to deal
with patent eligibility of software and associated methods and the
first to find a claim patent-eligible.125 Although no prior decisions
were explicitly overruled, it is clear that the Diehr decision broke
with the rationale underlying Benson and Flook.126 Justice Breyer
later noted the incongruity of Diehr and Flook during oral
arguments for a subsequent case.127 By stating—contrary to the
approach of Flook—that patent eligibility should not be assessed at
the point of novelty, Diehr found a patent-eligible invention in a
combination of elements.128 Yet examination of the purported
inventive “combination” at issue in Diehr does not reveal any
meaningful inventive contribution other than recitations that
preempt using the Arrhenius equation within an economic market
for curing rubber using automated machines of some sort. This is a
situation nearly identical to that in the Marchand v. Emken case,
yet the Court in Diehr reached an opposite result on
patentability.129 As discussed below, it is possible to think of the
125

Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981).
The number of justices dissenting from the Diehr majority opinion
evidence the abrupt shift from Benson and Flook, to some extent. “Confusion
originated in the inherent conflict between the Diamond v. Diehr and the Parker
v. Flook Supreme Court decisions, since the majority decisions in these two
cases appear to contradict each other in fundamental ways (see the Stevens
dissent in Diamond v. Diehr for a discussion of this conflict). What was clear
was that the patentability of a software related invention depended heavily on
the claims crafted by the patent attorney.” Daniel A. Tysver, History of Software
Patents, from Benson, Flook and Diehr to Bilski and Mayo v. Prometheus,
BITLAW, http://www.bitlaw.com/software-patent/history.html (last visited Mar.
20, 2014) (internal hyperlinks omitted). It should also be noted that Justice
Rehnquist, who wrote the Diehr opinion, dissented from the Flook decision.
127
Transcript of Oral Argument at 14, Mayo Collaborative Servs. v.
Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S.Ct. 1289 (2012), available at http://
patentlyo.com/media/docs/2011/12/10-1150.pdf (Breyer, J.) (“If you look at the
Court’s cases, they seem to say Flook, one thing, and Diehr, another thing.”).
128
Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 at 188,190–92.
129
Marchand v. Emken, 132 U.S. 195 (1889) (finding the claim
unpatentable).
126
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addition of only generic “machine automation” recitations to an
underlying abstract concept as merely adding another abstract
concept to the claim, namely the fundamentally social notion of
replacing workers with machines. In this respect, Diehr provided
the impetus for a surge in highly formalistic end-runs around the
patent-eligibility question through careful claim drafting that adds
cursory reference to a machine but does not recite the essential
elements of the solution to the underlying technical problem.130
Diehr starts to substitute a first-mover approach to patentability, in
that any person first to recognize that an abstract concept has
saleable economic value in a particular market can obtain a patent
by restricting the scope of the patent monopoly to that particular
area of economic activity, without more.131
Diamond v. Chakrabarty was the first Supreme Court case to
deal with patent eligibility for biotechnology inventions.132 The
Court asked whether the claimed microorganism constituted a
“manufacture” or “composition of matter” within the meaning of
35 U.S.C. § 101; it held that the artificially synthesized
microorganism being claimed was “the result of human ingenuity
and research” and was patent-eligible.133 This seemed to reach a
proper result, in that productive activities creating new synthetic
organisms was found to be patentable, but the Chakrabarty opinion
offered a somewhat skewed reading of legislative history; it
suggested that there were few, if any, limits on patent eligibility—

130

Such an approach broke with Supreme Court precedent. See, e.g., Le
Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 156, 174–75 (1852); Marchand v. Emken,
132 U.S. 195, 200 (1889).
131
See generally Irwin, supra note 9, at 814–15 (discussing a shift in
underlying rationales for patentability standards).
132
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
133
Id. at 313. Though Chakrabarty seemed to reach the correct result, the
rationale that “Congress intended statutory subject matter to include anything
under the sun made by man” aligns more closely with the problematic aspects of
Diehr. Id. at 309 (quoting S. REP. NO. 82-1979 at 5 (1952); H.R. REP. NO. 821923 at 6 (1952)).
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something that colored many later judicial decisions,134 particularly
in lower courts.
Decades later, the Court decided Association for Molecular
Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, which similarly found that synthetic
material such as complementary DNA (cDNA) was patenteligible.135 However, the Myriad Court found that claims directed
to isolated segments of naturally occurring DNA sequences were
not patent-eligible.136 “Myriad’s principal contribution was
uncovering the precise location and genetic sequence of the
BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes within chromosomes 17 and 13.”137
The Court found that unlike the inventor in Chakrabarty, “Myriad
did not create anything. To be sure, it found an important and
useful gene, but separating that gene from its surrounding genetic
material is not an act of invention.”138 Rebuffing a sweat-of-thebrow labor theory, the Court critically held that “extensive effort
alone is insufficient” to confer patent eligibility.139 The overly broad
claim at issue reflected only effort (and money) invested in the
discovery of information necessary for further development of
saleable products and services in the associated field, rather than
the contribution of a solution to an underlying technical problem.
Bilski v. Kappos was the first Supreme Court decision to
directly assess the patent eligibility of what was unequivocally
acknowledged as a “business method.”140 Specifically, Bilski
134

Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S.Ct. 3218, 3248-50 (2009) (Stevens, J.,
concurring).
135
Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S.Ct. 2107,
2119 (2013).
136
Id. at 2120.
137
Id. at 2216.
138
Id. at 2217. The Court noted that “Myriad’s claims . . . [do not] rely in
any way on the chemical changes that result from the isolation of a particular
section of DNA.” Id. at 2118.
139
Id. at 2118.
140
Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S.Ct. 3218, 3223 (2010).
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claimed a method of hedging losses in commodities trading.141 The
method claims in Bilski did not require a computer or other
machine or apparatus. The Court held that the claims were not
patent-eligible because they were drawn to “an unpatentable
abstract idea, just like the algorithms at issue in Benson and
Flook.”142 The most significant holding in Bilski was in
overturning the lower court’s finding that the “machine-ortransformation” test was the exclusive test for patent eligibility.
Instead, the Court held that: “[T]he machine-or-transformation test
is a useful and important clue, an investigative tool, for
determining whether some claimed inventions are processes under
§ 101. The machine-or-transformation test is not the sole test for
deciding whether an invention is a patent-eligible ‘process.’”143
The Court nonetheless avoided any meaningful discussion of
constitutional limits on patent eligibility. Like many other Supreme
Court cases on patent eligibility decided after 1980, Bilski focuses
rather narrowly on statutory interpretation of 35 U.S.C. § 101 and
omits much of the constitutional and policy-based analysis of
earlier cases. The major failing of the Bilski opinion itself is that it
tends to treat Benson, Flook, and Diehr as if those prior decisions
took a consistent approach to the question of patent eligibility,
when they clearly do not. The majority opinion made no attempt to
reconcile the inconsistency in those precedents. To draw a football
analogy, the majority’s Bilski decision punted the ball down the
field, thus putting off until a later date the difficult task of
141

Claim 1 read “(a) initiating a series of transactions between said
commodity provider and consumers of said commodity wherein said consumers
purchase said commodity at a fixed rate based upon historical averages, said
fixed rate corresponding to a risk position of said consumers; (b) identifying
market participants for said commodity having a counter-risk position to said
consumers; and (c) initiating a series of transactions between said commodity
provider and said market participants at a second fixed rate such that said series
of market participant transactions balances the risk position of said series of
consumer transactions.” Id. at 3223–24.
142
Id. at 3231.
143
Id. at 3227.
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harmonizing precedent. In his final decision before retirement,
Justice Stevens wrote a concurrence (joined by Justices Ginsburg,
Breyer, and Sotomayor) indicating that he “would restore patent
law to its historical and constitutional moorings.”144 Stevens noted
that business methods were categorically excluded from patent
eligibility for centuries, and it was only in the 1990s that the
Federal Circuit began to call that categorical exclusion into
question.145
Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc.
made “preemption” a primary criterion for patent-eligible subject
matter under § 101.146 Application of the machine-ortransformation test for patentability, still used extensively by lower
courts, was relegated to a decidedly secondary position in the
analysis, at best.147 According to the majority in Mayo, “a process
that focuses upon the use of a natural law [must] also contain other
elements or a combination of elements, sometimes referred to as an
‘inventive concept,’ sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice
amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the natural law
itself.”148 The mere act of “picking out the relevant audience”—
which essentially involves identifying the saleable market for an
abstract idea, law of nature, or natural phenomenon—is not enough
to confer patent eligibility.149 From a Veblenian perspective, this
can be seen as a requirement that patent claims be directed to a
contribution to the common stock of technical proficiency, rather
than merely staking a pecuniary claim to concepts that are
fundamental to any work in a given field. There was, indeed, a
144

Id. at 3232 (Stevens, J., concurring).
Id. at 3232, 3239–50. Justice Stevens’ concurrence is well worth reading
on its own. Much of the discussion that follows in this article is along the lines
of the argument laid out in Justice Stevens’ Bilski concurrence.
146
Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S.Ct. 1289
(2012); see also Zuege, supra note 64, at 19.
147
Mayo, 132 S.Ct. at 1302–04.
148
Id. at 1294.
149
Id. at 1299.
145
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cursory reference to this concept in the Mayo opinion, which stated
that rent-seeking through patenting can be problematic,150 and that
there is a “two-edged sword” in the encouragement of invention
through monopoly grants that requires a careful balance.151 Mayo
was a re-affirmance of the rationale of the Flook line of cases and
various Nineteenth Century Supreme Court precedents that dealt
with the question of patent eligibility in terms of whether a
patentee (or patent applicant) is overreaching by presenting
preemptive patent claims that lack the inventive contribution
required as part of the quid pro quo of a patent monopoly. Yet
Mayo hardly settled the debate, and, despite some helpful but
tentative and brief asides, still fell short of clearly articulating a
general theory as to why the concept of “preemption” really
matters, such that judges, patent office staff, and patentees can
have a shared sense of purpose in applying a patent eligibility
standard—however formulated.
C. Conflicting Views on the Federal Circuit
The Federal Circuit remains the locus for the patentable subject
matter debate, with a “deep underlying philosophical divide”
regarding the correct approach for patent eligibility analysis.152
Yet, there is a growing consensus on the still-divided Federal
Circuit that something close to a technological arts test should be
applied.153 For instance, certain current and recently departed
150

Id. at 1301–02 (quoting W. LANDES & R. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 305–306 (2003)).
151
Mayo, 132 S.Ct. at 1305.
152
Dina Roumiantseva, The Eye of the Storm: Software Patents and The
Abstract Idea Doctrine in CLS Bank v. Alice, 28 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 569,
577–78 (2013).
153
For comments on the divide among current Federal Circuit judges on
this issue, see Bruce Sunstein, New Obstacles Are Raised to Protecting
Computer-Related Inventions, INTELL. PROP. TODAY, Dec. 2013, at 27;
Roumiantseva, supra note 153, at 577–88. For summaries of technological arts
tests applied in select other countries, see, e.g., Jay Erstling et al., Usefulness
Varies by Country: The Utility Requirement of Patent Law in the United States,

[5:211 2014]

PATENT SUBJECT MATTER ELIGIBILITY

265

Federal Circuit judges have fairly consistently ruled in a variety of
cases that to satisfy the utility requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 101 there
must be a close nexus between a recited computer and the nature of
the invention. Although those judges stop short of stating a
technological arts test, their opinions seem to reject the notion that
business and financial methods can ever be patent-eligible, such as
by finding that such methods could have been performed mentally
or finding the cursory recitation of a computer (or other concrete
object) insufficient to satisfy § 101. These judges have expended
considerable effort across numerous opinions to try to elucidate in
a meaningful way what level of detail is required to reduce the
level of abstraction of a claim sufficient for patent eligibility.154
Europe and Canada, 3 CYBARIS 1 (2012), http://web.wmitchell.edu/cybaris/wpcontent/uploads/2012/06/Erstling-Salmela-Woo.pdf. In Europe, business
methods and software per se are categorically excluded from patent eligibility.
Convention on the Grant of European Patents art. 52, Oct. 5, 1973, 13 I.L.M.
268 (“EPC”) (“The following in particular shall not be regarded as inventions . .
. schemes, rules and methods for performing mental acts, playing games or
doing business, and programs for computers.”).
154
E.g., Accenture Global Servs. v. Guidewire Software, Inc., 728 F.3d
1336 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (Lourie, J.); Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen
IDEC, 659 F.3d 1057, 1075–81 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (Moore, J., dissenting);
Alexsam, Inc. v. IDT Corp., 715 F.3d 1336, 1349-50 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (Dyk, J.
dissenting); CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd., 717 F.3d 1269 (Fed. Cir.
2013) (en banc) (per curiam) (Lourie, J., concurring), cert. granted, 82 U.S.L.W.
3131 (U.S. Dec. 6, 2013) (No. 13–298); Bancorp Servs., L.L.C. v. Sun Life
Assurance Co. of Canada, 687 F.3d 1266 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (Lourie, J.);
MySpace, Inc. v. GraphOn Corp., 672 F 3d 1250 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (Mayer, J.,
dissenting); Dealertrack, Inc. v. Huber, 674 F.3d 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Fort
Props., Inc. v. Am. Master Lease LLC, 671 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2012);
CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2011)
(Dyk, J.); SiRF Tech., Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n., 601 F.3d 1319 (Fed. Cir.
2010) (Dyk, J.); In re Bilski, 545 F.3d at 998 (Mayer, J., dissenting); In re
Comiskey, 554 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (Dyk, J.) (revised opinion); In re
Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc) (Dyk, J., with Linn, J.,
concurring). It is speculative to assess how Federal Circuit judges feel about this
issue, generally, and some judges may have changed their views over time.
However, some Federal Circuit judges, like Judge Dyk and current Chief Judge
Rader, have clearly come out on opposite sides of the debate. There have been
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Cases from this faction of the Federal Circuit seem cognizant that
the Constitution may impose limits on what the patent statutes can
make patent-eligible and hint at some sort of technological-artslike test.155 While this first faction has tried to bring clarity to the
patent subject matter eligibility debate, they have yet to articulate a
sufficiently clear theory or test to establish consensus. The
discussion that follows will illustrate how a Veblenian perspective
might strengthen and clarify an underlying theory for such tests,
consistent with various Supreme Court opinions—and particularly
Justice Stevens’ concurrence in Bilski.
Another faction of Federal Circuit judges have been firmly
opposed to patent eligibility challenges and insist that patent
eligibility challenges are really questions of claim
novelty/obviousness, definiteness, and/or enablement and as such
can or should be addressed under other statutory sections of the
patent laws.156 Led by Chief Judge Rader, the most vociferous
attempts to assign Federal Circuit Judges to opposing camps, though. See
Roumiantseva, supra note 153, at 578, 581–82 (placing Judges Rader, Newman,
Plager, and O’Malley in the broad “coarse filter” camp/faction and Judges Dyk,
Prost, Moore, Schall, and Bryson in the “limiting test” camp/faction); Sunstein,
supra note 154, at 27. More recently appointed Judges like Renya, Wallach, and
Taranto seem to fall into the “limiting test” camp/faction. See CLS Bank Int’l,
717 F.3d 1269 (Lourie, J., concurring); Bancorp Servs., 687 F.3d 1266;
Accenture Global Servs., 728 F.3d 1336; Smartgene, Inc. v. Advanced
Biological Labs, SA, No. 2013-1186, 2014 WL259824 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 24, 2014)
(Taranto, J.) (nonprecedential).
155
The rationales in opinions from these judges align with Supreme Court
cases like Benson and Flook.
156
E.g., Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen IDEC, 659 F.3d 1057,
1075 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (Newman, J.); Research Corp. Techs. v. Microsoft Corp.,
627 F.3d 859, 869 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“[S]ubject matter might . . . be so
conceptual that the written description does not enable a person of ordinary skill
in the art to replicate the process.”) (Rader, C.J.); Bilski, 545 F.3d at 977–94
(Newman, J., dissenting); Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 722 F.3d 1335,
1342,1345–48 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (Rader, J.) (emphasizing other statutory limits
for patentability and attempting to diminish the significance of the “preemption” doctrine); Dealertrack, 674 F.3d at 1335 (Plager, J., dissenting-in-part,
concurring-in-part); CLS Bank Int’l., 717 F.3d at 1292–1336 (dissenting and
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Federal Circuit judge on this point, the opinions of this faction
reflect a view that patentable subject matter “may include even
methods of doing business.”157 For instance, these judges
repeatedly reject or ignore calls to specify the level of complexity
of computer programming necessary to no longer be “abstract”
under § 101.158 These judges also consistently frame issues under
the rubric of the sweeping scope of § 101, and the definition of
“process” in § 100, without reference to limiting language of the
Patent & Copyright Clause of the Constitution or early Supreme
Court cases and therefore without recognition of the ways that the
language from the 1952 patent law revisions (and later legislative
amendments) may have departed from constitutional limits.159
They conclude that the statutory threshold is very low, a “coarse
filter,”160 and they put few teeth into the “preemption” doctrine.161
There are numerous problems with the second faction’s view that
concerns raised about patent subject matter eligibility should not
be addressed under § 101 but should instead be policed elsewhere,
such as under 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103 and 112. For one, this view
renders § 101 somewhat dead letter, in a way that may simplify
judicial decision-making but only at the expense of forcing
dissenting-in-part opinions, and additional reflections); In re Schrader, 22 F.3d
290 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (Plager, J.).
157
Ultramercial, 722 F.3d at 1342 (citation omitted); see also Bilski, 130
S.Ct. at 3223-24 (2010) (reciting claim 1).
158
Ultramercial, 722 F.3d at 1353 (“[T]his court does not define the level
of programming complexity required before a computer-implemented method
can be patent-eligible.”).
159
The rationales in opinions from these judges tend to align with the
Supreme Court’s opinion in Diehr more so than in Benson or Flook, for
instance. See, e.g., Arrhythmia Research Tech., Inc. v. Corazonix Corp., 958
F.2d 1053, 1066 (Fed. Cir. 1992 (Rader, J., concurring) (arguing that Diehr
limited Benson and supposedly “refocused” the patentability analysis on the
statutory language rather than “vague” judicial exclusions).
160
Classen Immunotherapies, Inc., 659 F.3d at 1066; Research Corp.
Techs., Inc., 627 F.3d at 869.
161
E.g., Ultramercial, Inc., 722 F.3d at 1345–46 (Rader, J.).
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accused infringers and patent examiners to waste efforts on more
burdensome investigations to uncover prior art, etc. This position
takes an unequal view of the burdens associated with the
arguments under different statutory sections and expresses concern
for the amount of effort involved only when that effort is expended
by judges—anathema to a legal realist analysis. The refusal to
consider multiple bases for unpatentability is also not justified in
any meaningful way. For instance, patent litigators rarely believe
that a validity challenge under § 112 has a great chance of success,
yet panels of the Federal Circuit seem to imply that making a § 112
invalidity argument is a preferred approach.162 There is a large
disconnect in that regard. Moreover, indefiniteness issues
surrounding functional claiming at the point of novelty (in claims
without means-plus-function or step-plus-function recitations) are
rarely relied upon by patent examiners, and the topic receives no
treatment in the Manual of Patent Examining Procedure.163 This
second faction of Federal Circuit judges is perhaps the most
resistant to clarity in the area of patent eligibility, but a Veblenian
perspective might provide them with a new way to look at the
underlying issues and perhaps find common ground with the other
faction.
Many of the changing interpretations can be viewed as
reflecting changing economic ideologies held by the judiciary.164
162

The standard for definiteness under 35 U.S.C. § 112 is currently
awaiting Supreme Court review. Biosig Instruments, Inc. v. Nautilus, Inc., 715
F.3d 891 (Fed. Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 896 (U.S. Jan, 10, 2014)
(No. 13-339).
163
Contra, e.g., Ex parte Miyazaki, 89 USPQ.2d 1207 (B.P.A.I. 2008).
However, President Obama recently initiated a training program around the
issue of functional claiming. FACT SHEET—Executive Actions: Answering the
President’s Call to Strengthen Our Patent System and Foster Innovation,
WHITEHOUSE (Feb. 20, 2014), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/
2014/02/20/fact-sheet-executive-actions-answering-president-s-call-strengthenour-p.
164
Similarly, Robert Post suggested that variations in patent allowance
rates after the Civil War reflected not changes in inventive activity but primarily
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For instance, Federal Circuit opinions often argue (without much
empirical support) in terms of the economic effect of various
patent policy decisions.165 In this context, questions regarding who
should benefit from access to creative monopolies as secured by
patents are highly relevant. If the major basis of the economy in
the United States moves away from productive technology—
machines, electronics, chemicals and the like—then it seems
inevitable that patents restricted to productive technology would
experience a corresponding decline in significance. But this raises
the question, too, of whether economic factors should change the
interpretation of the patent laws in order to maintain the role of
patents. Or should patents instead be subject to the rise and ebb of
external economic factors, declining in prominence in along with
industrial sectors? One gets the sense that some Federal Circuit
judges fear patents will lose prominence if the economy shifts
away from industrial activities and the patent system does not
follow along. Vested interests in the patent system—and judges of
the Federal Circuit must fall in this category,166 though they do
changes in ideological outlook by Patent Office administrators, with
“liberalizers” ideologically favoring more patent grants and “scientific men”
ideologically favoring less. Robert C. Post, ’Liberalizers’ Versus ‘Scientific
Men’ in the Antebellum Patent Office, 17 TECH. & CULTURE 24 (1976).
165
E.g., Classen Immunotherapies, Inc., 659 F.3d at 1075 (Rader, J., joined
by Newman, J., additional views) (“[I]f one nation makes patent protection
difficult, it will drive research to another, more accommodating nation.”). This
seems like an absurd argument, given that patent protection is typically provided
regardless of the location where the invention was developed, and a researcher
can forego patent protection in her native country while seeking it elsewhere.
166
Numerous commentators have alleged a pro-patent bias in the Federal
Circuit. See, e.g., Jonathan Masur, Patent Inflation, 121 YALE L.J. 470 (2011)
(proffering a model to explain expanding patentability); Thomas F. Cotter, Book
Review: Law, Economics, and Intellectual Property, THE ANTITRUST SOURCE,
Mar. 2004, at 2, available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/
publishing/antitrust_source/bookreview.authcheckdam.pdf. But see Lisa
Larrimore Ouellette, What Are the Sources of Patent Inflation? An Analysis of
Federal Circuit Patentability Rulings, 121 YALE L.J. 347 (2011) (critiquing the
Masur patent inflation model).
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hear matters outside the realm of patent law—seem reluctant to
place limits on the scope of patent subject matter eligibility but
instead tend to adopt liberal, expansive views on patent subject
matter eligibility.167 At the very least, it seems that those arguing
for broad patent eligibility tend to have no concern about patents
covering nonproductive activities, in a Veblenian sense. On the
other side of the argument, it can be argued that an expanded scope
of patentability devalues the kinds of productive technologies that,
in a historical sense, have been the foundation of the patent system
for centuries, and thought to be a driver of general welfare.
V. THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMIT
It has been suggested by numerous others that the
constitutional question of what is patent-eligible subject matter is
central to assessing patent eligibility for business methods and
other nontechnological “inventions.”168 The question has been
raised across numerous judicial opinions, from the Supreme Court,
lower courts, and administrative bodies. One of the clearest
discussions came from the landmark case of Graham v. John
Deere, interpreting the then fairly recent 1952 revisions to the
patent statutes.
167

See, e.g., Michele Boldrin & David K. Levine, The Case Against
Patents, J. ECON. PERSP., Winter 2013, at 3–4 (“[T]he political demand for
stronger patent protection comes from old and stagnant industries and firms, not
from new and innovative ones.”); Ouellette, supra note 166, at 349 (suggesting
that the Federal Circuit may have been created with the purpose of increasing
findings of patent validity and infringement).
168
E.g., Alan L. Durham, ‘Useful Arts’ in the Information Age, 1999 BYU
L. REV. 1419, 1420 (1999); Richard Stern, Being Within the Useful Arts as a
Further Constitutional Requirement for US Patent Eligibility, EUR. INTELL.
PROP. REV. 6, 10 (2009); Thomas, supra note 97, at 4–6; John R. Thomas, The
Patenting of the Liberal Professions, 40 B.C. L. REV. 1139, 1142 (1999); Robert
A. Kreiss, Patent Protection for Computer Programs and Mathematical
Algorithms: The Constitutional Limit on Patentable Subject Matter, 29 N.M. L.
REV. 31 (1999); Malla Pollack, The Multiple Unconstitutionality of Business
Method Patents: Common Sense, Congressional Consideration, and
Constitutional History, 28 RUTGERS COMP. & TECH. L.J. 61 (2002).
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At the outset it must be remembered that the
federal patent power stems from a specific
constitutional provision which authorizes the
Congress “To promote the Progress of . . . useful
Arts, by securing for limited Times to . . . Inventors
the exclusive Right to their . . . Discoveries.” Art. I,
§ 8, cl. 8. The clause is both a grant of power and a
limitation. This qualified authority, unlike the
power often exercised in the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries by the English Crown, is
limited to the promotion of advances in the “useful
arts.” It was written against the backdrop of the
practices—eventually curtailed by the Statute of
Monopolies—of the Crown in granting monopolies
to court favorites in goods or businesses which had
long before been enjoyed by the public. See
Meinhardt, Inventions, Patents and Monopoly, pp.
30–35 (London, 1946). The Congress in the
exercise of the patent power may not overreach the
restraints imposed by the stated constitutional
purpose. Nor may it enlarge the patent monopoly
without regard to the innovation, advancement or
social benefit gained thereby. Moreover, Congress
may not authorize the issuance of patents whose
effects are to remove existent knowledge from the
public domain, or to restrict free access to materials
already available. Innovation, advancement, and
things which add to the sum of useful knowledge
are inherent requisites in a patent system which by
constitutional command must “promote the
Progress of . . . useful Arts.” This is the standard
expressed in the Constitution and it may not be
ignored.169

169

Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 5–6 (1966)
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This express linking of technology to social progress in
Graham echoed views widely held when the Constitution was
framed.170
[T]he Constitution dictates the interpretation of
‘process’, ‘machine’ and similar words in s.101—
limiting them to things within the ‘useful Arts.’ At
the very least, it may be presumed . . . that one
cannot promote the progress of ‘useful Arts’ by
rewarding or regulating activities not within the
‘useful Arts.’171
Available history regarding deliberation on this constitutional
language indicates that the “useful Arts” language was specifically
inserted in place of alternate language. At the constitutional
convention, James Madison proposed language “To grant patents
for useful inventions,” “To secure to Authors exclusive rights for a
certain time,” and “To establish public institutions, rewards and
immunities for the promotion of agriculture, commerce, trades and
manufactures,” all of which was rejected in favor of the language
proposed a few weeks later: “To promote the Progress of Science
and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries[.]”172 The final language of the Constitution reflects a
different and narrower scope of legislative authority than proposed
(emphasis added).
170
Irwin, supra note 9, at 785.
171
Stern, supra note 168, at 10. This statement should be qualified by
noting that the same clause allows promotion of “science” as use to provide
copyrights. Stern goes on to argue for a general theory of the useful Arts and
suggests a dichotomy of sorts. In reaching that conclusion, however, his
explanation of “technological arts” and “industrial arts” are unsupported, and
rest on shaky philosophical foundations.
172
Madison Debates, August 18, 1787, THE AVALON PROJECT: YALE LAW
SCHOOL, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/debates_818.asp (last visited
Mar. 13, 2012) (statement by Mr. Madison); see also Durham, supra note 169,
at 1431.
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by Madison.173 Moreover, as described in detail by Alan Durham,
the term “useful arts” at the time the Constitution was drafted was
used in general parlance to describe all sorts of areas of
technology, engineering, craft, workmanship, and technique, but
was never described as encompassing business or business
methods.174 Durham notes, as has Dana Remus Irwin, that much of
the confusion surrounding the scope of patentability of things like
business methods can be traced to the 1952 codification of the
patent laws, in which the term “art” was replaced with “process”
when delineating utility requirements for patentability, without any
clear intent to change the overall scope of patent-eligible subject
matter.175
Recognition of constitutional limits on patent-eligible subject
matter has not been discussed in great detail in more recent
Supreme Court opinions, which since 1980 have focused more on
statutory interpretation. Discussion of constitutional limits on
patentability has been somewhat sporadic in the Federal Circuit
and other lower courts. However, In re Comiskey explicitly stated
that the Patent & Copyright Clause of the Constitution “limited the
subject matter eligible for patent protection to the ‘useful arts.’”176
“The Constitution explicitly limited patentability to ‘the national
purpose of advancing the useful arts—the process today called
technological innovation.’”177 That constitutional limit was used to
173

This followed the general trend of patent laws being put in place to limit
monopolies, rather than to encourage them.
174
Durham, supra note 169, at 1424–44; see also Irwin, supra note 9, at
782–810 (suggesting that the 1952 patent law codification was a driver of
patentable subject matter expansion and a break from the constitutional
framework).
175
Durham, supra note 169, at 1425 n.24; Irwin, supra note 9, at 804–10.
176
In re Comiskey, 554 F.3d 967, 976 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (citing Graham v.
John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 5 (1966)).
177
Id. at 977 (quoting Paulik v. Rizkalla, 760 F.2d 1270, 1276 (Fed. Cir.
1985) (en banc)); see also MySpace, Inc. v. GraphOn Corp., 672 F.3d, 1250,
1269–70 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (Mayer, J. dissenting); cf. Classen Immunotherapies,
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govern the application of statutory provisions in Comiskey, noting
that “the present statute does not allow patents to be issued on
particular business systems—such as a particular type of arbitration—
that depend entirely on the use of mental processes. In other words,
the patent statute does not allow patents on particular systems that
depend for their operation on human intelligence alone, a field of
endeavor that both the framers and Congress intended to be beyond
the reach of patentable subject matter.”178
Administrative agencies overseeing the U.S. patent system
have tended to adopt very liberal standards for patentability. A
number of years ago, the Board of Patent Appeals and
Interferences (BPAI), the former name for the administrative court
within the USPTO (now called the Patent Trial and Appeal Board),
decided Ex parte Lundgren,179 in which the majority rejected a
“technological arts” test for business method patents.180 Yet
Administrative Patent Judge Jerry Smith, dissenting, took the view
that a technological arts test was necessary, in that the language of
Inc. v. Biogen IDEC, 659 F.3d 1057, 1074 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (Rader, J., joined by
Newman, J., additional views) (“[A]fter all, patents require a translation of
technology into text, i.e., patent claims. Inevitably the subject matter exclusions
of eligibility doctrines depend on the way that claims are drafted. Thus, careful
claim drafting or new claim forms can often avoid eligibility restrictions.
Eligibility then becomes a game where lawyers learn ingenious ways to recast
technology in terms that satisfy eligibility concerns.”) (emphasis added).
178
Comiskey, 554 F.3d at 980.
179
Ex parte Lundgren, 76 USPQ.2d 1385, (B.P.A.I. 2005).
180
Id.; see also Robert E. Thomas & Larry A. DiMatteo, Harmonizing the
International Law of Business Method and Software Patents: Following
Europe’s Lead, 16 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 1, 11 (2007) (noting that Lundgren
rejected “the international trend towards requiring a minimal technical
advancement or contribution for the patentability of business methods”). Contra
Paulik v. Rizkalla, 760 F.2d 1270, 1276 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (“The exclusive right,
constitutionally derived, was for the national purpose of advancing the useful
arts—the process today called technological innovation.”); In re Waldbaum, 457
F.2d 997, 1003 (C.C.P.A. 1972) (Rich, J., concurring) (“The phrase
‘technological arts,’ as we have used it, is synonymous with the phrase ‘useful
arts’ as it appears in Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution.”).
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§ 101 could not be interpreted in a way that exceeds the power
granted to Congress to enact that statutory section under the Patent
& Copyright Clause of the Constitution. He noted that “the term
‘technological arts’ should be construed to mean nothing more
than a threshold nexus to some field of technology to fall within
the constitutional mandate.”181
Some have argued that patent eligibility cannot be restricted by
the Constitution. Numerous commentators have alleged a threshold
on domestic patentable subject matter standards imposed by the
TRIPS agreement, which would allegedly prohibit certain limits on
patentable subject matter.182 However, the constitutional patentable
subject matter inquiry cannot be subsumed by analysis under a
treaty because the Supreme Court has repeatedly and
unequivocally stated that constitutional limits override any treaty
pursuant to the Supremacy Clause in Article VI, § 2.183 Moreover,
the idea that other member states would object to a technological
181

Ex parte Lundgren, 76 USPQ.2d 1385, 5 (B.P.A.I. 2005) (Smith,
dissenting).
182
Thomas, supra note 97, at 49; Thomas, The Patenting of the Liberal
Professions, supra note 86, at 1142–43, 1177–84; Cotter, supra note 11, at 878–
79; see also Rajnish Kumar Rai & Srinath Jagannathan, Do Business Method
Patents Encourage Innovation, B.C. INTELL. PROP. & TECH. FORUM 5 (2012),
http://bciptf.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/Business-Method-Patents-andInnovation.pdf.
183
The Supreme Court “has regularly and uniformly recognized the
supremacy of the Constitution over a treaty.” Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 17
(1957). “It need hardly be said that a treaty cannot change the Constitution or be
held valid if it be in violation of that instrument.” The Cherokee Tobacco, 78
U.S. (11 Wall.) 616, 620 (1871). See also Asakura v. City of Seattle, 265 U.S.
332, 341 (1924); United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 700 (1898);
Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 267 (1890); Doe v. Braden, 57 U.S. (16 How.)
635, 656–57 (1853). However, purely statutory analysis would be subject to any
limitation imposed by treaty. Yet Thomas does not acknowledge the Global
South’s position on patents, particular on medical technologies, in that the
Global South despises allowing its people to die merely to preserve comparative
advantages and profit margins for the North Atlantic states. See PRASHAD, supra
note 79.

[5:211 2014]

CYBARIS®, AN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW REVIEW

276

arts test on the basis of the TRIPS agreement also somewhat
ignores that many other countries already have such eligibility
limits and generally support them.184
In sum, the arguments in favor of a constitutional limit on
patent eligibility that constrains interpretation of statutory dictates
for patentability are more compelling than contrary positions. The
Graham case could hardly have been clearer on that point.
Arguments that treaties require expansive patent eligibility
standards quickly run afoul of the Supremacy Clause and therefore
fall away. All this leaves one with the impression that
counterarguments for expansive patent eligibility stem from a
rejection or disregard of underlying constitutional dictates and
Enlightenment-era values that influenced the framing of the
Constitution.
VI. ASSESSING PATENT ELIGIBILITY AT THE POINT OF INVENTIVE
CONTRIBUTION
Patent eligibility could be best analyzed through an approach
that focuses on the point of inventive contribution, also called a
point of novelty analysis.185 This would look to the essential
element(s) of the alleged solution to a technical problem as recited
in a given patent claim. “Under the ‘point of novelty’ approach, if
the novelty or advancement in the art claimed by the inventor
resided solely in a step of the process embodying a mental
operation or other unpatentable element, the claim was rejected

184

See, e.g., Erstling et al., supra note 154, at 1; TRANS-PACIFIC
PARTNERSHIP IP GROUP COUNTRY NEGOTIATORS, TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP
AGREEMENT: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY [RIGHTS] CHAPTER, ART. QQ.E.1 (Aug.
30, 2013), available at https://wikileaks.org/tpp/static/pdf/Wikileaks-secretTPP-treaty-IP-chapter.pdf.
185
Chao, supra note 3, at 83, 91 (calling this subject matter eligibility
analysis a “point of novelty” approach unfortunately tends to generate much
confusion with what is presently a separate statutory requirement of novelty for
patentability under 35 U.S.C. § 102).
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under § 101 as being directed to nonstatutory subject matter.”186
The reason such an approach is desirable is that broad claims, of
the sort that tend to raise patent eligibility questions, are often
written in such a way that they recite a desired result without any
meaningful limits as to how that result is achieved through
186

Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 200 n.15 (1981) (emphasis added)
(citation omitted); cf. Application of Seid, 161 F.2d 229 (C.C.P.A. 1947) (“[A]
mere matter of choice in ornamentality . . . produces no new mechanical effect
or advantage considered to constitute invention” and is therefore not eligible for
utility patent protection.); Eskimo Pie Corp. v. Levous, 35 F.2d 120 (3rd Cir.
1929) (stating that a claim to a rectangular ice cream desert was invalidated by a
prior art spherical or ball-shaped one, because “[t]here is no invention in merely
changing the shape or form of an article without changing its function except in
a design patent”). For a proposal for a “revised” two-part point of novelty
subject matter eligibility test, see Chao, supra note 186, at 94 (“If the limitation
embodying the point of novelty does not describe an unpatentable concept, the
claim qualifies as patentable subject matter. If the limitation embodying the
point of novelty merely describes one of these unpatentable concepts, the court
should proceed to the second part of the analysis— examining the other
limitations. If the other limitations are not directed at an unpatentable concept
and have a strong nexus with the point of novelty, the claim is patentable. The
nexus requirement excludes ‘insignificant post-solution activity’ and other
limitations that are not central to the point of novelty.”). However, Chao’s test
still leaves some uncertainty about how to meaningfully characterize
“unpatentable concepts” without the machine-or-transformation test. Id.
Moreover, Chao’s approach requires analysis of extrinsic evidence in order to
assess the first part of the test. Id. In contrast, applying a problem-solution
analysis to identify an alleged point of inventive contribution could be
performed based solely on the intrinsic record of a given patent or patent
application, and later analysis of whether the point of inventive contribution
constitutes a productive contribution to the common stock of technical
proficiency (a concept discuss further below) would tend to require relatively
little analysis of extrinsic evidence. Id. Nonetheless, the plurality opinion of the
Federal Circuit in CLS Bank adopted a two-part analysis similar to Chao’s
recommendation. CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd., 717 F.3d 1269 (Fed.
Cir. 2013) (en banc) (per curiam), cert. granted, 82 U.S.L.W. 3131 (U.S. Dec. 6,
2013) (No. 13–298); accord Accenture Global Servs. v. Guidewire Software,
Inc., 728 F.3d 1336, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2013). Yet the CLS Bank plurality opinion
approach still tends to require claim construction prior to patent eligibility
analysis, which is a weakness of that approach.
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technical means.187 In such cases, the “how” part of the alleged
invention is recited merely in terms of an abstract idea, a law of
nature, or a natural phenomenon. At times, today, the “how” part is
recited by only the most cursory and general reference to general
purpose computers and the like—an approach that begs the
question of whether reciting, essentially, that computers allow
automated calculations to be performed, constitutes merely an
unpatentable abstract idea unto itself.188 Alternatively, this might
187

Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 156, 173 (1852) (“A patent is not
good for an effect, or the result of a certain process, as that would prohibit all
other persons from making the same thing by any means whatsoever.”). The
problem of results-based claiming is explicitly addressed under guidelines for
European patent practice. “As a general rule, claims which attempt to define the
invention by a result to be achieved should not be allowed, in particular if they
only amount to claiming the underlying technical problem.” GUIDELINES FOR
EXAMINATION IN THE EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE § 4.10 (rev. ed. 2013).
Moreover, “[t]he claims . . . must be clear, meaning not only that a claim must
be comprehensible from a technical point of view, but also that it must define
clearly all the essential features of the invention . . . .” Id. § 4.5.1. “Essential
features of a claim are those necessary for achieving a technical effect
underlying the solution of the technical problem with which the application is
concerned (the problem usually being derived from the description). The
independent claim(s) should therefore contain all features explicitly described in
the description as being necessary to carry out the invention. Any features
which, even if consistently mentioned in the context of the invention throughout
the application, do not actually contribute to the solution of the problem are not
essential features.” Id. § 4.5.2.
188
Marchand v. Emken, 132 U.S. 195, 199 (1889). Some cases establish a
similar proposition that one cannot merely claim the “automation” of a known
manual activity without reciting a particular automation mechanism that
represents an inventive contribution to an underlying technical problem.
“Appellant argues that his rejected claims rest upon an automatic mechanism.
The mere statement that a device is to be operated automatically instead of by
hand, without a claim specifying any particular automatic mechanism, is not the
statement of an invention. . . . Much of the argument made here is directed to the
various elements of appellant’s automatic mechanism. It is sufficient to say that
however inventive these elements may be, they are not mentioned in the rejected
claims, and hence can have no effect upon on conclusion thereon.” In re
Rundell, 48 F.2d 958 (C.C.P.A. 1931) (internal citations omitted); In re Venner,
262 F.2d 91 (C.C.P.A. 1958) (internal citations omitted) (“[I]t is well settled that

[5:211 2014]

PATENT SUBJECT MATTER ELIGIBILITY

279

be viewed as seeking monopoly rights over a solution (that uses
technology) to a social problem. Merely reciting that a machine
(e.g., computer) performs a task rather than a person is not a
solution to a technical problem but is instead an abstract idea
regarding a social question of whether employers hire employees
or purchase machines instead. Put another way, the “invention”
may really be a solution to a social problem rather than a technical
problem, albeit a solution that utilizes technology—typically
ubiquitous technology (at least at the level of abstraction that such
technology is recited in the claims). This “point of inventive
contribution” approach does not simply convert the patent
eligibility analysis to a consideration of novelty and/or
obviousness, but rather is an insistence that the patentee or patent
applicant should have to limit her claims to more than just a
statement of a desired result or an essentially bare statement of a
technical problem (without reciting the technical solution)—
something explicitly required by rule in other jurisdictions.189 In
other words, claims that recite an effect (or result) must delineate
both cause and effect and not merely the effect (or result) in
isolation. The desired effect (or result) may be new and
nonobvious, or the underlying technical problem may have been
previously unsolved, but if there is no recitation in the claims of
how that effect is achieved (the technical causal mechanism), then
preemption and a lack of patent eligibility become meaningful
concerns. These concerns appear in the backdrop of many Supreme
Court cases on patent eligibility, at least when the actual claim
language is considered.190 Moreover, cases like Bilski present
it is not ‘invention’ to broadly provide a mechanical or automatic means to
replace manual activity which has accomplished the same result,” and
“[p]atentability cannot be predicated upon a mental step.”). However, these
cases treat the question as one of obviousness rather than of patent eligibility.
189
Cf. GUIDELINES FOR EXAMINATION IN THE EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE §§
4.5, 4.10 (rev. ed. 2013) (requiring a technical solution).
190
A problem with opinions like Gottschalk v. Benson is that they do not
provide any meaningful analysis of the actual claim language at issue. See Supra
Part IV.A.
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attempts to claim solutions to social allocations of wealth already
in existence (e.g., hedging investment risk), which through one
mechanism or another courts have historically tended to find
constitute no more than unpatentable abstract ideas, or the like. In
other words, proffered “solutions” to social “problems” are not
generally thought of as being within the realm of the technological
or useful arts. Claims like that of Bilski clearly fail a technological
arts test, but asking whether a claim at the recited point of
inventive contribution provides a productive contribution to the
common stock of technological proficiency is a much more direct
way to repeatedly reach the sorts of conclusions found in Supreme
Court cases for centuries, from Marchand to Funk Brothers to
Flook to Mayo. Practically speaking, courts and USPTO staff
could analyze claims to identify the purported inventive
contribution, and if it contains only a result or effect, without
reciting the mechanism (or step) that causes it, or if it relates to a
social question rather than a technical problem, then patent
eligibility could be denied due to preemption. Other jurisdictions
sort claims in a two-part manner like this with great success.191
Judicial precedent is highly confused when a “point of novelty”
type of patent eligibility analysis is considered—comparable to the
presently endorsed point of inventive contribution approach.
Justice Rehnquist wrote in the Diehr case that patent subject matter
eligibility cannot be assessed at the point of novelty.192 That
statement seems to have been a miscalculation, and one that the
Supreme Court should explicitly correct.193 In other areas of patent
191

See, e.g., European Patent Convention r. 43(1).
Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 188–89 (1981); see also Bilski v.
Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3236 (2010); In re Schrader, 22 F.3d 290, 294 (Fed.
Cir. 1994). Flook stated that the Court’s approach is “not at all inconsistent with
the view that a patent claim must be considered as a whole.” Parker v. Flook,
437 U.S. 584, 594 (1978).
193
For a contrary view, arguing that the Supreme Court was correct to
disregard the point of novelty, see Mark A. Lemley, Point of Novelty, 105 NW.
U. L. REV. 1253, 1277–79 (2011). Lemley’s analysis rests on somewhat dubious
192
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law, such as with respect to indefiniteness caused by functional
claiming at the point of novelty, the Supreme Court and
subsequent lower court opinions have endorsed an approach that
looks to the point of novelty of a given patent claim.194 While the
analysis of obviousness under 35 U.S.C. § 103 requires by statute
that “the claimed invention as a whole” (formerly worded as “the
subject matter as a whole”) be analyzed, 35 U.S.C. § 101 includes
no such explicit requirement for the analysis of utility.195 In other
words, the statutory language of § 101 does not preclude a point of
inventive contribution analysis.
It continues to be a source of confusion that the Supreme Court
has mostly deferred to lower court precedents barring a point of
novelty analysis of patent eligibility. As a result, Judges on the
Federal Circuit have struggled through the question of whether the
point of novelty, or something like it, should be considered in
assessing patent subject matter eligibility. For example, in the
nonprecedential opinion for Smartgene, Inc. v. Advanced
Biological Labs, SA, a Federal Circuit panel noted that the method
claim at issue “calls on a computer to do nothing that is even
arguably an advance in physical implementations of routine mental
information-comparison and rule-application processes.”196 Such a
statement hints that the recitation of a “computer” does not fall at
the point of inventive contribution, that is, the computer does not

assumptions about expansive patent grants always being desirable, of the sort
routinely criticized by economists. Id at 1279.
194
E.g., Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Walker, 329 U.S. 1 (1946);
Halliburton Energy Servs., Inc. v. M-I LLC, 514 F.3d 1244 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Ex
parte Miyazaki, 89 USPQ.2d 1207 (B.P.A.I. 2008), Greenberg v. Ethicon EndoSurgery Inc., 91 F.3d 1580, 1584 (Fed. Cir. 1996); see also In re Abrams, 188
F.2d 165, 166,170 (C.C.P.A. 1951).
195
Compare 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2011) (pre-AIA), and 35 U.S.C. § 103
(2014) (post-AIA), with 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2014).
196
Smartgene, Inc. v. Advanced Biological Labs, SA, No. 2013–1186,
2014 WL 259824, at *5 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 24, 2014) (nonprecedential).
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relate to any alleged technological advance.197 On the other hand,
the opinion for Accenture Global Services v. Guidewire Software,
Inc. quoted the en banc plurality opinion of CLS Bank as saying
that to assess preemption of an abstract idea “the court must first
‘identify and define whatever fundamental concept appears
wrapped up in the claim.’”198 This approach on its face seems
indefensible. What is the “invention” for purposes of a
patentability analysis if not what is claimed?199 The Federal Circuit
made a clearer point with a seemingly contrary statement in
another, earlier case. “In considering patent eligibility under § 101,
one must focus on the claims. This is because a claim may
‘preempt’ only that which the claims encompass, not what is
disclosed but left unclaimed.”200 These statements seem to be
premised on conflicting ideas of what should be assessed for patent
eligibility, and how that should be done—a question of which of
the seemingly conflicting rationales of cases like Flook or Diehr
should be applied.
Most recent case law under the machine-or-transformation test
for patent eligibility has focused on attempts (in view of the
197

Cf., e.g., Alexsam, Inc. v. IDT Corp., 715 F.3d 1336, 1349–50 (Fed. Cir.
2013) (Dyk, J., dissenting).
198
Accenture Global Servs. v. Guidewire Software, Inc., 728 F.3d 1336,
1341 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (quoting CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp., 717 F.3d 1269,
1282 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (en banc)); see also CyberSource Corp. v. Retail
Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“Regardless of what
statutory category (‘process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter,’
35 U.S.C. § 101) a claim’s language is crafted to literally invoke, we look to the
underlying invention for patent-eligibility purposes.”).
199
See, e.g., Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 722 F.3d 1335, 1355 (Fed.
Cir. 2013) (Lourie, J., concurring) (“While a computer or complex computer
program . . . may be necessary to perform the method, it is not what the claim
specifically requires[.]”); In re Rundell, 48 F.2d 958 (C.C.P.A. 1931) (“Much of
the argument made here is directed to the various elements of appellant’s
automatic mechanism. It is sufficient to say that however inventive these
elements may be, they are not mentioned in the rejected claims, and hence can
have no effect upon on conclusion thereon.”).
200
Dealertrack v. Huber, 674 F.3d 1315, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
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hopelessness of making software and business methods satisfy the
“transformation” prong)201 by patent owners (or applicants) to
recite a computer to satisfy the “machine” prong. These cases push
toward something like an analysis at the point of inventive
contribution. For instance, in the frequently-cited CyberSource
opinion, a Federal Circuit panel stated that “the incidental use of a
computer to perform [a] mental process . . . does not impose a
sufficiently meaningful limit on . . . claim[] scope.”202 In another
opinion, it was held that where “[t]he claims are silent as to how a
computer aids the method, the extent to which a computer aids the
method, or the significance of a computer to the performance of
the method. The undefined phrase 'computer aided' does not make
the claimed concept any less abstract than an underlying abstract
idea.203 “Simply adding a ‘computer aided’ limitation to a claim
covering an abstract concept, without more, is insufficient to
render the claim patent eligible.”204 In one of the clearest
statements the Federal Circuit has issued on this point, it was held
that “[i]n order for the addition of a machine to impose a
meaningful limit on the scope of a claim, it must play a significant
part in permitting the claimed method to be performed, rather than
function solely as an obvious mechanism for permitting a solution
201

Courts have made clear that little if anything outside the realm of
manufacturing methods can satisfy the “transformation” prong. “The mere
manipulation or reorganization of data . . . does not satisfy the transformation
prong.” CyberSource, 654 F.3d at 1375. An “abstract concept cannot be
transformed into patentable subject matter merely because of connections to the
physical world through deeds, contracts, and real property.” Fort Properties, Inc.
v. American Master Lease LLC, 671 F.3d 1317, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2012); cf.
Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 788 (1877) (“A process is a mode of treatment
of certain materials to produce a given result. It is an act, or a series of acts,
performed upon the subject-matter to be transformed and reduced to a different
state or thing.”).
202
CyberSource, 654 F.3d at 1375.
203
Dealertrack, 674 F.3d at 1333.
204
Id. (citing SiRF Tech., Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 601 F.3d 1319, 1333
(Fed. Cir. 2010)); accord Fort Properties, Inc., 671 F.3d at 1323.
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to be achieved more quickly, i.e., through the utilization of a
computer for performing calculations.”205 Yet, unfortunately,
though that statement added the term “obvious” to the subject
matter eligibility standard, it was added in such a way that still
breeds confusion.
The trickiest aspect of analysis under the “machine” prong of
the machine-or-transformation test remains the assessment of
mental processes. There appears to be agreement on the Federal
Circuit that purely mental processes are not patent-eligible because
they constitute abstract ideas.206 “Merely claiming a software
implementation of a purely mental process that could otherwise be
performed without the use of a computer does not satisfy the
machine prong of the machine-or-transformation test.”207 Yet this
mental process analysis places a heavy burden on the patent
examiner or court addressing the question. It generally requires
comparison to a hypothetical—an unclaimed mental process. In
CyberSource,208 the court had an admission by the CEO of the
company that owned the patent that the method had actually been
performed mentally in the past,209 and in Fort Properties the patent
owner admitted during prosecution that the use of a computer was
not necessary.210 Those admissions are the sorts of “golden facts”
not available with respect to most patents or patent applications. A
205

SiRF Tech., 601 F.3d at 1333; cf. Marchand v. Emken, 132 U.S. 195,
199 (1889).
206
E.g., CyberSource, 654 F.3d at 1377; Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC,
722 F.3d 1335, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
207
CyberSource, 654 F.3d at 1375; cf. SiRF Tech., 601 F.3d at 1332–33
(“We are not dealing with a situation in which there is a method that can be
performed without a machine.”).
208
CyberSource dealt with not only method claims but also a so-called
Beauregard claim, which recited a “computer readable medium containing
program instructions” that are executed by one or more computer processors to
carry out recited steps (i.e., method or process recitations).
209
CyberSource, 654 F.3d at 1373.
210
Fort Properties, 671 F.3d at 1319 (applicant represented during
prosecution that the recited methods “need not be performed by a computer”).
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patent examiner would typically not have the benefit of such
admissions on the record and is therefore forced to hypothesize
about the possibility of mental execution. Examiners, often quite
rightly, tend to struggle with such mental exercises that are not
based on evidence of record,211 potentially leading to the issuance
of a patent claims drawn to non-patent-eligible subject matter. The
same problems arise for judges in litigation.212 Any doctrine that
tends to require an admission by the patent applicant or owner that
the invention could be performed mentally is problematic because
a clever patent applicant or owner can simply avoid making such
an admission. But by looking at the point of novelty in a claim,
that is to say the point where the essential element of a solution to
an underlying technical problem is recited, trivial connections to
tangible, non-mental things like computers can be disregarded
when they are not implicated at the alleged point of novelty. For
instance, much greater clarity on patent subject matter eligibility
could be achieved if the United States required by statute that
patent claims be in two-part form as required in Europe,213 with
known, prior art elements separated from the recitation of the
asserted inventive contribution.214

211

The main problem is that the examiner or other person assessing patent
eligibility must effectively “invent” beyond the recited claim in order to analyze
it, which make the entire patentability analysis look like a farce.
212
Indeed, when a Federal Circuit panel decided Smartgene, Inc. v.
Advanced Biological Labs, SA, No. 2013–1186, 2014 WL259824 (Fed. Cir.
2014) (nonprecedential), under a “mental steps” analysis without the benefit of
an admission in the record as in Fort Properties or CyberSource, the opinion
was published as nonprecedential.
213
This format is called Jepson form in the United States and is permitted
but is not required.
214
European Patent Convention Rules Relating to Fees, EUR. PAT. OFF., r.
43(1), at 370 (Oct. 2013), http://documents.epo.org/projects/babylon/eponet.nsf/
0/00E0CD7FD461C0D5C1257C060050C376/$File/
EPC_15th_edition_2013.pdf (“The claims shall define the matter for which
protection is sought in terms of the technical features of the invention. Wherever
appropriate, claims shall contain: (a) a statement indicating the designation of
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In the Veblenian view, outlined further below, the dichotomy
between industrial and pecuniary activity suggests looking at
where the alleged gain from a claimed invention falls, in a
functional sense. If the proffered gain falls not within a
technological function, but within pecuniary or social spheres, then
the claim is directed to nonpatentable subject matter. For instance,
if a claim merely outlines the scope of the creative monopoly
desired by way of patent (i.e., the desired social consequence), but
does not delineate a contribution to the common stock of technical
knowledge, it fails to escape the purview of the pecuniary and
therefore should be deemed to lack the particular quid pro quo
required for a patent grant. This analysis can most meaningfully be
addressed by looking to the point of novelty or undertaking a
problem/solution analysis similar to what is performed under many
foreign patent law regimes in certain patentability contexts. When
U.S. courts resist such an approach, they only foster confusion and
abuse.
VII. GENERAL CONTOURS OF THE NEW THEORY
A. The Veblen Dichotomy
Thorstein Veblen introduced what is now commonly referred
to as the “pecuniary-industrial dichotomy,” the “ceremonialtechnological
dichotomy,”
the
“ceremonial-instrumental
dichotomy,” or sometimes even simply the “Veblen dichotomy.”215
[T]he central feature of Veblen’s work . . . was
the subject‑matter of the invention and those technical features which are
necessary for the definition of the claimed subject‑matter but which, in
combination, form part of the prior art; (b) a characterising portion, beginning
with the expression ‘characterised in that’ or ‘characterised by’ and specifying
the technical features for which, in combination with the features stated under
sub‑paragraph (a), protection is sought.”).
215
O’Hara, supra note 14, at 94. Clarence Ayres restated Veblen’s concept
as the “ceremonial-technological dichotomy.” RICK TILMAN, THORSTEIN
VEBLEN & JOHN DEWEY, C. WRIGHT MILLS AND THE GENERIC ENDS OF LIFE
107 (Rowman & Littlefield 2004).
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his development and use of the dichotomy between
business and industry, what his disciples were later
to call the ‘ceremonial-technological dichotomy’.
They and Veblen employed it as an analytical
device, as an approach to the larger problem of
value in economics and as part of a theory of social
change. In his usage, the dichotomy was extended
to include salesmanship as opposed to
workmanship, free income versus tangible
performance, individual gain as opposed to
community serviceability, invidious emulation
versus technological efﬁciency, and competitive
advertising versus the provision of valuable
information and guidance. To Veblen much of the
activity that the business community engaged in
was wasteful and futile, for the proﬁtability of
market exchange did not necessarily measure its
social value in achieving the generic ends of life.
However, he was not adequately speciﬁc about
which pursuits are industrial and which are
businesslike or which have both traits. Nevertheless,
it is clear in retrospect that such judgements [sic]
depend on the meaning assigned by Veblen to
‘fullness of life, impersonally considered’ which
was his way of indicating that the ‘generic ends of
life’ are transcultural in nature and often not served
by proﬁt-making.216
This was not a bright-line test in terms of the particular
industry or businesses involved, but rather dealt with the processes
and functions involved.217 When sorting processes according to the
216

Rick Tilman, Thorstein Veblen (1857–1929), supra note 13, at 167; see
also JONATHAN NITZAN & SHIMSHON BICHLER, CAPITAL AS POWER: A STUDY OF
ORDER AND CREORDER (Routledge 2009); Nitzan, supra note 29, at 169.
217
TILMAN supra note 215, at 93–108; see also R.L. Brinkman, Culture in
Neoinstititional Economics: An Integration of Myrdal and Galbraith Into the

[5:211 2014]

CYBARIS®, AN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW REVIEW

288

dichotomy, “[i]t is a question of the character of the process rather
than a question of the contrivances employed.”218 Veblen believed
that the functional character of technology is its application to
natural forces involving labor, materials and energy: “[K]nowledge
is useful, or may be made so, by applying it to control of the
processes in which natural forces are engaged. This employment of
scientific knowledge for useful ends is technology . . . .”219
Technology and the machine process220 deal with “impersonal,
dispassionate insight into the material facts with which mankind
has to deal.”221 Veblen wrote at length about how he saw the
“instinct of workmanship” fostering the useful employment of
science and technology to contribute to the “material well-being”
and “biological success” of the human race.222 His interest was in
Veblen-Ayres Matrix, 40 AM. J. OF ECONOMICS AND SOCIOLOGY, 401, 402–04
(1981).
218
VEBLEN, supra note 20, at 6.
219
VEBLEN, THE PLACE OF SCIENCE IN MODERN CIVILISATION, supra note
29, at 16; see also Geoffrey M. Hodgson, Veblen and Darwinism, 14 INT’L REV.
OF SOCIOLOGY 343, 344 (2004) (providing that the Darwinism that Veblen
adopted “means causal explanation, where a cause is understood as necessarily
involving transfers of matter or energy. Divine, spiritual, miraculous or
uncaused causes are ruled out. Explanations of outcomes are in terms of
connected causal sequence.”); see also, e.g., THORSTEIN VEBLEN, ABSENTEE
OWNERSHIP AND BUSINESS ENTERPRISE IN RECENT TIMES: THE CASE OF
AMERICA 231 n.1, 236 (Viking Press 1938) (1923).
220
In Veblen’s usage, the “machine process” was a component of
“technology” separated by a level of abstraction. Schatzberg, supra note 19, at
503.
221
VEBLEN, THE PLACE OF SCIENCE IN MODERN CIVILIZATION, supra note
219, at 1.
222
VEBLEN, supra note 8, at 25. Veblen saw the instinct of workmanship
rivaled only by the “parental bent” (with both of those instincts competing with
the acquisitive instinct); see also Reinert, supra note 18, at 65 (identifying in
Veblen productive proclivities, and the unproductive instinct of predation); cf.,
e.g., Naomi Klein, How Science Is Telling Us All to Revolt, NEW STATESMAN
(Oct. 29, 2013), http://www.newstatesman.com/2013/10/science-says-revolt
(positioning scientists against financiers when modeling how climate
catastrophe and possible extinction of the human species might be avoided).
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productivity gains from labor-and-energy-driven capital.223 The
functional character of invidious business or pecuniary activity, in
contrast to industrial activity, is culturally or socially contextdependent and not generally limited by labor or energy scarcity.
Much of Veblen’s thinking about engineering in this respect
showed some affinity with German economists (especially the
German Historical School) and demonstrated high regard for
German industrial practices, in which the concept of Technik drew
a connection between useful, practical skills and knowledge.224 “In
223

Michael Hudson, Veblen’s Institutionalist Elaboration of Rent Theory,
Speech given at the Veblen, Capitalism and Possibilities for a Rational
Economic Order Conference, Istanbul, Turkey (June 6, 2012), available at http:/
/michael-hudson.com/2012/07/veblens-institutionalist-elaboration-of-renttheory/; see also Paul N. Goldstene, Veblen's Theory of Value and the Problem
of Revolution, 6 INT’L J. POL. CULTURE & SOC’Y 507, 511-16 (1993).
224
Robert R. Locke, Reassessing the Basis of Corporate Business
Performance: Modern Financial Economics’ Profit Control Versus Integrated
People and Process Improvement, 64 REAL-WORLD ECON. REV. 110, 110, 115–
20
(2013),
available
at
http://www.paecon.net/PAEReview/issue64/
whole64.pdf. Eric Schatzberg has discussed Veblen’s pivotal role in importing
the concept of Tecknik to America, and highlighting how subsequent thinkers
lost much of Veblen’s nuance. Schatzberg, supra note 19, at 487–88; VEBLEN,
supra note 36, at 181–189. Veblen saw the predominance of “captains of
industry” over “captains of finance” as key to the rise of imperial Germany
leading up to World War I. More generally, some of Veblen’s contemporaries
who shared many theoretical similarities were Werner Sombart and Simon
Patten. See, e.g., THORSTEIN VEBLEN, ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF
POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE 125 (1899) (reviewing SIMON N. PATTEN, THE
DEVELOPMENT OF ENGLISH THOUGHT: A STUDY IN THE ECONOMIC
INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY (1899)); Thorstein Veblen, Book Review, 11 J.
POL. ECON. 300 (1903) (reviewing WERNER SOMBART, DER MODERNE
KAPITALISMUS (1902)); Thorstein Veblen, Book Review, 23 J. POL. ECON. 846
(1915)
(reviewing
WERNER
SOMBART
DER
BOURGEOIS:
ZUR
GEISTESGESCHICHTE DES MODERNEN WIRTSCHAFTSMENSCHEN (1913)). Veblen’s
work also reflected in some ways that of Henry George. See, e.g., Jim Horner &
John Martinez, Thorstein Veblen and Henry George on War, Conflict, and the
Military: An Institutionalist Connection, 31 J. ECON. ISSUES 633 (1997); James
H. Horner, Seeking Institutionalist Signposts in the Work of Henry George:
Relevance Often Overlooked, 52 AM. J. ECON. & SOC. 247 (1993).
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Germany the idea of Technik [the combination of Können
(practical skills and industrial arts) and Wissen (knowledge)] was
the essence of engineering . . . .”225
Veblen outlined clear distinctions between “the kind of
[productive] self-interest which contributes to wealth creation
from that which constitutes predatory wealth extraction.”226 He
described the socially and culturally determined monetary gains of
accumulated wealth and “assets” in contradistinction to
technological capital. Although the so-called “cumulative
causation” aspect of his thinking is often disregarded or
misunderstood,227 he said that pecuniary gains of wealth and
“assets” “are ‘timeless,’ . . . in so far as the enterprise from which
they accrue is dissociated from the technological circumstances
and processes of industry, and only in so far. Technological
(industrial) procedure, being of the nature of physical causation, is
subject to the time relation under which causal sequence runs.”228
That is not to say that business and pecuniary functions do not
have deep and wide-ranging influence, but their social contingency
lends them a different character than technology and the machine
process. In this sense, nontechnological activities can essentially be
divorced from the causally-linked evolution of the state of the art

225

Locke, supra note 224, at 110, 115–20.
Reinert, supra note 18, at 58; HUDSON, supra note 10, at xiv, xviii, 105,
130, 133, 383, 435 (explaining the financial sector “seeks to make money from
the economy in an extractive way. Finance today is acting in a way that deindustrializes economies, not builds them up.” “[T]he idea of ‘wealth creation’
has come to refer to raising the price of stocks and bonds that represent claims
on wealth (‘indirect investment’) rather than direct investment in capital
spending, research and development to increase production.”).
227
See Malcolm Rutherford, Veblen's Evolutionary Programme: a Promise
Unfulfilled, 22 CAMBRIDGE J. ECON. 463 (1998).
228
Veblen, On the Nature of Capital, supra note 8, at 129; see also
VEBLEN, supra note 20, at 37 (describing the machine process by saying “[i]ts
metaphysics is materialism and its point of view is that of causal sequence”).
226
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(in the Darwinian sense).229 Put more simply, technology is
transcultural, while pecuniary activity is not. Technological
advance faces different constraints than pecuniary activities, and
Veblen recognized that such a divergence could lead to various
price manipulations like over-capitalization (e.g., watered stock)
and credit bubbles brought about by pecuniary activities, which
can have disastrous effects on the economy as a whole.230 In the
practice of patent law, this is often seen with method claims that
use technology but are directed, at bottom, to only business
practices that merely direct the benefit of that use without
overcoming a problem associated with the current state of the
technological arts.231 Decisions on how to allocate benefits, wealth,
and economic value are purely social matters of a different
character than the “matter of fact” (objective) constraints on
knowledge of cause and effect involved in solving technical
problems. Allocations of value produce no net gain, they just
reposition actors within a social matrix (i.e., relative social status
changes), while advances in technical knowledge have potential to
provide a net gain in terms of increases in general well-being and
standards of living.
Others have articulated similar dichotomies, such as architect,
engineer, and futurist R. Buckminster Fuller’s “Class-One” and
229

See Geoffrey M. Hodgson, Veblen and Darwinism, 14 INT’L REV. SOC.
343, 345–48 (2004) (explaining Veblen’s Darwinian views on “cumulative
causation”); see also Alfred E. Kahn, Fundamental Deficiencies of the American
Patent Law, 30 AM. ECON. REV. 475, 479 (1940).
230
See Wray, supra note 13, at 618.
231
Although elsewhere this paper criticizes the use of hypotheticals to test
patentable subject matter eligibility (such as whether a method could
hypothetically be performed purely mentally), there is the possibility that a test
could ask hypothetically whether a patent claim would make sense if placed in a
different cultural context. For instance, if a patent claim relates to the legal
obligations associated with deeds to real property, one could ask if the claim
would present any productive benefit if practiced in another jurisdiction where
all land is owned by a monarch or the state, or where the “rule against
perpetuities” does not exist, etc.
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“Class-Two” evolutionary trending distinction. The former
represents the “integration of experience-won information” that
“increase[s] the capacity of humanity at large to cope with the
exigencies of life” in a way that “accounts for humans’ presence
on Earth,” while the latter represents “ego-flattering,” “initiative
taking,” “political reform,” credit taking, “power-structure,”
“privilege,” and “manipulation”-related activities.232 He used the
term “ephemeralization” to describe doing more with less through
technological advancement.233 Fuller’s comments are in a sense a
mere extension of Veblen’s theories.
Similar distinctions have been echoed in the realm of legal
commentary. The Veblen dichotomy was mirrored in some ways
by an influential 1952 article by patent attorney Robert Coulter,
which distinguished useful arts as practiced by tradesmen from
cultural arts that he described to include grammar, logic, rhetoric,
arithmetic, geometry, music and astronomy.234 Likewise, a similar
approach was suggested more recently by John Thomas, who said:
By restricting patentable advances to the
repeatable production or transformation of material
objects, and excluding subject matter founded upon
the aesthetic, social observation or personal skill,
[an] industrial application requirement would
restore a sense of patentable subject matter that
matches our sensibilities.235
Yet Coulter and Thomas’ approaches can be greatly refined
and bolstered with reference to Veblen’s economics, by tying the
232

R. BUCKMINSTER FULLER, CRITICAL PATH 229–30 (1981).
R. BUCKMINSTER FULLER, NINE CHAINS TO THE MOON 276–79 (1938).
234
Robert I. Coulter, The Field of the Statutory Useful Arts, 34 J. PAT. OFF.
SOC’Y 417, 496 (1952).
235
John R. Thomas, The Post-Industrial Patent System, 10 FORDHAM
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 3, 7 (1999); see also John R. Thomas, The
Patenting of the Liberal Professions, 40 B.C. L. REV. 1139, 1142, 1177–84
(1999).
233
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analysis to economic well-being in the real world rather than
merely alluding to historical traditions and arbitrary customs.236
Prior judicial decisions have held that a claim cannot carve out
a portion of an abstract concept for patent protection merely on the
basis reciting an incidental machine, computer or broad field of
endeavor.237 Such claims amount to merely reserving a portion of
the commercial market for an abstract idea (i.e., use of the abstract
idea in a given technological environment) without regard for any
technological contribution to public knowledge or restrictions on
further innovations by others.238 Claims that are “preemptive of a
fundamental concept or idea that would foreclose innovation” in a

236

Thomas’ paper on the “post-industrial patent system” makes no
reference to any of the various sociologists alternatively credited with coining
the term “post-industrial society,” or to Veblen or any other economists. He
instead focuses on philosophers of science. Paul W. DeVore, cited by Thomas,
echoes some views similar to Veblen, nonetheless. Although Thomas refers to
“restor[ing] a sense of patentable subject matter that matches our sensibilities,”
and “our long-held sense of the reach of the patent system,” he provides no
explanations for the economic or cultural bases for those “sensibilities” or
“long-held sense,” only more philosophical ones. Thomas, The Post-Industrial
Patent System, supra note 235, at 43–44; Thomas, The Patenting of the Liberal
Professions, supra note 235, at 1142.
237
E.g., Dealertrack, Inc. v. Huber, 674 F.3d 1315, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
(citing Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3231 (2010); Diamond v. Diehr, 450
U.S. 175, 191 (1981)); see also Marchand v. Emken, 132 U.S. 195, 199–200
(1889).
238
See, e.g., Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534 (1966) (“The basic quid
pro quo . . . for granting a patent monopoly is the benefit derived by the public
from an invention with substantial utility.”); Pennock v. Dialogue, 27 U.S. (2
Pet.) 1, 23 (1829) (If an invention is already commonly known and used when
the patent is sought, “there might be sound reason for presuming, that the
legislature did not intend to grant an exclusive right,” given the absence of a
“quid pro quo.”); Mayo Collab. Servs. v. Prometheus Labs, Inc., 132 S. Ct.
1289, 1301–02 (2012) (noting how problematic rent seeking is associated with
preemptive patent claims); MySpace, Inc. v. GraphOn Corp., 672 F.3d 1250,
1266,1269 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (Mayer, J., dissenting).
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given area are too abstract to be eligible for patent protection.239
The problem of preemption is only overcome with a reduction in
the level of abstraction by tying the inherent pecuniary aspects of a
patent monopoly (discussed below) to the recitation of productive
contributions to the general stock of technological knowledge of
cause-and-effect relationships. Cases on the issue of patent
eligibility have seen judges wrangle over where such a threshold is
crossed (or if the threshold is even a meaningful one)240 and have
set forth many different tests and clarifications that lack
uniformity.241 But such a threshold could be clearly established
with reference to the Veblen dichotomy. It is possible to fairly
consistently translate judicial concern over “abstract ideas” as an
underlying concern for patent protection on what Veblen called
“invidious” or “pecuniary” activity, with the level of abstraction
reduced sufficiently for patent eligibility only when patent claims
are tied to workmanlike technological activity.242
B. Economic Surplus and Productivity
A distinction can be drawn between technological advances
that can create economic surplus or wealth (which can later be
disposed of any a variety of ways), and ceremonial, business or
social endeavors that control economic value or surplus or wealth

239

Dealertrack, 674 F.3d at 1333; see also Mayo, 132 S.Ct. at 1301–02;
Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 91–92 (1972).
240
E.g. Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 722 F.3d 1335, 1342, 1353 (Fed.
Cir. 2013) (“[T]his court does not define the level of programming complexity
required before a computer-implemented method can be patent-eligible.”).
241
See generally CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd., 717 F.3d 1269
(Fed. Cir. 2013) (en banc) (per curiam), cert. granted, 82 U.S.L.W. 3131 (U.S.
Dec. 6, 2013) (No. 13–298).
242
Today it is really only the subset of Federal Circuit judges advocating an
expansive “coarse filter” approach to patent eligibility who diverge from this
tenet. See Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen IDEC, 659 F.3d 1057, 1066
(Fed. Cir. 2011); Research Corp. Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 627 F.3d 859,
869 (2010).
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already in existence.243 This was a major feature of Veblen’s 1914
book, The Instinct of Workmanship and the State of the Industrial
Arts, which described transformations in society whereby
economic surpluses were first created by technological advances
but then looted, appropriated, and subverted, through war in early
phases of civilization and then by the sabotage and appropriations
of the pecuniary business interests in later phases.244 He thought,
however, that modern technology was so productive that historical
examples failed to impress the significance of how the
wastefulness of nonproductive pecuniary activities parasitically
detracted from general welfare.245 Although Veblen was not the
243

Dugger, Veblen’s Radical Theory of Social Evolution, supra note 15, at
651; RICK TILMAN, A VEBLEN TREASURY: FROM LEISURE CLASS TO WAR,
PEACE, AND CAPITALISM xxiv (Sharpe 1993); STEPHEN EDGELL, VEBLEN IN
PERSPECTIVE: HIS LIFE AND THOUGHT 77 (Sharpe 2001); O’Hara, supra note
14.; Reinert, supra note 18, at 58–69 (“A major achievement of Enlightenment
economics, on which I argue Veblen builds, was to separate the economic
activities where the vested interests contributed to the common good—where
wealth-production was a by-product of self-interest and greed—and where greed
produced no such beneficial effects.”); Mitchell, supra note 15, at 392; Dugger,
Veblen and Kropotkin on Human Evolution, supra note 15, at 978; cf. JOHN
RAE, STATEMENT OF SOME NEW PRINCIPLES ON THE SUBJECT OF POLITICAL
ECONOMY, EXPOSING THE FALLACIES OF THE SYSTEM OF FREE TRADE, AND OF
SOME OTHER DOCTRINES MAINTAINED IN THE “WEALTH OF NATIONS” (1834),
available
at
http://books.google.com/books?id=4TXAAAAMAAJ&printsec=frontcover#v=onepage&q&f=false; Brewer, supra
note 13; see also Schatzberg, supra note 19, at 499 (“[I]n essence [Veblen’s
expressed conflict between “business” and “industry”] centered on the
distinction between wasteful and productive tendencies in human evolution.”).
244
Sociologist C. Wright Mills, for one, elaborated on the ceremonialtechnological distinction in the context of industrial relations in later historical
phases, focusing on the ways in which industrial managers deal with workers to
achieve ceremonial ends rather than technological ones. TILMAN supra note 215,
at 107.
245
VEBLEN, supra note 20, at 36, 64–65 (“In so far as the gains of . . .
unproductive occupations are of a substantial character, they come out of the
aggregate product of other occupations in which the various classes of the
community engage. . . . But owing to the very high productive efficiency of the
modern mechanical industry, the margin available for wasteful occupations and
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first or last economic theorist to discuss concepts that surround
surplus value, he went further than those before him in illustrating
the relationship of social institutions to the control of such value.246
His particular emphasis on the control of surplus to bolster social
status represents a significant departure from (if not an implicit
refutation of) Say’s law—“supply creates its own demand”—
which is the foundation of much of neoclassical economics and the
equilibrium theories that Veblen despised yet dominate orthodox
economics to this day.247 This also allowed Veblen to completely
abandon the labor theory of value relied upon by classical

wasteful expenditures is very great.”); see also Hudson, supra note 223 (“It was
left to Veblen to deal with the rentiers’ increasingly dominant yet corrosive role,
extracting their wealth by imposing overhead charges on the rest of society.”);
HUDSON, supra note 10, at xiv, xviii, 105, 130, 133, 383, 435 (“The banking
system has been decoupled from the real economy. The financial sector’s
independent and self-referential expansion path is independent of the ‘real’
economy’s surplus, or its ability to support this overhead. Financial returns are
made in extractive ways, as a subtrahend from the surplus created by labor and
tangible capital, rather than funding capital accumulation. Productivity is raised
by working labor harder and exploiting it more, not by technology.” “The
banker’s ‘product’ is society’s debt overhead.”).
246
Veblen drew this long-established concept from classical economics.
HUDSON, supra note 10, at 19-203 (summarizing relevant classical economic
theory, including that of surplus value). An important early example was
François Quesnay of the French physiocrat school, whose TABLEAU
ÉCONOMIQUE (1759) outlined economic interactions between “productive,”
“proprietary,” and “sterile” classes. Quesnay, however, emphasized agriculture
over industry, for largely chauvinistic reasons given the greater role of
agriculture in France as compared to England, France’s chief rival at the time.
247
Adil H. Mouhammed, Veblen and Keynes: On the Economic Theory of
the Capitalist Economy, 155 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 594, 599–
600 (1999); see also Debunking Economics, Part VIII: Macroeconomics, or
Applied Microeconomics?, UNLEARNING ECON. (Aug. 26, 2012), http://
unlearningeconomics.wordpress.com/2012/08/26/debunking-economics-partviii-macroeconomics-or-applied-microeconomics
(citing
STEVE
KEEN,
DEBUNKING ECONOMICS : THE NAKED EMPEROR DETHRONED? (2011)). Contra
Say’s Law, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Say%27s_Law (last
modified Mar. 17, 2014).
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economists like Adam Smith and David Ricardo.248 He instead
posited value as being pecuniary (i.e., based on money), and in
turn saw money as being endogenous—a social creation—with
humans engaging in production to acquire money as a
representation of social status and power.249 The late sociologist
Pierre Bourdieu, in championing a return to the challenge put forth
by institutional economics, noted that it was Veblen who “long ago
enunciated the effects of structure, or of position within a structure,
on the definition of needs and hence on demand.”250 In this way,
Veblen represented a singular voice on the fundamental economic
question of how “value” is conceptualized.
Importantly, Veblen’s dichotomy “breaks the link between
production and distribution.”251 In doing so, a novel theory of
economic value is introduced, albeit somewhat obliquely.252
Distribution of socially-recognized assets had a different character
than the industrial activities that provide the means of production.
It is the existential notion of absurdity (Veblen instead preferred
the term opacity) that anchors Veblen’s argument for
differentiating productive and unproductive functions in economic

248

O’Hara, supra note 14, at 90–93; Dugger, supra note 13, at 1; see also
Labor
Theory
of
Value,
WIKIPEDIA
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Labor_theory_of_value (last modified Mar. 11, 2014).
249
G. Parker Foster & B. Ranson, Thorstein Veblen on Money and
Production, 9 ECON. ET SOCIETIES 221 (1987), reprinted in 2 THORSTEIN
VEBLEN: CRITICAL ASSESSMENTS 444–49 (John Cunningham Wood ed.,
Routledge 1993) (noting how Veblen’s thinking here anticipated that of John
Maynard Keynes); L. Randall Wray, Endogenous Money: Structuralist and
Horizontalist 4 (Levy Econ. Inst., Working Paper No. 512), available at http://
www.levyinstitute.org/pubs/wp_512.pdf.
250
BOURDIEU, supra note 40, at 211.
251
TILMAN, supra note 215, at 97 (citing Thorstein Veblen, Industrial and
Pecuniary Employments, 3 PUBLICATIONS OF THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC
ASSOCIATION 190, 215–16 (1901)).
252
Paul N. Goldstene, Veblen's Theory of Value and the Problem of
Revolution, 6 INT’L J. POL. CULTURE & SOC’Y 507, 511–16 (1993).
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analysis,253 and likewise can anchor an argument against extending
patent protection to unproductive functions.
C. Asset Relationships
Veblen noted the different characters of tangible and intangible
assets, on the one hand, and capital goods on the other.254 Both are
ways in which products and processes are capitalized. A given
item may have characteristics of both, in varying degrees. Tangible
assets are rather self-explanatory, yet intangible ones raise deeper
issues. Letters patents were noted in his analysis for their character
as intangible assets, due to their special legal status that grants the
patent holder a right to exclude others from practicing the claimed
invention.
The tangible assets capitalize the preferential
use of technological, industrial expedients,—
expedients of production, dealing with the facts of
brute nature under the laws of physical cause and
effect,—this preferential use being secured by the
ownership of material articles employed in the
processes in which these expedients are put into
effect. The intangible assets capitalize the
preferential use of certain facts of human nature—
habits,
propensities,
beliefs,
aspirations,
necessities—to be dealt with under the
psychological laws of human motivation; this
253

In Veblen’s idea of blind drift, which is the substance of his arguments
involving the absurd, “[h]istory contains no meaning save what humans impart
to it.” Dugger, supra note 13, at 1.
254
“[T]angible assets, commonly so called, capitalize the processes of
production, while intangible assets, so called, capitalize certain expedients and
processes of acquisition, not productive of wealth, but affecting only its
distribution.” Veblen, On the Nature of Capital, supra note 8, at 117; see also
STEVE KEEN, DEBUNKING ECONOMICS - REVISED AND EXPANDED EDITION: THE
NAKED EMPEROR DETHRONED? 142–57 (2011) (explaining how “capital” should
not really be used interchangeably to describe both “a sum of money” and “a
collection of machinery,” though some economists confusingly do so).
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preferential use being secured by custom, as in the
case of old-fashioned good-will, by legal
assignment, as in patent or copyright, by ownership
of the instruments of production, as in the case of
industrial monopolies.255
Further, as to the character of a patent right
considered as an asset[.] The invention or
innovation covered by the patent right is a
contribution to the common stock of technological
proficiency[.] It may be (immediately) serviceable
to the community at large, or it may not;—eg, a
cash register, a bank-check punch, a street-car fare
register, a burglar-proof safe, and the like are of no
immediate service to the community at large, but
serve only a pecuniary use to their users[.] But,
whether the innovation is useful or not, the patent
right, as an asset, has no (immediate) usefulness at
large, since its essence is the restriction of the
usufruct of the innovation to the patentee[.]
Immediately and directly the patent right must be
considered a detriment to the community at large,
since its purport is to prevent the community from
making use of the patented innovation, whatever
may be its ulterior beneficial effects or its ethical
justification.256
Key to these insights is the relationship to the traditional quid
pro quo of the patent grant.257 Every patent has at least theoretical
255

Veblen, On the Nature of Capital, supra note 8, at 123–24 (footnote
omitted) (emphasis added).
256
Id. at 115 n.1 (emphasis added). This resembles a Jeffersonian view on
the value of patents.
257
Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 223–24 (2002) (discussing the
foundation of patent right—and copyright—in a quid pro quo framework);
J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred International, Inc., 534 U. S. 124,
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value as an intangible asset.258 This is fundamentally a social
(pecuniary) value, as it rests on social norms that give weight to
the rule of law establishing exclusionary rights in patents. This is
also the basis for the incentive theory on which the U.S. patent
laws have rested—rightly or wrongly—from their first
enactment.259 Public disclosure of an invention is “the price paid
for the exclusivity secured” by the patent monopoly given to an
inventor.260 For instance, in parallel with Veblen’s critiques,
economist Alfred Marshall distinguished temporally-limited
“quasi-rents,” associated with patent grants as reward for
innovation, from predatory, unearned rents.261 Yet the subject
142 (2001) (“The disclosure required by the Patent Act is ‘the quid pro quo of
the right to exclude.’” (quoting Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U. S. 470,
484 (1974))); Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U. S. 141,
161 (1989) (“the quid pro quo of substantial creative effort required by the
federal [patent] statute”); Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534 (1966) (“The
basic quid pro quo ... for granting a patent monopoly is the benefit derived by
the public from an invention with substantial utility.”); Pennock v. Dialogue, 27
U.S. (2 Pet.) 1, 23 (1829) (If an invention is already commonly known and used
when the patent is sought, “there might be sound reason for presuming, that the
legislature did not intend to grant an exclusive right,” given the absence of a
“quid pro quo.”); see also Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 63 (1998)
(“[T]he patent system represents a carefully crafted bargain that encourages both
the creation and the public disclosure of new and useful advances in technology,
in return for an exclusive monopoly for a limited period of time.”); MySpace,
Inc. v. GraphOn Corp., 672 F.3d 1250, 1266 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (Mayer, J.,
dissenting).
258
This distinction is lost in some economic treatments of patents, or at
least not completely articulated. See, e.g., Irwin, supra note 9, at 814, 820
(noting that “economic good” and “social good” are not coextensive as is
sometimes assumed).
259
See, e.g., Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U. S. 225, 229
(1964).
260
Eldred, 537 U.S. at 216.
261
Hudson, supra note 223; Quasi-rent, WIKIPEDIA, https://
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quasi-rent (last updated Aug. 10, 2013). It does bear
mentioning here that Veblen was, in general, critical of Alfred Marshall. The
basic idea is that although patents are about rent-seeking, the quid pro quo of
patent grants balances the inherent rent-seeking aspect against a public benefit
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matter of a given patent claim may or may not relate to tools, real
production, and technological knowledge of cause-and-effect. This
correlates directly to the question of patent subject matter
eligibility and goes to the balance struck by the patent laws
between rewarding inventive activity, on the one hand, and
conveying creative monopolies, on the other.262 Some, like Joseph
Schumpeter, tend to assume that the latter always promotes the
former, while others, like Veblen, tend to see possible divergences.
It might be said that a patent claim that does not recite a
contribution with a sufficient relationship to “technological
proficiency” or “usefulness at large” should not be subject matter
eligible, because it represents merely a naked pecuniary benefit
and therefore is about “getting something for nothing” or a “free
lunch.” The point, along Veblenian lines, is to identify and limit
zero-sum pecuniary rent-seeking. “Any and all greed and selfinterest is obviously not compatible with public interest, only the
self-interest which increases rather than diminishes the size of the
economic pie.”263 This is a more economic-centered approach than
the “machine-or-transformation” test applied in patent law,264 yet
also the opposite of the tacit economic rationale applied by some
judges to the analysis of patent eligibility today. 265 All patents are
for a temporally-limited period. Veblen said that discussions of “rent” or
“quasi-rent” were “of great theoretical weight.” VEBLEN, supra note 20, at 201,
n. 6.
262
DAVID F. NOBLE, AMERICA BY DESIGN: SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND THE
RISE OF CORPORATE CAPITALISM 84-109 (Knopf 1977).
263
Reinert, supra note 18, at 58, 62 (noting a need to “separate the kind of
self-interest which contributes to wealth creation from that which constitutes
predatory wealth extraction. In other words productive self-interest or good
greed must be separated from bad greed . . . . Thorstein Veblen’s work was the
one making the clearest separation between the human proclivities that produce
– respectively – good and bad greed.”).
264
See generally U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, MPEP § 2106 (8th
ed. Rev. 8, Aug. 2012).
265
Irwin, supra note 9, at 814 (“Today, the standards [for patent eligibility]
encompass any product of human action that creates economic value. If
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intangible assets, but when a patent claim fails to extend beyond
the essentially social realm of intangible assets and fails to provide
a contribution to the common stock of technological proficiency,
then subject matter eligibility should be deemed lacking. A patent
claim that relates only to intangible assets is a naked grant of
economic monopoly power, in a zero-sum sense, without a
concomitant contribution to the repeatable human mastery of
nature (i.e., applied physics and engineering).266
When courts criticize patent claims as being to “abstract ideas”
because those claims have only incidental connections to
machines, etc.,267 it often is because the patent applicant or owner
something has value in use or exchange . . . it now constitutes patentable subject
matter.”) (internal citations omitted). In many ways, Irwin’s analysis is along
Veblenian lines, by criticizing the refusal of neoclassical economics to recognize
distinctions between productive and unproductive activities or the endogenous
and social nature of economic valuation, and by rejecting the distinction drawn
in some economic schools between exchange value and use value. Compare id.,
with BOURDIEU, supra note 40. The “economic” rationale summarized by Irwin
also rejects the Enlightenment ideal that private greed is tolerated only when it
promotes the public good, and instead endorses any private gain without
consideration of the public good—making such analyses blind to whether the
asserted private gain came at the expense of another (a zero-sum result). See
Reinert, supra note 18, at 58, 62. This is a turn toward what the Lowell Mill
Girls’ once criticized as the “new spirit of the age: gain wealth, forgetting all but
self.”
266
This is why Veblen could mention “letters patent” and “letters of
marque” in the same breath when discussing the preferential benefits of
immaterial wealth. Veblen, On the Nature of Capital, supra note 8, at 113–14;
see also Zuege, supra note 64, at 21. Veblen drew a distinction between
serviceability “at large” and serviceability merely to a user. The “usefulness” of
a patent that covers a known process may be tremendous for the patent holder in
the self-interested, intangible asset sense, due to the patent holder’s ability to
levy what amounts to a quasi-extortionate tax on businesses relying on the
process (i.e., rent-seeking). But while such a raw transfer of wealth is “useful” to
the patent holder accruing the benefits of such a transfer, it is of no use to
society writ large, which gains no step forward in repeatable efforts of applied
physics and engineering.
267
See, e.g., Dealertrack, Inc. v. Huber, 674 F.3d 1315, 1334 (Fed. Cir.
2012) (citing Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3231 (2010); Diamond v. Diehr,
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is merely seeking to surrender a part of the monopoly power that
“capitalize[s] the preferential use of certain facts of human naturehabits, propensities, beliefs, aspirations, necessities” (usually the
part least profitable to him or her) without tethering him- or herself
to any particular “contribution to the common stock of
technological proficiency.” The patent applicant/owner may be
willing to accept a smaller monopoly, but such argument should be
deemed irrelevant. The question that should be asked is how the
patent applicant or patentee has claimed a contribution to the
“common stock of technological proficiency” to justify any
monopoly grant at all.268 Has a given “inventor” enabled human
beings to repeatably achieve a result in the (transcultural) natural
world that humans were unable to previously accomplish?269 Or
has he or she merely found a way to exert influence in a social
matrix, possibly by seeking a patent monopoly—however large or
small—to reserve an entire field of endeavor to him- or herself?
The former can be economically productive, while the latter is
invidious and nonproductive.270 A contribution of a nontechnical
450 U.S. 175, 191 – 92 n.14 (1981)); SiRF Tech., Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n,
601 F.3d 1319, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Marchand v. Emken, 132 U.S. 195, 199
(1889).
268
Cf. MySpace, Inc. v. GraphOn Corp., 672 F.3d 1250, 1266 (Fed. Cir.
2012 (Mayer, J., dissenting) (“A patentee does not uphold his end of [the patent
system’s] ‘bargain’ if he seeks broad monopoly rights without a concomitant
contribution to the existing body of scientific and technical knowledge.”).
“Technological progress reduces the value of physical capital in place.”
HUDSON, supra note 10, at 312.
269
See VEBLEN, supra note 20, at 37 (“The discipline of the machine
process . . . inculcates a habit of apprehending and explaining facts in terms of
material cause and effect.”).
270
Even Ronald Coase, from the so-called “freshwater” neo-classical
school of economics, had to concede—albeit tucked into a footnote—a very
Veblenian point that (for a parallel situation involving broadcast
communications licenses), “A waste of resources may result when the criteria
used by courts to delimit rights result in resources being employed solely to
establish a claim.” R. H. Coase, The Federal Communications Commission, 2 J.
LAW & ECONOMICS 1, 27 n.54 (1959). To the extent that Coase attempted to
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and nonproductive disclosure as to business methods or the like
should therefore be seen as insufficient to satisfy the quid pro quo
of a patent monopoly. Such business method patent claims amount
to no more than piling the pecuniary on top of the pecuniary,
without crossing over to the realm of nonpecuniary technological
proficiency.
D. Equal Access
When the U.S. patent system was first established, in the initial
constitutional authorization and through its early administration, it
represented both a continuance and a divergence from the British
patent system on which it was largely based. The constitutional
clause “To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries” continued to
give inventors (and authors) a central role,271 but the United States
went further in making its patent system more egalitarian than the
system in England.272 The early administration of the patent system
in the United States made patents available to a much wider set of
socioeconomic classes than in England, which had historically
tended to preserve upper class privilege through royal grants of

merge institutional economics with marginal analysis, see Herbert Hovenkamp,
The Law of Vertical Integration and the Business Firm: 1880–1960, 95 IOWA L.
REV. 863, 875 (2010), he was rejecting the basis of Veblen’s program.
271
The role of inventors was established in the British Statute of
Monopolies of 1624. This has carried through as a bedrock principle of America
patent law. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche
Molecular Sys., Inc., 563 U.S. ___, No. 09-1159, Slip Op. at *6 (U.S., June 6,
2011) (“Although much in intellectual property law has changed in the 220
years since the first [American] Patent Act, the basic idea that inventors have the
right to patent their inventions has not.”).
272
It scarcely bears mentioning that the United States was still lacking in
egalitarian practices by modern standards, given that slavery was protected,
women denied the right to vote, etc. But the trend was toward increasing
egalitarianism.
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monopolies.273 Moreover, the practice of the “useful arts” was
from antiquity through the American revolutionary period viewed
as the province of lower classes.274 Reciting “useful arts” as a
constitutional limitation on patent grants carries a significant social
meaning, linking patent monopolies to the “vulgar” workmanlike
activities of lower classes. Yet as Veblen later articulated, things
like privilege and monopoly (including patent monopolies) are
connected to the pecuniary interests of the leisure and business
classes—those who typically see themselves as above the sort of
“workmanship” associated with the useful arts.
In these respects, the American patent system represented a
relatively egalitarian convergence of upper and lower class
interests.275 Veblen’s discussion of intangible asset capitalization
273

B. Zorina Khan, Intellectual Property and Economic Development:
Lessons from American and European History, BRITISH COMM. INT. PROP.
RIGHTS (London, 2002), available at http://network.idlo.int/Publications/
Khan%20Z.%20%20Intellectual%20Property%20and%20Economic%20Development,%20Less
ons%20from%20History.pdf; B. Zorina Khan & Kenneth L. Sokoloff,
Institutions and Technological Growth During Early Economic Development:
Evidence from the Great Inventors of the United States, 94 AM. ECON. REV. 395,
1790–1930 (2004) (noting, inter alia, that early U.S. patents were less restricted
to inventors with “elite” backgrounds than in Britain during the same era, and
early U.S. patent system fees were a fraction of those in Britain); see also
Morgan Sherwood, The Origins and Development of the American Patent
System: How Well Do the Idea and Implementation of Patents Mesh With the
Aims of a Democratic Society?, 71 AM. SCIENTIST 500 (1983); Irwin, supra note
9, at 796–97.
274
Leo Marx, Technology: The Emergence of a Hazardous Concept, 51
TECH. & CULTURE 561, 573 (2010).
275
Chris Dent has written about how the British Statute of Monopolies
represented a political compromise between essentially different class interests,
and was emblematic of the transition from feudalism to capitalism. In this
context, the Statute of Monopolies eliminated patents in areas other than for
invention. Chris Dent, ‘Generally Inconvenient’: The 1624 Statute of
Monopolies as Political Compromise, 33 MELBOURNE U. L. REV. 415 (2009);
see also MAX LOUIS KENT, THE BRITISH ENLIGHTENMENT AND THE SPIRIT OF
THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION: THE SOCIETY FOR THE ENCOURAGEMENT OF
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through patents implicitly recognizes that convergence.276 Yet,
recent expansions of patent subject matter eligibility threaten to
erase this contextual grounding.
By opening patentability to the domains of invidious pecuniary
interests—like those of the FIRE sector—the strict connection to
the lowly “useful arts” is broken and the egalitarian class
convergence embedded in the U.S. patent system is denigrated.
This harkens back to the pre-Statue of Monopolies British system
that tended toward monopoly grants to protect the privileges of
vested interests.277 The seeming regression to the economic
conditions of “post-industrial feudalism” discussed above carries
with it an urge to shift social institutions as well, pushing patent
law institutions back the pre-Enlightenment era when they
encompassed naked grants of privilege, unmoored from the bounds
of the useful arts.278 While criticizing the underlying views that
rely on a labor theory of value, Veblen discussed how the Western
European (and specifically English) view of ownership, which had
ARTS, MANUFACTURES AND COMMERCE (1754–1815) 215–22 (2008). In the
Veblenian view, the ways in which feudal privileges were both preserved and
limited as evidenced by the political compromise of the Statute of Monopolies,
and then carried over in part to American patent law, is of particular interest.
276
Veblen very much wrote about social shifts in balances of power, and
was in some respects lamenting how egalitarian ideals from the Enlightenment
era were being lost in America at the dawn of the Twentieth Century.
277
Thomas Ewing, The American Patent System, in CENTENNIAL
CELEBRATION OF THE AMERICAN PATENT SYSTEM: BEING A COMPLETE
SUMMARY OF ALL THE SPEECHES & DATA OF THE BANQUET & PROCEEDINGS OF
THE ONE HUNDREDTH ANNIVERSARY OF THE AMERICAN PATENT SYSTEM 6 (U.S.
Gov. Printing Office, 1937); Dent, supra note 275, at 443 (noting that patents
were sometimes granted to someone other than the inventor); Allen Nard &
Andrew P. Morriss, Constitutionalizing Patents: From Venice to Philadelphia, 2
REV. L. & ECON. 223, 258–90 (2006).
278
This is part of what Veblen means when he distinguishes the causal
sequence of technology from the evolution of pecuniary institutions—the latter
can ebb and flow while technological knowledge doesn’t. For a discussion of the
influence of Enlightenment thought on the question of patentability, see Irwin,
supra note 9, at 785–96.
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carried forward to the modern age, first arose during the era of
“handicraft and petty trade” from the theories of people like John
Locke, and dealt with ownership claims arising from productive
work.279 This supplanted a view from medieval (feudal) times
when ownership was premised on social standing (the divine rights
of kings, hereditary privilege, etc.).280 Where Veblen went beyond
Enlightenment thinkers like Locke, was in his exposition of the
industrial-pecuniary dichotomy to more clearly distinguish
productive activity from unproductive activity during a more
modern age of mechanized industry, and in rejecting an economic
value theory premised exclusively on one factor like labor. In
present circumstances, opening patent eligibility to business
methods and the like allows pecuniary interests to exert further
control over the economy without interfacing with the lowly realm
of the useful arts, turning the conception of patent rights back to
the period before the Enlightenment and before the Statute of
Monopolies set the stage for Enlightenment thinkers like Locke.
VIII. EXPLORING SOCIAL ASPECTS FOR PATENT ELIGIBILITY
ANALYSIS IN A VEBLENIAN FRAMEWORK
A. The Nature of Pecuniary Activities
If a Veblenian dichotomy is to be applied to patent subject
matter eligibility questions, it is important to understand the
invidious social nature of pecuniary activities. Veblen saw
financial securities instruments and real estate as the two chief
examples (though certainly not the only examples) of pecuniary
business activities that lacked serviceability at large.281
279

VEBLEN, supra note 20, at 71–82.
Id. at 75–77.
281
He also frequently mentioned advertising and sales as privately
benefitting business without corresponding serviceability at large. Id. at 52–55
(“The great end of consistent advertising is to establish such differential
monopolies resting on popular conviction.”). Compare id., with Graeber, supra
note 57. Moreover, he saw gambling and games of chance as also lacking
280
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Of these strictly economic activities that are
lucrative without necessarily being serviceable to
the community, the greater part are to be classed as
“business.” Perhaps the largest and most obvious
illustration
of
these
legitimate
business
employments is afforded by the speculator in
securities. By way of further illustration may be
mentioned the extensive and varied business of realestate men (land-agents) engaged in the purchase
and sale of property for speculative gain or for a
commission; so, also, the closely related business of
promoters and boomers of other than real-estate
ventures; as also attorneys, brokers, bankers, and
the like, although the work of these latter will more
obviously bear interpretation in terms of social
serviceability. The traffic of these business men
shades off insensibly from that of the bona fide
speculator who has no ulterior end of industrial
efficiency to serve, to that of the captain of industry
or entrepreneur as conventionally set forth in the
economic manuals.
The characteristic in which these business
employments resemble one another, and in which
they differ from the mechanical occupations as well
as from other non-economic employments, is that
they are concerned primarily with the phenomena of
value—with exchange or market values and with
purchase and sale—and only indirectly and
secondarily, if at all, with mechanical processes.
What holds the interest and guides and shifts the
attention of men within these employments is the
main chance. These activities begin and end within
serviceability and fundamentally based on predatory instincts rather than
scientific matter-of-fact knowledge. See generally VEBLEN, supra note 10, at
276–78, 282.
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what may broadly be called “the higgling of the
market”. Of the industrial employments, in the
stricter sense, it may be said, on the other hand, that
they begin and end outside the higgling of the
market. Their proximate aim and effect is the
shaping and guiding of material things and
processes. Broadly, they may be said to be primarily
occupied with the phenomena of material
serviceability, rather than with those of exchange
value. They are taken up with the phenomena which
make the subject matter of Physics and the other
material sciences.282
Early on Veblen drew this distinction between invidious
“pecuniary” activities, which tended to function in the realm of
pricing and socially contingent value judgments, from those of
industry, which were noninvidious and matter-of-fact issues of
efficiency, and he carried the idea forward through his later work.
Indeed, he used the term “price system” to refer generally to the
endogenous (and socially contingent) nature of economic value
determinations, as distinct from the practical and useful qualities of
workmanlike engineering activity.283
First, take “inventions” for financial securities operations and
practices. These are generally a product of confidence and
euphoria, and are tied to particular social contexts. Economist John
Kenneth Galbraith (a noted adherent of Veblen’s theories) later
said that “financial operations do not lend themselves to
innovation.”284 Rather, “[a]ll financial innovation involves, in one
282

Thorstein Veblen, Industrial and Pecuniary Employments, 2 PUB. AM.
ECON. ASS’N, 190, 204–05 (1901), available at https://archive.org/details/jstor2485814.
283
See generally THORSTEIN VEBLEN, THE ENGINEERS AND THE PRICE
SYSTEM (1921).
284
JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, A SHORT HISTORY OF FINANCIAL
EUPHORIA 19 (Penguin Books 1993); see also VEBLEN, supra note 20, at 103–
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form or another, the creation of debt secured in greater or lesser
adequacy by real assets.”285 Finance often revolves around
“speculative” activities, which involve “changing prices of goods
which have already been produced, rather than . . . the production
of new goods and services.”286 In this way recently reported
“productivity gains” in the U.S. economy have often really
“involved control of government and cultural attitudes, not
technology as most people understand the term.”287 The highvolume, nearly instantaneous computerized securities trading
undertaken by financial traders known as “quants,”288 for instance,
tends to look much like a game of misleading competitors
(especially other quants) in intention in order to make speculative
profits off zero-sum arbitrage.289 In some ways, the “quants”
simply deployed a computerized Keynesian beauty contest, the
classic example given by economist John Maynard Keynes, of
economic activities being less about objective fact or individual
opinion than of gauging public perceptions within a social

04, (“[A]ll advances made by banking houses or by other creditors in a like case,
. . . all these ‘advances’ go to increase the ‘capital’ of which business men have
the disposal; but for the material purposes of industry, taken in the aggregate,
they are purely fictitious items. . . . Funds of whatever character are a pecuniary
fact, not an industrial one; they serve the distribution of the control of industry
only, not its materially productive work.”).
285
GALBRAITH, supra note 284; see also Michael Hudson, Wall Street's
Power Grab, COUNTERPUNCH (Jan. 19, 2010), http://www.counterpunch.org/
2010/01/19/wall-street-s-power-grab. Similar views appear regularly in the
popular press. E.g., Matt Taibbi, Looting the Pension Funds, ROLLING STONE
(Sept. 26, 2013), http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/looting-thepension-funds-20130926.
286
Reinert, supra note 18, at 57, 66.
287
Schaefer, supra note 58 (quoting Michael Hudson).
288
For an overview of “quants,” see SCOTT PATTERSON, THE QUANTS
(2010).
289
Pam Martens, Inside the Flash Crash Report, COUNTERPUNCH (Oct. 4,
2010), http://www.counterpunch.org/2010/10/04/inside-the-flash-crash-report.
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context.290 Taken to the absurd, this is very much like the battle of
wits between Vizzini (played by Wallace Shawn) and The Man in
Black (played by Cary Elwes) in the movie The Princess Bride in
which two men compete to the death as one tries to select a wine
chalice to drink from that is free from poison—noting of course
Vizzini’s attempt to deceive the Man in Black with distraction and
a surreptitious maneuver.291
Another, closely related aspect is to avoid regulation, that is, to
circumvent legal restrictions on capital flow.292 In essence,
“financial innovation” for financial instruments and trading can be
generalized as variations in leverage in such instruments and
transaction, and in the manipulation of balance sheets through
accounting practices. While these may admit a certain
accomplishment and personal skill, it is a game of confidence. And
confidence games are social ones. Persons achieving such financial
accomplishments have certainly expended effort to do so, but it
remains difficult to see how such effort bears any relationship to
the ways productive innovation has been recognized in traditional
290

JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT INTEREST
MONEY (1936); see also Keynesian Beauty Contest, WIKIPEDIA, https://
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Keynesian_beauty_contest (last updated June 7, 2013).
291
THE PRINCESS BRIDE (Twentieth Century Fox 1987).
292
HARVEY, supra note 67, at 99–100 (“One of the purposes of this
innovation wave was to avoid regulation and to create new arenas in which the
capital surpluses could be profitably deployed in ‘free’ (that is, unregulated)
markets without constraint.”); James K. Galbraith, The Final Death (and Next
Life) of Keynes, Keynote Lecture to 5th Annual “Dijon” Conference on Post
Keynesian Economics, Copenhagen, Denmark (May 13, 2011), http://
www.zcommunications.org/the-final-death-and-next-life-of-keynes-by-james-kgalbraith (discussing, in the context of the work of Thorstein Veblen and John
Commons, the use of technology by finance “for the purpose of breaking down
and evading the law” and that volumes of recent financial vehicles are hypervulnerable to fraud). The argument that patents that restrict this sort of activity
might be to the public benefit is not pursued here. See generally Christopher A.
Cotropia & James Gibson, The Upside of Intellectual Property’s Downside, 57
UCLA L. REV. 921 (2010).
AND
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industrial sectors.293 These take on something more like factors of
sociopolitical action rather than of technological progress, because
society at large stands to gain nothing at all.
Next, take real estate. The domain of real estate is really about
legal rights to territory, and residential real estate at least is
generally a matter of formalities and transactions in establishing
claims to particular space. Investment in real estate tends toward
being speculative, and can divert the use of loan credit away from
productive employment in industry.294
The key to understand Veblen and indeed, the
Reform Era, is to analyze land rent, and how urban
real estate speculation was becoming not only the
fastest way to get rich, but also the major customer
of banking and high finance. . . . Veblen became
justly famous for describing small towns (and by
logical extension, big cities) as real estate
promotion projects, trying to get the proverbial
“something for nothing.” He described America’s
rapid urbanization as a great real estate game—what
today is called a zero-sum game in which one
party’s winnings are another’s loss.295
Commenting on the sale of Veblen’s former home, Professor
Sidney Plotkin noted, “He understood that real estate was an

293

Indeed, most statistics compiled on research and development and
innovation do not include financial products. Robert M. Hunt, Ten Years After:
What Are the Effects of Business Method Patents in Financial Services?,
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF PHILADELPHIA BUSINESS REVIEW 21, 27 (3rd
Quarter 2008), available at http://www.phil.frb.org/research-and-data/
publications/business-review/2008/q3/brq308_effects-of-business-methodpatents.pdf.
294
See, e.g., VEBLEN, supra note 20, at 102–03.
295
Michael Hudson, The Social Economics of Thorstein Veblen, EH.NET
(Oct. 23, 2012), available at http://michael-hudson.com/2012/10/the-socialeconomics-of-thorstein-veblen/; see also VEBLEN, supra note 20, at 64–65
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exercise in inflated values that could vanish in a split second.”296
Pierre Bourdieu’s landmark study of the French single-family real
estate market later demonstrated how real estate transactions were
influenced by a structural field, that is to say a “space of possibles”
open to economic actors.297 Much as Veblen discussed “vested
interests,” Bourdieu concludes that “[t]he forces of the field orient
the dominant towards strategies whose end is the perpetuation or
reinforcement of their domination.”298 Again, like Veblen,
Bourdieu noted that “technological capital” plays a crucial role, but
only when combined with other forms of capital.299 It is those
nontechnological aspects that come into play when considering
patenting related to real estate—principally the patenting of
methods for conducting real estate transactions and handling
associated securities. Bourdieu emphasized how the nature of
single-family home sales revolved around marketing and sales
efforts intended to convince buyers to live further from city centers
than they would otherwise choose, to feel as if they have purchased
a “traditionally built” home that in fact is made with “industrial”
pre-fab methods, and to commit to a purchase above resale value.
296

Patricia Leight Brown, An Inconspicuous Consumption Yields, at Last,
to Market Forces, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 9, 2004), http://www.nytimes.com/2004/10/
09/national/09menlo.html.
297
BOURDIEU, supra note 40, at 194–195; see also Anna Leander, Pierre
Bourdieu on Economics, 8 REV. INT’L POL. ECON. 344, 347 (2001) (“[I]t is
precisely the formation of the rules of the game, of interests and of identities that
gives shape to social identity.”). Bourdieu’s economic field theory is akin to
Einstein’s general theory of relativity in physics, in so much as the specific
weapons or strengths of economic entities in a structural field exert weight in
that field apart from any direct intervention or manipulation by that entity, much
like the way gravity is explained by Einstein not as a force acting upon discrete
bodies as in Newtonian physics but as a characteristic of the curvature of spacetime as a result of the physical reality of space-time being represented as forcefree continuous functions of independent variables. See Albert Einstein, On the
Generalized Theory of Gravitation, 182 SCI. AM. 13, 15-16 (April 1950),
reprinted in IDEAS AND OPINIONS 341–56 (Bonanza 1988).
298
BOURDIEU, supra note 40, at 202.
299
Id. at 203.
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Bourdieu also emphasized how the nature of single-family home
sales revolved around cultural and legal contexts such as
government support for private mortgage loans over public
housing.300 Here it might also be worth considering a character
from novelist Sinclair Lewis: “[h]is name was George F. Babbitt.
He was forty-six years old now, in April, 1920, and he made
nothing in particular, neither butter nor shoes nor poetry, but he
was nimble in the calling of selling houses for more than people
could afford to pay.”301 Patents involving real estate are likely to
revolve around customs that govern transaction protocols, in a
constant interaction with the social peculiarities of the agents
involved in sales, particularly the “effect of trusting closeness or
hostile aloofness.”302 For instance, adding computers to the
transactions merely increases the aloofness. These are social and
pecuniary activities, part of the “higgling of the market,” and bear
no relationship to mastering the cause-and-effect nature of the
physical world.
Allowing patents on what amount to social relations is
problematic. While there is much discussion of whether business
methods should be patent-eligible, a more pointed question is
whether claims drawn to a business model, unmoored from
technological constraints, should be patent-eligible. Business
models fall into the realm of social relations, and perhaps can be
analyzed as such more readily and objectively than assessing how
substantially or meaningfully the model relates to tangible objects
like general-purpose computers. This question is important though,
because the latitude to seek claims to a given invention at any level
of abstraction means that nearly any invention can be claimed so
broadly as to constitute a business model, even in situations where
more narrowly drawn claims to the same invention would no
longer consist only of the business model (as the asserted point of
300

See generally id.
SINCLAIR LEWIS, BABBIT 6 (Modern Library 2002) (1922).
302
BOURDIEU supra note 85, at 175.
301
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novelty).303 Business models do not solve technical problems, but
only dictate who controls (and therefore who benefits from)
transactions and associated wealth.
Many of these concerns seem like the same ones underlying
judicial statements in the Prometheus and Flook cases regarding
pre-solution and post-solution activities. In the Veblenian view, the
judicial term “pre-solution activities”304 is best viewed as a
euphemism for protecting a subject matter space in which
inventive activity is planned, and in which the planned inventive
activity may or may not later occur or succeed.305 That term can be
seen to describe overbroad functional or genus language in patent
claims, like that of Samuel Morse in O’Reilly v. Morse,306 in which
protection is prospectively sought over possible and unrealized
future invention by reciting only the desired result without
reference to the technical mechanism(s) actually invented.307
303

See, e.g., Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen IDEC, 659 F.3d
1057, 1078, 1080 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (Moore, J., dissenting). Judge Moore stated
quite well how Classen could have claimed any number of specific contributions
but instead sought what amounts to a monopoly on any study of a particular
phenomenon. This is quite close to saying that Classen was claiming what
amounted to a business model for the use of medical phenomena.
304
Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S.Ct. 1289
(2012).
305
According to Veblen, “[b]usiness conceptions and methods antedate the
machine process.” L.A. O’Donnell, Rationalism, Capitalism and the
Entrepreneur: The Views of Veblen and Schumpeter, 5 HISTORY OF POLITICAL
ECONOMY 199 (1973), reprinted in 3 THORSTEIN VEBLEN: CRITICAL
ASSESSMENTS 219 (John Cunningham Wood ed., 1993).
306
O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S 62, 68 (1852). Contra Tilghman v. Proctor,
102 U.S. 707, 710, 720–22 (1880) (noting that the “patent is for a process, and
not for any specific mechanism for carrying such process into effect,” but
further noting that different processes for achieving the effect claimed by
Tilghman were known in the prior art and that Tilghman himself disclosed an
unclaimed lower temperature variation, in essence acknowledging that the claim
language at issue was not preemptive).
307
O’Reilly, 56 U.S at 113 (“[W]hile he shuts the door against inventions
of other persons, the patentee would be able to avail himself of new discoveries
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Further, the judicial term “postsolution activity”308 can be seen as
another euphemism for nontechnological activities that lack a
sufficient connection to a technological process or artifact, by
instead being after-the-fact attempts to privately direct or sequester
the saleable benefits of prior technological achievement.309 The
term “postsolution activity” often precisely describes patent claims
directed to business activities that make arbitrary and passing
reference to known technologies, while making a further
“contribution” only to means for socially allocating value, such as
through a new business model that relates purely to the saleability
of pre-existing invention or technology.310
in the properties and powers of electro-magnetism which scientific men might
bring to light . . . .”). In short, this is an instance that the technical causal
mechanism that allows the result to be repeatably achieved must be claimed, not
merely disclosed.
308
Parker v. Flook, 437 U. S. 584, 590 (1978); Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S.
174, 191–92 (1981).
309
“By the sale of the output the business man in industry ‘realizes’ his
gains. To ‘realize’ means to convert salable goods into money values. The sale
is the last step in the process and the end of the business man’s endeavor. When
he has disposed of the output, and so has converted his holdings of consumable
articles into money values, his gains are as nearly secure and definitive as the
circumstances of modern life admit. It is in terms of price that he keeps his
accounts, and in the same terms he computes his output of products. The vital
point of production with him is the vendibility of the output, its convertibility
into money values, not its serviceability for the needs of mankind. A modicum
of serviceability, for some purpose or other, the output must have if it is to be
salable.” VEBLEN, supra note 20, at 30.
310
As an example, this could involve the inventor of a business method
recognizing that a customer might change its practices if doing so is tied to
buying a new computer system, even if the customer could have readily changed
its practices without the purchase of a computer system. In other words, the
“tangible” machine—the computer system—is something tied to saleability
(triggering the customer’s desire to purchase something) rather than to changes
in practices alleged to be more efficient or to solve a problem. In terms of
productivity, the computer system is a red herring. For that matter, the
underlying practices may not relate to productivity either, but may be driven
entirely by a desire to work employees harder and longer, increase power and
control of management over labor, etc.
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B. Example Claim Analyses
Some patent-specific examples may clarify these Veblenian
distinctions between productive and unproductive activities. For
instance, an inventor may devise a new method for operating an
existing machine, say, by operating different components at
different speeds to achieve higher throughput with fewer defects.
Such a process-oriented achievement puts forth no new structure or
machine, but does enhance economic surplus through the manner
of using such a machine. This seems like a patent-eligible
contribution. The same might be said for devising a new sequence
for chemically separating compounds more efficiently. Such an
advance relates to the technology involved in the application of
chemical principles to reduce material or energy inputs, and seems
patent-eligible.311 Pure “business methods” are a rather easy case
from a Veblenian perspective—they would simply be categorically
excluded from patentability. But business methods can appear in
unlikely places, as explained below. Software also presents a
particularly thorny problem because it can easily have both
technological and pecuniary functions in varying degrees.312 But
the abstraction problem encountered with software patents313 can
be assessed in a more practical manner with reference to the
Veblen dichotomy, which can allow assessment of the tipping
point where high levels of abstraction relinquish a connection to
productive industrial activity leaving only unproductive pecuniary
activity. Let us turn to a few more concrete examples of patent
311

See, e.g., Tilghman, 102 U.S. 707, 710 (1880) (finding a process for
separating fat patentable).
312
Jaron Lanier, in his philosophically muddled way, lamented that social
media software had allowed influence to overtake innovation, which was
something of a warmed-over Veblenian argument. JARON LANIER, YOU ARE
NOT A GADGET: A MANIFESTO (2010).
313
See, e.g., JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURUR, PATENT FAILURE: HOW
JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK (2009); Mark
A. Lemley & Julie E. Cohen, Patent Scope and Innovation in the Software
Industry, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1, 47–50 (2001).
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claim language to illustrate how the Veblen dichotomy might be
applied to the question of patent eligibility.
For instance, DealerTrack involved U.S. Patent No. 6,292,788
(filed Dec. 3, 1998) (“the ’788 Patent”), of which independent
claim 1 is representative:314
1. A method of creating a real estate investment
instrument adapted for performing tax-deferred
exchanges comprising:
aggregating real property to form a real estate
portfolio;
encumbering the property in the real estate
portfolio with a master agreement; and
creating a plurality of deedshares by dividing
title in the real estate portfolio into a
plurality of tenant-in-common deeds of at
least one predetermined denomination, each
of the plurality of deedshares subject to a
provision in the master agreement for
reaggregating the plurality of tenant-incommon deeds after a specified interval.
From the Veblenian perspective, claim 1 of the ’788 Patent is
clearly directed to pecuniary activities that hinge upon social
constructs of tax laws, title to real property, and speculative
investment, and therefore should not be patentable.315 This is
314

Dealertrack, Inc. v. Huber, 674 F.3d 1315, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
U.S. Patent No. 6,292,788 col. 12 l. 52–64 (filed Dec. 3, 1998). Another
example would be claim 1 of U.S. Patent No. 7,584,167 col. 23 l. 8–16 (filed
June 22, 2004), (“the ’167 Patent”), which claims “1. A real estate disclosure
reporting method comprising the steps of: compiling a plurality of items of
disclosure; relating said items of disclosure according to a plurality of condition
categories; researching a particular property to determine a plurality of known
ones of said items of disclosure; and disclosing said known ones according to
said condition categories.” The ’167 patent was originally classified in class/
subclass 707/1, “for computerized data processing systems and corresponding
methods for the retrieval of records stored in a database or as computer files.”
315
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consistent with the Federal Circuit’s holding when considering the
claim:
In Bilski II, the Supreme Court explained that
the dependent claims were not patent eligible
though they “limit[ed] an abstract idea to one field
of use or add[ed] token postsolution components.”
130 S. Ct. at 3231. See also Diehr, 450 U.S. at 192
n.14 (“A mathematical formula does not suddenly
become patentable subject matter simply by having
the applicant acquiesce to limiting the reach of the
patent for the formula to a particular technological
use.”).
The restriction here is precisely the kind of
limitation held to be insufficient to confer patent
eligibility in Bilski II. The notion of using a
clearinghouse generally and using a clearinghouse
specifically to apply for car loans, like the
relationship between hedging and hedging in the
energy market in Bilski II, is of no consequence
without more. See Diehr, 450 U.S. at 191 (noting
that the principle that a mathematical formula “is
not accorded the protection of our patent laws . . .
cannot be circumvented by attempting to limit the
use of the formula to a particular technological
environment”316

While such a claim seems to fail the machine-or-transformation test, and to
primarily relate to what could be considered purely mental steps, it also has
meaning only in a pecuniary and social sense, because it is premised on legal
(or, more broadly, social) obligations associated with real estate transactions
rather than productive efficiency gains associated with technological cumulative
causation. For those reasons, claim 1 of the ’167 patent would seem non-patenteligible from a Veblenian perspective.
316
Dealertrack, 674 F.3d at 1334 (emphasis added).
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From a Veblenian perspective, this is a bit like saying that
claims to more narrowly circumscribed pecuniary activities—
abstract ideas limited to a particular industry or technological
environment—are still directed to pecuniary activities, and
therefore lack a sufficient connection to a technological
contribution to justify patent eligibility.317 A claim like that in
DealerTrack disrupts the quid pro quo of the patent grant and
amounts to just a naked grant of rent-seeking monopoly without
contributing to production.
A similar example is U.S. Patent Application Pub. No.
2007/0288360 (filed Apr. 5, 2007) (“the ’360 Application”), of
which independent claim 1 is representative:
1. An interface system for matching a position
with an applicant based on credit information,
comprising:
a credit user entry module that allows a credit
user to define the position and enter a
position grade associated with the position;
an applicant entry module that allows the
applicant to enter applicant information;
a credit bureau module that generates an
applicant grade based on the applicant
information and credit information stored in
a credit bureau database;
a decision module for comparing the position
grade with the applicant grade to determine
whether the applicant is qualified for the
position; and

317

It is in relation to the notion of the supposed quid pro quo of the patent
bargain where Veblen discusses the underlying policy of granting any patent,
rhetorically asking, “whatever may be its ulterior beneficial effects or its ethical
justification.” Veblen, On the Nature of Capital, supra note 8, at 115–16 n.1.
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a notification module for notifying the credit user
and the applicant whether the applicant is
qualified for the position.
Although not explicitly discussed by the ’360 Application, a
key goal of the claimed system is to provide an intermediary in
such a way as to avoid regulatory burdens that limit access to
credit information and credit scores (themselves a purely social
creation).318 Claim 1 of the ’360 Application does not delimit itself
to technological improvements in terms of labor, materials or
energy savings, but instead focuses on the highly abstract forms of
interfaces that provide a socially acceptable platform for regulatory
avoidance (specifically in relation to credit access).319 Perhaps the
unclaimed specifics of the “decision module” or “notification
module” would present a technological advance, but the claim is
written too abstractly to capture any such alleged technological
contribution. Although during prosecution of the ’360 Application
an examiner issued rejections alleging the claims impermissibly
recited software per se,320 the Veblenian perspective would not
view the issue in terms of technicalities of form like the recitation
of software versus hardware (there would be no categorical ban of
software patentability). Instead, the Veblenian approach would
look at claim 1 of the ’360 Application as a merely pecuniary
system to avoid regulation and mediate trust, and therefore would
say claim 1 should not be patent-eligible because it is not directed
to a productive contribution to an underlying technical problem.
Further examples can be found in less conspicuous fields. For
instance, U.S. Patent Application Publication Number
2013/0068890 (filed Sept. 20, 2011) (“the ’890 Application”),
318

See, e.g., Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003, Pub. L.
108–159, 117 STAT. 1952 (2003).
319
U.S. Patent Application Pub. No. US 2007/0288360 A1 cl. 1 (filed Apr.
5, 2007).
320
Non-Final Rejection, U.S. Patent Application Pub. No. 2007/0288360
(filed Apr. 5, 2007), at 3, June 23, 2011.
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entitled “Dual Boarding System for Aircraft,” published March 21,
2013 and assigned to The Boeing Company, includes the following
independent claim:
1. A method for boarding an aircraft, the method
comprising:
lining up passengers in a first line and a second
line relative to a doorway for the aircraft;
and
controlling a flow of the passengers in the first
line and the second line through the
doorway and a corridor connecting the
doorway to an interior of the aircraft in
which the flow of the passengers passes
through a number of spaces in the corridor
in which the number of spaces is reserved
for a number of crew members during an
emergency operation in which the
passengers exit the aircraft.
The ’890 Application was classified upon publication in U.S.
Class/Subclass 244/137.2, for “Aeronautics and Astronautics,”
“device or arrangement wherein a living being may be taken
aboard or removed from the aircraft,” “for aircraft structure
designed to improve the efficiency of transporting passengers,
absent detail or arrangement for loading, or unloading or discharge
thereof.”321 However, despite the technical-sounding classification
and the fact that aircraft construction and design can be productive,
the actual language of claim 1 of the ’890 Application as published
is that of a business method.322 Disregarding whatever may be
disclosed or claimed elsewhere in the application; claim 1 does not
321

USPTO, MANUAL OF PATENT CLASSIFICATION, http://www.uspto.gov/
web/patents/classification/uspc244/defs244.htm#C244S137200 (last visited
Sept. 24, 2013). Subclass 137.2. of class 244 appears to have only existed for
about a decade.
322
U.S. Patent Application Pub. No. US 2013/0068890 A1 cl. 1 (filed Sept.
20, 2011).
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contain any reference to the solution of a technical problem.323
Rather, the claim is written so as to address only a business model
applicable to an effect or result in airline operations, and to be
preemptive of any technical apparatuses that might be used in
service of a two-line passenger boarding business model.324 Claim
1 of the ’890 Application highlights how a company (Boeing)
engaged in actual industrial processes and technological
development can still present claims in patent applications directed
to pecuniary business models rather than to matter-of-fact
industrial solutions to technical problems. In the Veblenian view,
claim 1 of the ’890 application would not be patent-eligible,
because the claim language is not tied to any particularized
contribution to technical proficiency.
Another example is U.S. Patent No. 7,080,019 (filed Mar. 4,
2001) (“the ’019 Patent”), directed to a “ride share contact
system.” Independent claim 1 recites in part:325
1. A method for enabling contact among
travelers with similar travel plans, comprising:
soliciting available travel plans from a multitude of
Posting travelers, quantitatively characterizing each
of said available travel plans' origins and
destinations by their numerical latitudes and
longitudes, posting said quantitatively characterized
available plans to a data base, . . . soliciting a
desired travel plan from a Browsing traveler, . . .
whereby said Browsing travelers can exercise
323

Id. (“[T]he flow of the passengers passes through a number of spaces in
the corridor in which the number of spaces is reserved for a number of crew
members during an emergency operation in which the passengers exit the
aircraft” seems like an attempt to distinguish cargo planes (such as military
transport planes) with large aft doors clearly large enough to fit two passengers,
side-by-side).
324
Id.
325
U.S. Patent No. 7,080,019 col. 11–12 (filed Mar. 4, 2001).
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explicit control over said final choice process, and
are not constrained to accept the putative optimal
choice of said ordering according to said rank.
Although there is a considerable amount of verbiage in claim 1
of the ’019 Patent, that claim is directed to managing (potential)
customer/user expectations and making social and business
judgments as to the types of information that such customers/users
would want to see, rather than solving any technological hurdle
associated with scarcity of materials, energy and/or labor.326
Therefore, from the Veblenian perspective, claim 1 of the ’019
Patent would seem unpatentable as being directed only to a
nonproductive pecuniary endeavor.
In contrast, though still in a situation somewhat comparable to
that of the ’019 Patent, U.S. Patent No. 8,531,954 (filed May 31,
2007) (“the ’954 Patent”) is directed to a “system and method for
handling reservation requests with a connection admission control
engine.” Claim 1 of the ’954 patent recites:
1. A method for handling reservation requests,
the method comprising:
receiving network performance information,
utilization information, and capacity
information associated with a data stream or
connections, the network performance
information and utilization information is
enabled to be received through one or more
performance information packet (PIP) data
packets and a state machine tracking the
326

Id.; see also Darwin Bond-Graham, Sharing Rides, Hording Profits,
COUNTERPUNCH (Oct. 18, 2013), http://www.counterpunch.org/2013/10/18/
sharing-rides-hording-profits (questioning the characterization of ride sharing
software as “disruptive” technology and noting how ride sharing business
models seek social ends of avoiding regulation, avoiding taxes and fees that
support public infrastructure, and, more generally, externalizing costs onto
predominantly low-income users).
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utilization information and the capacity
information, wherein the PIP data packets
and the state machine cumulatively update
the network performance information,
utilization information, and capacity
information for each node between and
including endpoints of the data stream
including customer equipment, wherein the
network
performance
information,
utilization information, and capacity
information include a plurality of indicators
for each node, and wherein each of the
plurality of indicators are compared against
thresholds to determine a status of each
node;
determining available bandwidth in response to
the network performance information,
utilization information, and capacity
information that are cumulatively updated
for the data stream or connections utilizing
the PIP data packets and the state machine;
responding to a plurality of reservation requests
in response to the status of each node and
the determined available bandwidth
determined utilizing the PIP data packets
and state machine;
adjusting a frequency the one or more PIP data
packets sent through a portion of the
communications network in response to
determining the portion is experiencing a
problem; and

325
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rerouting the one or more PIP data packets to
avoid a failed portion of the communications
network.327
Such a claim seems patent-eligible, from the Veblenian
perspective, because the claimed invention relates to the use of
scarce computing (and perhaps energy) resources, as well as
specific and detailed methodologies that are tied to a technical
problem associated with resource scarcity (within communication
networks).
Furthermore, a software-based method that changes the way a
computer operates to achieve new computing powers, such as to
better render pixels in an image, would seem patentable. In just
such a case, the Federal Circuit found such claims to be patenteligible. In Research Corp. Technologies, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp.
the court assessed claim 1 of U.S. Patent No. 5,341,228 (filed Dec.
3, 1991) (“the ’228 Patent”), which recites:
1. A method for the halftoning of color images,
comprising the steps of utilizing, in turn, a pixel-bypixel comparison of each of a plurality of color
planes of said color image against a blue noise mask
in which the blue noise mask is comprised of a
random non-deterministic, non-white noise single
valued function which is designed to provide
visually pleasing dot profiles when thresholded at
any level of said color images, wherein a plurality
of blue noise masks are separately utilized to
perform said pixel-by-pixel comparison and in
which at least one of said blue noise masks has its
pixels shifted by at least one pixel prior to
performing said pixel-by-pixel comparison.328
327

U.S. Patent No. 8,531,954 col. 102 l. 17–51 (filed May 31, 2007).
Research Corp. Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 627 F.3d 859, 869 (Fed.
Cir. 2010). The ’228 patent was classified in U.S. class/subclass 358/534 for
Halftone processing, “Subject matter wherein shades of various darkness
328
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This seems like the correct result from a Veblenian perspective,
because even though arguably directed to software per se or pure
information manipulation, the claimed invention was directed to a
technical achievement regarding a way to render digital images
that relates to providing better substantive technical
performance.329 Reference to blue noise masks in the claims
conveys the essential feature of the solution to the underlying
technical problem addressed by the invention.
Furthermore, claims to a method for updating a web page
would be patentable from a Veblenian perspective if directed to the
technical mechanisms involved in web page coding and the like.
For example, U.S. Patent No. 7,640,512 (filed Dec. 22, 2000) (the
’512 Patent) recites:
1. A method for updating objects contained
within a web page, comprising:
displaying a web page;
creating a frame having a height of zero and a
width of zero within the web page;
displaying outside the frame at least one
updateable object within the web page,
wherein the at least one updateable object
corresponds to an HVAC system;
configuring the frame to periodically request
updated data from a server, the updated
data comprising an instruction set for
causing the frame to update the at least
one updateable object;
between the darkest and lightest elements of the original object are represented
by a pattern of dots of varying density in the image.” U.S. Patent No. 5,341,228
col. 17 l. 55–68, (filed Dec. 3, 1991).
329
The Research Corp. decision seems like one of the most fertile grounds
for finding possible agreement between the different factions on the Federal
Circuit advancing competing theories for patent eligibility.
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configuring the frame to request the undated data
from the server in response to a timer
maintained on a client reaching a threshold
value, wherein the timer is configured to
be initiated as a function of creation of the
frame; and
configuring the frame, in response to receiving
the updated data, to cause the at least one
updateable object to be updated, such that
the updating of the at least one updateable
object updates only a portion of the web
page.330
The invention recited in claim 1 of the ’512 patent provides
labor and/or energy saving benefits through certain uses of
computers, and the claim includes steps involving specific
elements of a web page (such as a frame) that provide a solution to
the underlying technical problem addressed by the invention.
Therefore, it seems patent-eligible in the context of the present
theory.
In contrast, Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC involved claim 1
of U.S. Patent No. 7,346,545 (filed May 29, 2001) (“the ’545
patent”),331 which recites:
1. A method for distribution of products over
the Internet via a facilitator, said method comprising
the steps of:
a first step of receiving, from a content provider,
media products that are covered by
intellectual-property rights protection and
are available for purchase, wherein each said

330

In the interest of full disclosure, the author participated in the
prosecution of the ’512 patent briefly.
331
Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 722 F.3d 1335, 1337–38 (Fed. Cir.
2013).
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media product being comprised of at least
one of text data, music data, and video data;
a second step of selecting a sponsor message to
be associated with the media product, said
sponsor message being selected from a
plurality of sponsor messages, said second
step including accessing an activity log to
verify that the total number of times which
the sponsor message has been previously
presented is less than the number of
transaction cycles contracted by the sponsor
of the sponsor message;
a third step of providing the media product for
sale at an Internet website;
a fourth step of restricting general public access
to said media product;
a fifth step of offering to a consumer access to
the media product without charge to the
consumer on the precondition that the
consumer views the sponsor message;
a sixth step of receiving from the consumer a
request to view the sponsor message,
wherein the consumer submits said request
in response to being offered access to the
media product;
a seventh step of, in response to receiving the
request from the consumer, facilitating the
display of a sponsor message to the
consumer;
an eighth step of, if the sponsor message is not an
interactive message, allowing said consumer
access to said media product after said step
of facilitating the display of said sponsor
message;
a ninth step of, if the sponsor message is an
interactive message, presenting at least one

329
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query to the consumer and allowing said
consumer access to said media product after
receiving a response to said at least one
query;
a tenth step of recording the transaction event to
the activity log, said tenth step including
updating the total number of times the
sponsor message has been presented; and
an eleventh step of receiving payment from the
sponsor of the sponsor message displayed.
A method that forces a consumer to view an advertisement
before being granted access to a video relates to advertising
revenue streams and, secondarily, to contractual or legal rights to
access video content (“intellectual-property rights protection”), and
is a social function that allocates economic surpluses tied to the
advertisement and/or video but creates no additional surplus.332 In
regard to competitive advertising, Veblen said that “[i]t gives
vendibility, which is useful to the seller, but has no utility to the
last buyer.”333 Moreover, if copyright laws suddenly changed, such
that no copyright owner could claim exclusive rights to copying or
public display, then the “invention” of the Ultramercial patent
immediately loses all significance. In this way, the advertising and
video access functions are social/cultural in nature (i.e., they are
not transcultural) and do not appear to relate to advancement of the
useful arts. From the Veblenian perspective, the claims of the ’545
patent should be deemed nonpatentable, contrary to the Federal
Circuit panel’s holding. It is also rather glaringly apparent that
claim 1 the ’545 patent does not explicitly recite any solution to an

332

“The great end of consistent advertising is to establish such differential
monopolies resting on popular conviction.” VEBLEN, supra note 20, at 55.
“Competitive advertising is an unavoidable item in the aggregate costs of
industry. It does not add serviceability of the output, except be it incidentally
and unintentionally.” Id. at 59.
333
Id.
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underlying technical problem.334 Rather, the recited steps discuss
only routine activities phrased in such a way as to relate
specifically to control of the economic market for Internet
advertising and media delivery, without making a meaningful
contribution to the technical knowledge within that economic
market. The claim instead is at most directed toward a social
problem rather than a technical problem. In short, the ’545 patent
looks like naked rent-seeking of an invidious and pecuniary nature.
In Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics,
Inc., the Supreme Court held that isolated segments of naturally
occurring deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) are unpatentable products
of nature, while synthetically created complementary DNA
(cDNA) is patent-eligible. 335 From a Veblenian perspective, this
appears to be the right result. Identifying naturally occurring
substances, or portions of them, does not create any economic
surplus. A patent claim directed to such naturally occurring
substances has only a pecuniary character, by directing the
allocation of monetary benefits arising out of that naturally
occurring substance. Limiting the patent claim to merely a segment
of the overall natural substance is akin to accepting a smaller
patent monopoly, but still without a contribution of
workmanship.336 Yet, in contrast, synthesizing new compounds
that are not naturally occurring may involve workmanship,
regardless of any moral objections that might be raised when the
334

Ultramercial, 722 F.3d at 1355 (Lourie, J., concurring) (“While a
computer or complex computer program, as discussed by the majority opinion,
may be necessary to perform the method, it is not what the claim specifically
requires.”).
335
Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107,
2111 (2013).
336
Following the author’s “Spanish method” analogy, any defense of
patentability premised on the effort needed to isolate desired segments of
naturally occurring materials should be no more convincing than an argument
that the expense for a conquistador to sail across an ocean and plant a flag on
existing territory renders such conduct “inventive.”
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synthesis involves biologic matter. Thus, the Supreme Court
seemed to track the Veblenian perspective in their distinction
between the patent eligibility of synthetic cDNA and isolation of
segments of naturally occurring DNA.
No doubt, limitless examples could be given. In many of these
examples, a real technical accomplishment may be present and
could theoretically be claimed, but often patent applicants choose
to focus instead on only pecuniary aspects, most assuredly to seek
preemptive monopoly coverage.
IX. THE IMPORT OF THE NEW THEORY OF PATENT ELIGIBILITY
A. The Veblenian Viewpoint and “Progress” of the “Useful Arts”
What is lacking in much writing on patent subject matter
eligibility is open discussion of the desired ends of the inquiry.
Instead, an excessive focus on the process of patentability leads to
voluminous tracts on the tedious workings of one test versus
another for identifying patent-eligible subject matter, all the while
leaving unstated the social impacts and ideological bases—a
problem very much like that found with the insistence on decontextualized marginal analysis in neoclassical economics. But a
Veblenian perspective can shift the focus of this debate by
providing a more richly nuanced critique of how self-interest
correlates to the various incentive theories for patents, such as
those expressed in the Patent & Copyright Clause of the
Constitution.337 This is because Veblen was, at bottom, a
337

Leo Marx has written about how Veblen’s use of the term “technology”
might link to the efforts of Thomas Jefferson, Benjamin Franklin, Thomas
Paine, and others to frame the modern concept of “progress.” Leo Marx,
Technology: The Emergence of a Hazardous Concept, 51 TECH. & CULTURE
561, 564–65 (2010). All found technology in the form of “advances in science
and the mechanic arts valuable chiefly as means for arriving at social and
political ends.” Id. at 565. Although Marx does not develop this point, Veblen’s
usage included some recognition of the views of environmentally conscious
thinkers like John Muir, Henry David Thoreau and others who criticized
industrialization. E.g., Russell H. Bartley & Sylvia E. Yoneda, Thorstein Veblen
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moralist—constructing theories that relied upon only very basic
and elemental normative judgments, such as favoring equality over
inequality338—and his career focused primarily upon criticisms of
myopic economic methodologies that bracketed out all cultural
questions in order to make certain pre-determined or inherent
moral judgments undiscussable.
Institutionalist economists offered explanations for distinctions
between different economic activities that are useful in the context
of patentable subject matter inquiries. Veblen distinguished
business enterprise and technology in modern society with his
dichotomy. Yet his evolutionary view looks at outcomes as if in a
constant state of flux, with disparate forces interacting. “Culture
advances and evolves via the cumulative and dynamic forces of
industry and technology juxtaposed to the static forces of the
ceremonial and the pecuniary.”339 Whether this results in
“progress” is uncertain, though. From a Veblenian perspective,
“financially oriented business behavior makes the social
provisioning process more unstable and renders people’s welfare
more vulnerable.”340 Veblen believed that “[a] civilization which is
dominated by th[e] matter-of-fact insight [of technology and the

on Washington Island: Traces of a Life, 7 INT’L J. POL., CULTURE & SOC’Y 589,
602
(1994),
available
at
http://www.islandheritageconservancy.com/other/Thorstein%20Veblen%20on%
20Washington%20Island.pdf. A fair reading of Veblen here would include
recognition that he tried to separate out the respective roles of technology and
the pecuniary, indicating that the two influenced each other, which could lead to
positive or negative outcomes.
338
O’Hara, supra note 14 at 83.
339
Richard L. Brinkman, Culture in Neoinstitutional Economics: An
Integration of Myrdal and Galbraith into the Veblen-Ayres Matrix, 40 AM. J.
ECON. & SOC. 401, 402 (1981).
340
JO & HENRY, supra note 52, at 2.
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machine process] must prevail against any cultural scheme that
lacks this element.”341 History lends support to the theory.342
Ever since the mercantilist era, using technology
to maximize productivity had long been a basic
strategy of national power. This was the context in
which Veblen warned that the problem of high
finance was its tendency to deviate from
technological efficiency, to form a symbiosis with
speculative activities and defend the vested interests
(the term he coined for rentier real estate, finance
and monopolies).343
As detailed by Alan Durham, then Treasury Secretary
Alexander Hamilton wrote on how patents encourage industry and
manufactures in 1790, in much the same way Veblen later wrote
about fostering workmanship and machine knowledge to help
create economic surplus.344 But where Veblen goes a step beyond
341

Thorstein Veblen, The Place of Science in Modern Civilisation, 11 AM.
J. SOC. (1906) reprinted in THE PLACE OF SCIENCE IN MODERN CIVILISATION
AND OTHER ESSAYS 2 (B.W. Huebsch 1919).
342
William T. Ganley, The Theory of Business Enterprise and Veblen’s
Neglected Theory of Corporation Finance, 38 J. ECON. ISSUES 397, 400–01
(2004).
343
Michael Hudson, The Social Economics of Thorstein Veblen, EH.NET
(Oct.
2012),
http://eh.net/book_reviews/the-social-economics-of-thorsteinveblen; see also MICHAEL HUDSON, AMERICA'S PROTECTIONIST TAKEOFF 1815–
1914: THE NEGLECTED AMERICAN SCHOOL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY (2010). For
an exposition on Veblen’s engineering-focused rather than economic-focused
discussions of “efficiency,” see Janet T. Knoedler, Veblen and Technical
Efficiency, 31 J. ECON. ISSUES 1011 (1997).
344
Alan L. Durham, “Useful Arts” in the Information Age, 1999 BYU L.
REV. 1419, 1454 (1999). Alexander Hamilton established the Bank of New
York, and was a prominent banker in the American Revolutionary era. His more
restrictive views on what types of subject matter are patent-eligible can be
contrasted with those of some financial interests today. If a banker like
Hamilton did not see patents encompassing business methods and financial

[5:211 2014]

PATENT SUBJECT MATTER ELIGIBILITY

335

the established view (that technology and industry can advance
general well-being of a population) was in his recognition of
certain ways that technological gains can be thwarted.
Veblen issued a warning of a parasitic role of finance in
relation to engineers and real industry.345
Written in a popular sarcastic style, [Veblen’s]
books showed how the behavior of wealth and high
finance was having perverse effects after World
War I. Instead of funding economic growth, Wall
Street was becoming the protector of privilege and
engaging in artful deception, distorting economies
away from passing on the fruits of technology to
populations in the form of rising living standards
and falling costs of living and doing business.346
Veblen’s critical view of the evolution of capitalism into
finance capitalism is the polar opposite of that of Joseph
Schumpeter, who, despite sharing some theoretical ground with
Veblen, viewed big-business capitalism as a model of efficiency.347
“Whereas Schumpeter envisions [business enterprise and
technology] as integrally connected and perfectly harmonious,
Veblen sees them coming increasingly into conflict.”348 To Veblen,
activities when the Constitution was framed, then contrary views start to seem
out-of-step with original intent.
345
THORSTEIN VEBLEN, THE ENGINEERS AND THE PRICE SYSTEM (1921); cf.
GABRIEL KOLKO, THE TRIUMPH OF CONSERVATISM: A REINTERPRETATION OF
AMERICAN HISTORY, 1900–1916 (1963); FISK, supra note 37, at 9–11, 75–172.
346
Hudson, supra note 343.
347
L.A. O’Donnell, supra note 305, at 222–23. Rudolph Hilferding, who
coined the term “finance capitalism,” advanced views akin to Veblen’s. See
generally RUDOLPH HILFERDING, DAS FINANZKAPITAL [FINANCE CAPITAL]
(1910). Schumpeter shared many theoretical commonalities with Veblen, but the
two diverged on many conclusions.
348
L.A. O’Donnell, supra note 305, at 199; see also JO & HENRY, supra
note 52, at 5.
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equality was a central concept, and he viewed business—as
distinguished from industry—as the source of inequality.349
“Veblen and his fellow institutionalists understood that ‘the
market’ was distorted by special ‘free lunch’ privileges to extract
income without really contributing to production.”350
The word which best characterizes Veblen’s
view of business methods is ‘sabotage.’ By it he
means ‘a conscientious withdrawal of efficiency.’
To him it is so obvious as to be self-evident that
prices cannot be maintained at a reasonable
profitable level without the ‘habitual recourse to
delay and obstruction of industry.’ This theme
recurs endlessly in Veblen’s work.351
Veblen’s views formed much of the basis for the analyses of
sociologist Alain Touraine, who was an early commentator on the
concept of the “post-industrial society” that is so often used in the
context of the contemporary patentable subject matter debate.352
349

TILMAN, supra note 215, at 105. Contra, e.g., Cotter, supra note 11, at
855. There are a number of books by journalists that approach this topic—or at
least the effects—of corporate financialization from an emotional perspective,
relying heavily on anecdotes and case studies. E.g., JILL ANDRESKY FRASER,
WHITE-COLLAR SWEATSHOP: THE DETERIORATION OF WORK AND ITS REWARDS
IN CORPORATE AMERICA (2001).
350
Hudson, supra note 343.
351
O’Donnell, supra note 305, at 210; see also Wray, supra note 13, at
619. For a contemporary version of this sort of “sabotage” by financiers and
bankers, see, e.g., Ellen Brown, Larry Summers and the System: Making the
World Safe for Banksters, COUNTERPUNCH (Sept. 5, 2013), http://
www.counterpunch.org/2013/09/05/making-the-world-safe-for-banksters. There
is also something of a merger underway between the use of the World Trade
Organization to globally impose the North Atlantic States’ version of patent
laws and attempts to unleash the North Atlantic States’ financial products on the
globe. See PRASHAD, supra note 79.
352
ALAIN TOURAINE, THE POST INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY: TOMORROW'S
SOCIAL HISTORY: CLASSES, CONFLICTS, AND CULTURE IN THE PROGRAMMED
SOCIETY 140, 148–49, 152, 166–67 (Leonard F. X. Mayhew trans., Random
House, 1971) (1969). Touraine built on a Veblenian framework, stating that
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An example of business sabotage of industry is planned
obsolescence, including everything from constant stylistic
redesigns to drive conspicuous consumption, products that force
needless wear part replacements, products that are incapable of
repair, unsupported computer software dubbed “adandonware,”
and more.353 The artificial electrical power brownouts/blackouts
devised by Enron to inflate associated prices certainly provide a
prime example.354 Another example from popular cinema that
might illustrate this point from a different perspective is Happy
Gilmore, in which the titular character (played by Adam Sandler)
is a failed hockey player who revolutionizes professional golfing,
with the antagonist, Shooter McGavin (played by Christopher
McDonald), representing the “vested interests” continually trying,
but failing, to sabotage Happy Gilmore’s performance in order to
try to maintain his own public standing.355
Veblen’s insights have clear parallels in determining under the
Constitution what constitutes “promot[ing] the Progress of Science
and useful Arts.”356 What is “progress” in the context of the Patent
& Copyright Clause of the Constitution if not passing along the
when “economic growth comes to depend more on the capacity to mobilize and
organize resources, to direct change, and to foresee and program development . .
. . [T]he efficiency of the firm depends more and more on social and political
determinants and on the general functioning of the economic system.” Id. at 157.
Touraine nonetheless makes numerous criticisms of Veblen’s theories, often
without specifically identifying Veblen by name.
353
See generally GILES SLADE, MADE TO BREAK: TECHNOLOGY AND
OBSOLESCENCE IN AMERICA (2006); VANCE PACKARD, THE WASTE MAKERS
(1960).
354
Tapes: Enron Plotted to Shut Down Power Plant, CNN.COM (Feb. 3,
2005, 11:28 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2005/US/02/03/enron.tapes/; Timothy
Egan, Tapes Show Enron Arranged Plant Shutdown, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 4, 2005),
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/02/04/national/04energy.html.
355
HAPPY GILMORE (Universal Pictures 1996).
356
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; see also Irwin, supra note 9, at 785
(identifying egalitarian social progress in the Enlightenment vision of
technology adopted by Founding Fathers).
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benefits of technology to the general population in terms of rising
standards of living?357 Veblen’s ideas on the industrial/pecuniary
dichotomy found precedent in European Enlightenment era
concepts that tolerated private greed only when they coincided
with public good.358 Given that the Framers of the Constitution
were steeped in Enlightenment-era thought,359 this is a salient point
on understanding a possible interpretation of the limits on
promoting progress of the useful arts. Dana Remus (née Irwin) has
written on the need to re-craft patent eligibility standards such that
they reclaim their normative roots and consider social benefit
again.360 Justice Stevens reached a similar conclusion in his
concurrence to the Bilski decision.361 Such views can be developed
further with reference to Veblen’s theories.
Institutionalist economics recognizes that the FIRE sector and
business interests generally will almost always view their own
357

But see Malla Pollack, What is Congress Supposed to Promote?:
Defining “Progress” in Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the United States
Constitution, or Introducing the Progress Clause, 80 NEB. L. REV. 754, 755–77
(2001). Pollack discusses a theory for the “1780s meanings of ‘progress,’”
primarily in relation to the copyright portion of the Patent & Copyright Clause
of the Constitution. Id. However, that analysis is limited to the word “progress”
largely decoupled from “useful arts,” and therefore it omits nuance regarding
how the “useful arts” differ from “science.” Moreover, it presumes that the
Constitution is more inflexible than it need be. Nonetheless, interpreting
“progress” to mean “spread” as Pollack does, only a small step is required to
translate “spread” to industrialization and the increase in technological
efficiency and dissemination of “matter-of-fact” knowledge in the sense of
Veblen’s usage.
358
Reinert, supra note 18, at 61; see also, e.g., VEBLEN, supra note 20, at
38–44.
359
Irwin, supra note 9, at 785–89 (identifying an Enlightenment vision of
technology adopted by Founding Fathers when the Constitution was framed).
360
Id. at 815–23.
361
See generally Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3232 (2010) (Stevens,
J., concurring) (arguing that “restor[ing] patent law to its historical and
constitutional moorings” by limiting the patentability of business processes will
promote socially beneficial innovation as the Founders intended).
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activities favorably, but also that such views must be assessed in
relation to the greater social good. For example, in The Fisherman
and the Rhinoceros: How International Finance Shapes Everyday
Life, Eric Briys and François de Varenne lamented the “tyranny of
the real economy” and trumpeted the success of Enron—prior to
the exposure of Enron's fraudulent accounting practices.362 Their
view, as proponents of financial interests, is that “the speculator is
not a parasite on the real economy, but almost a saint, someone
who helps everyone by taking on the specialized task of managing
risks. For assuming these risks, the speculator gets the chance of
profits.”363 Such a FIRE sector perspective is an about-face from
that of institutionalist economists. To Veblen, the term “social”
means collective equality.364 The award of a patent to an individual
(or small groups of individuals or entities) on the basis of a social,
that is, collective, phenomenon, is a harmful inequality that lessens
social welfare and reduces economic growth. From such a point of
view, patent claims—particularly method claims—to invidious
business endeavors that are fundamentally social can never be
useful or promote progress of science and the useful arts, because
they are always stultifying or regressive with respect to collective

362

ERIC BRIYS & FRANÇOIS DE VARENNE, THE FISHERMAN AND THE
RHINOCEROS: HOW INTERNATIONAL FINANCE SHAPES EVERYDAY LIFE (2000);
see also JAMES N. BODURTHA, JR., “UNFAIR VALUES” – ENRON'S SHELL GAME
(2003), http://bodurtha.georgetown.edu/enron/bodurtha_enron_shell_game.pdf
(discussing Enron’s fraudulent practices). The financial industry often trumpets
itself, even within the realm of patent law. See, e.g., John A. Squires & Thomas
S. Biemer, Patent Law 101: Does a Grudging Lundgren Panel Decision Mean
that the USPTO is Finally Getting the Statutory Subject Matter Question
Right?”, 46 IDEA 561, 563–67 (2006) (Mr. Squires wrote as the Chief
Intellectual Property Counsel for Goldman, Sachs & Co., a leading securities
and investment banking firm).
363
Justin Podur, Monstrous Gambles on the Future: The Financial
Economy and Real Economy, COUNTERPUNCH (Oct. 15, 2008), http://
www.counterpunch.org/2008/10/15/the-financial-economy-and-real-economy.
364
TILMAN, supra note 215, at 106.
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“usefulness.”365

antagonistic

to

“progress”
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and

As capitalism took the fore, and the U.S. economy
industrialized from the Nineteenth Century to the early Twentieth
Century, the role of “creators” faded from view, and “the
relationship between the marketers and the consumers became
dominant.”366 If the transition to a “post-industrial” economy is
given credence, it is possible to question the continued relevance
of patent law to such a post-industrial economy. In the realm of
patentable subject matter, the question is whether “creators” of
inventive technology, as traditionally understood, risk
disappearance altogether, increasingly replaced by the direct
patenting of the relationships between marketers (or rentiers) and
consumers—and whether such a shift provides any public good.
The Veblen dichotomy bears on how such a shift impacts society
as a whole. He provided a theoretical link between collective wellbeing, equality, and a preference for workmanlike application of
matter-of-fact technical knowledge over the pecuniary,
unproductive application of business and financial control.
Contemporary empirical research supports Veblen’s theory,
indicating that increasing financialization of the U.S. economy has
“negative effects on equality, growth and employment.”367
Although some critics fault Veblen for failing to articulate a
sufficiently clear standard for his dichotomy, perhaps because they
preferred different normative conclusions, Veblen nonetheless
provided a theoretical link between notions of progress and growth
and the application a dichotomy of some sort. In the patent world,
this provides a basis for discussion of constitutional limits on the
patent statutes with regard to patent-eligible subject matter,
particularly with regard to “business methods” and other abstract
365

See generally JARON LANIER, WHO OWNS THE FUTURE? (2013)
(providing a similar, if less philosophically clear, argument with respect to
information and “big data” and other contemporary technology).
366
FISK, supra note 37, at 11.
367
Jacob Assa, supra note 46, at 38.
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ideas. The most striking possibility here is the notion, derived from
Veblen’s economics, that business method and other abstract
patents could actually further a relative regression in general wellbeing by adding patents to the usual complement of techniques of
pecuniary sabotage and exacerbating imbalances between the FIRE
sector and the rest of the economy.
Here the remarkable book by Peter Drahos with John
Braithwaite, Information Feudalism: Who Owns the Knowledge
Economy? deserves special attention.368 Although Veblen is never
mentioned, Drahos and Braithwaite reach essentially the same
conclusion that Veblen did in books like Absentee Ownership and
Business Enterprise in Recent Times: The Case of America,369 that
FIRE sector interests can overtake and disrupt the real economy to
the detriment of general public welfare, and they tie that
conclusion to contemporary international negotiations over
intellectual property rights treaties and the rise renewed influence
of feudal-like conditions.
The present approach to patent eligibility is far more sweeping
than more limited technical criticisms regarding financial and
business method patenting, which often focus on the procedural
and technical competency of the USPTO to examine such patent
applications in the same manner as applications in other subject
matter areas, or judicial review of such patents after issuance.370
368

DRAHOS WITH BRAITHWAITE, supra note 54; see also Drahos, supra
note 54, at 209–222.
369
VEBLEN, supra note 78.
370
See, e.g., Michael Moulton, Effecting the Impossible: An Argument
Against Tax Strategy Patents, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 631 (2008). There is no
shortage of possible procedural and administrative or judicial competency
arguments against expanding patent-eligible subject matter. For instance, social
science backgrounds are not accepted to satisfy eligibility requirements for the
patent bar. U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, GENERAL REQUIREMENTS
BULLETIN FOR ADMISSION TO THE EXAMINATION FOR REGISTRATION TO
PRACTICE IN PATENT CASES BEFORE THE UNITED STATES PATENT AND
TRADEMARK OFFICE 4 (2014), available at http://www.uspto.gov/ip/boards/oed/
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Yet Veblen’s analysis of the economic role of technology is
premised on many of the same Enlightenment era ideals that
originally gave rise to the Patent & Copyright Clause in the
Constitution. Amid a confusing array of theories for patent
eligibility, Veblen at a minimum suggests that the motives behind
some are to recreate the near-feudal economic conditions of the
pre-Enlightenment era,371 with a corresponding diminishment in
public well-being. It becomes a question of underlying ideologies.
A. Why Perspective Matters
The policy implications of the patentable subject matter debate
can be informed by a recognition that ideology is a driving force
behind what are often presented as “objective” arguments.372 One

exam/GRB_January_2014.pdf. A bachelor's degree in a recognized technical
subject, or evidence of another degree with equivalent scientific and technical
training, are accepted, as is evidence of practical engineering or scientific
experience. Id. In other words, attorneys and agents practicing before the
USPTO in patent matters cannot qualify based on experience with marketing,
social sciences, finance, politics, or the like. The tired joke, “I have a science
background: in political science,” comes up short. Although the matter of
practitioner credentialing is very nearly an afterthought when considering the
substantive question of patent subject matter eligibility, it does further
emphasize how finance, business, and other social sciences have traditionally
not been considered disciplines that deal with patentable subject matter. This
underscores how much recent patent activity has shifted into new areas without
significant historical precedent. But it is also an attack on institutional practices,
and a very procedural one at that. Without a broader theoretical basis—and
therefore reminiscent of the sorts of analyses Veblen derided as mere
“taxonomy” in economics—these sorts of analyses will never provide any
definitive resolutions.
371
Cf. DRAHOS WITH BRAITHWAITE, supra note 54.
372
Judge Richard Posner has made this point before in reference to
arguments from Justice Antonin Scalia and Bryan Garner regarding the alleged
objectivity of the “textualist” statutory interpretation methodology. Richard A.
Posner, The Incoherence of Antonin Scalia, NEW REPUBLIC (Aug. 24, 2012),
http://www.newrepublic.com/article/magazine/books-and-arts/106441/scaliagarner-reading-the-law-textual-originalism (book review of ANTONIN SCALIA &
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useful insight, advanced by philosopher Slavoj Žižek and others,373
is that “[t]he fundamental aim of ideological fantasy is to silence
social antagonism,” and “[t]he only way of not falling into
ideological thought is, then, to maintain the tension between
ideology and reality, although they cannot be clearly separated
from one another.”374 In this sense,
it is not simply a matter of seeing which account of
reality best matches the ‘facts’, with the one that is
closest being the least biased and therefore the best.
As soon as the facts are determined, we have
already - whether we know it or not - made our
choice; we are already within one ideological
system or another.375
Yet the nature of ideology is to keep its aims of rationalization
hidden.376 As jurists and commentators weigh the various
BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS
(2012)).
373
A “post-modern” view of patent-eligible subject matter has been
suggested. Irwin, supra note 9, at 815–16. Post-modernism is a precursor to the
views advanced by Žižek. The emphasis on dynamic, context-dependent
tensions in Žižek’s philosophy has many similarities with old institutional
economics. See HÄRING & DOUGLAS, supra note 56, at 8–11.
374
George I. García & Carlos Gmo., Psychoanalysis and Politics: The
Theory of Ideology in Slavoj Žižek, 2 INT. J. ZIZEK STUD. 8–9 (Imanol
Galfarsoro trans., 2008), available at http://zizekstudies.org/index.php/ijzs/
article/viewFile/149/243.
375
Rex Butler, Zizek: What is a Master-Signifier, LACAN.COM, http://
www.lacan.com/zizek-signifier.htm (last visited Mar. 25, 2014). This is
analogous to an Albert Einstein quote: “Whether you can observe a thing or not
depends on the theory which you use. It is the theory which decides what can be
observed.” See ABDUS SALAM, UNIFICATION OF FUNDAMENTAL FORCES 99
(Cambridge Univ. Press 1990).
376
García & Gmo, supra note 374, at 3 (“[I]deology always implies a
concealment: ‘to be effective, the logic of the legitimation of the relations of
domination must remain hidden.’”); SLAVOJ ŽIŽEK, THE FRAGILE ABSOLUTE:
OR, WHY IS THE CHRISTIAN LEGACY WORTH FIGHTING FOR? 16 (Verso 2000)
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proposals for patent subject matter eligibility, they do so against a
typically unstated ideological backdrop, which too often makes the
associated statements of “facts”—as pertaining to “purely mental
steps,” a “transformation of matter,” a connection to a “machine,”
or any other patentability litmus test—more of an expression of the
unstated ideology than the reliable and objective judgments they
are made out to be. Much of the confusion in Federal Circuit case
law centers on this problem.
With that said, the present theory on patent eligibility exhibits a
stark departure from certain views on patent law gradualism—the
notion that the scope of patent-eligible subject matter should
slowly continue to increase. The Veblenian perspective suggests
that patent law should not be shaped and adjusted to defend and
accommodate vested social privileges, but should instead be more
egalitarian and should be reevaluated over time in view of
constantly changing circumstances.377 In contrast, Thomas Cotter
wrote about evaluating patent subject matter eligibility from a
“Burkean perspective,” and recognized, if only by implication, that
evaluation of any test or tests for patent subject matter eligibility
must be made against some sort of ideological backdrop.378 Cotter
(“[T]he highest form of ideology lies not in getting caught in ideological
spectrality, forgetting about its foundations in real people and their relations, but
precisely in overlooking this Real of spectrality, and pretending to address
directly ‘real people with their real worries’. Visitors to the London Stock
Exchange are given a free leaflet which explains to them that the stock market is
not about some mysterious fluctuations, but about real people and their products
– this is ideology at its purest.”); see also Posner, supra note 367.
377
Contra Cotter, supra note 11, at 857 (“[T]he extent to which [Burkean]
tradition reflects the perspectives of elites clearly presents a bone of contention
for thinkers more inclined towards egalitarianism.”).
378
Id.; Thomas F. Cotter, A Burkean Perspective on Patent Eligibility, Part
II: Reflections on the (Counter) Revolution in Patent Law, 11 MINN. J.L. SCI. &
TECH. 365, 365–66 (“I contended that it would be inadvisable to exclude
computer and business-related art from the scope of patentable subject matter
altogether.”). Cotter’s “Burkean” view starts down the same direction as the
Veblenian one, suggesting that limits on patent eligibility are appropriate, but in
true Burkean fashion obfuscates the social context as to why that would matter.
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endorses Irish statesman Edmund Burke as a reference point,
whereas the present article rejects Burke and proffers Veblen (and
institutional economics more generally) as a superior alternative.
Burke’s philosophical outlook was, at bottom, an attempt to
restrain emancipatory and disruptive social movements,379 and that
included restraining entrepreneurial inventors whose inventions
chipped away at the supremacy of an existing aristocracy, whereas
Veblen noted the unique role of technology and industry in
disrupting vested interests for the possible advancement of the
“generic ends of life.”380 Veblen saw the possibility for social good
379

During his lifetime, Burke was “a leader of the anti-patent campaign” in
England. KENT, supra note 275, at 221 (citing PAUL MANTOUX, THE
INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION 336 (London 1928)).
380
For a general critique of Burke and his progeny, see COREY ROBIN, THE
REACTIONARY MIND: CONSERVATISM FROM EDMUND BURKE TO SARAH PALIN
(Oxford Univ. Press 2011) (placing Burke on a continuum of reactionary
thinkers seeking to protect established hierarchy against emancipatory
movements from below). Against Robin’s analysis of Burke, it is interesting that
Chief Judge Rader of the Federal Circuit wrote an op-ed in 2013 that seems to
tie in closely with the fact that he offered comments to Cotter on the Burkean
view of patent eligibility. Randall R. Rader et al., Make Patent Trolls Pay in
Court, N.Y. TIMES, June 5, 2013, at A25, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
2013/06/05/opinion/make-patent-trolls-pay-in-court.html; see also Charles
Arthud, Obama Takes Aim at ‘Patent Trolls’, THE GUARDIAN, June 5, 2013,
available at http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2013/jun/05/obama-patenttrolls (quoting J. Randall R. Rader); Randall R. Rader, Chief Judge, United
States Court of Appeals for the Fed. Cir., The State of Patent Litigation, Address
at the E. Dist. Tex. Judicial Conference (Sept. 27, 2011) (transcript available at
http://memberconnections.com/olc/filelib/LVFC/cpages/9008/Library/
The%20State%20of%20Patent%20Litigation%20w%20Ediscovery%20Model%
20Order.pdf). A crucial point here is that Judge Rader’s suggestion to value
patent litigation early implies that technical (i.e., useful) aspects of a patented
invention drive valuation. One of Veblen’s more remarkable contributions to
this most daunting question of economics—how to assess value?—was his
recognition that pecuniary interests can influence or outright impose valuations
on serviceable technology, suggesting that valuation occurs in the opposite
manner to what Rader implies. See Wray, supra note 13, at 618; Hobson, supra
note 30. In the patent context, the Veblenian view is that the legal mechanisms
at play in patent litigation drive valuation independent of usefulness at large of
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in such disruption. Here, it should be noted that “[e]ver since
antiquity, the useful arts in their various guises had been
considered intellectually and socially inferior to the high (or fine,
or creative, or imaginative) arts.”381 It is precisely in this context
that Veblen, somewhat like Thomas Jefferson et al.,382 saw
technology as a means of sociopolitical change working against
vested interests, making the Veblenian view of technology
potentially more consistent with the revolutionary era conception
of promoting progress in the useful arts than a Burkean view that
must generally be seen as seeking to protect vested interests from
disruption.383
Moreover, Veblen saw the pecuniary activities of business and
finance as bearing the large share of responsibility for fluctuations
in and de-synchronization of an economy on a macro scale,

the claimed invention. Moreover, even though the argument by Rader et al.
emphasizes the toll allegedly imposed on small companies, there is nothing in
current patent laws that exempts small companies from patent infringement.
Rightly or wrongly, the patent laws treat all parties the same regardless of size,
ability to monitor the patent landscape, or resources to defend against frivolous
litigation. Moreover, start-up companies are sometimes merely the playthings of
venture capitalists and therefore still as much “vested interests” in the Veblenian
sense as large companies. The notion that patents impose a sort of “tax” on
productive business is in line with many of Veblen’s original criticisms of
pecuniary activities (in which legal work was included) wastefully raising the
general cost of doing business. It is an argument that when taken to its logical
conclusion is one against the very existence of patents (and other intellectual
property). At bottom, too, it is merely a generalized complaint against frivolous
litigation, which is not unique to patent law by any means—with no clear
mechanism in sight to quickly, reliably and fairly separate the frivolous from the
nonfrivolous.
381
Marx, supra note 274, at 573.
382
See Irwin, supra note 9, at 789; Marx, supra note 274, at 565.
383
Although neither Burke nor Veblen favored patents, their rationales for
arriving at their respective positions were polar opposites.
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particularly in relation to economic crises that harm general
welfare.384
Veblen specifically focuses on the problem how
domination and direction of industrial activities by
financial activities result in instabilities and
fluctuations in economy. At this point, Veblen
asserts that fluctuations in [the] economy do not
stem from [the] industrial sector, but from activities
that business enterprises follow for more profit.
Veblen defines fluctuations emerging at the level of
financial activity not as industrial fluctuations but as
business cycles. In this sense, Veblen indicates
crisis and financial fluctuations in modern economy
not as a result of [the] industrial economy but as a
result of [the] money economy.385
The self-interested views of the FIRE sector can be seen in a
stark new light from this perspective. For instance, commentator
John Duffy took quite literally the notion that “financial
engineering” is indeed a new form of engineering, noting that
Princeton University had created a Department of Operations

384

VEBLEN, supra note 20, at 14–32; see also Gülenay Baş Dinar, Conflict
between Industrial and Financial Activities and Instability of Capitalism in
Veblen's Analysis presented at the Veblen, Capitalism and Possibilities for a
Rational
Economic
Order
Symposium,
available
at
http://
www.veblenconference.org/en/
index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=73:guelenay-badinar&catid=47:paper-owners&Itemid=101 (last updated June 18, 2012); Little,
supra note 20.
385
Gülenay Baş Dinar, Abstract: Conflict Between Industrial and Financial
Activities and Instability of Capitalism in Veblen's Analysis presented at the
Veblen, Capitalism and Possibilities for a Rational Economic Order
Symposium,
available
at
http://www.veblenconference.org/en/
index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=73:guelenay-badinar&catid=47:paper-owners&Itemid=101 (last updated June 18, 2012).
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Research and Financial Engineering.386 In such a view, the scope
of “technological arts” is flexible and should be expanded to
include activities of the financial sector or any other sector that
may dominate the economy in the future. Insiders in the FIRE
sector tend to view themselves as engineers in this way too.387
From the Veblenian perspective, that view is suspect because it is
rooted in status and institution instead of taking a functional
approach with respect to productive contribution.388 Princeton
University creating such a department within their engineering
school raises the same questions posed by the formation of
business schools nearly a century earlier, many of which were
created not to develop new curricula, but “(a) to engage and serve
the local business community, and thereby attract students and
donations, and (b) to steal away the significant paying business
education that was already being done by many nation-wide
nonacademic schools of commerce.”389 Duffy gives academic
386

Duffy, supra note 35, at 1268–69. Duffy’s views are not uncommon
here. For instance, the television program NOVA ran an episode on October 16,
2013 titled “Making Stuff Faster” that blurred the lines between what might be
called the useful arts and business management when discussing operations
research initiatives. How to Run Faster, SCI. AM. (Oct. 16, 2013), http://
www.scientificamerican.com/article/how-to-run-faster-video.
387
Engineering, machinery and technology metaphors now abound in
describing financial and business activities. See, e.g., John Cassidy, Mastering
the Machine: How Ray Diallo Built the World’s Richest and Strangest Hedge
Fund, THE NEW YORKER, July 25, 2011, http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/
2011/07/25/110725fa_fact_cassidy; SCOTT PATTERSON, THE QUANTS: HOW A
NEW BREED OF MATH WIZZES CONQUERED WALL STREET AND NEARLY
DESTROYED IT (2010); see also John A. Squires and Thomas S. Biemer, Patent
Law 101: Does a Grudging Lundgren Panel Decision Mean That the USPTO Is
Finally Getting The Statutory Subject Matter Question Right?, 46 IDEA 561
(2006). However, “[t]he strategy of ‘financial engineering’ is to make capital
gains by downsizing and breaking up companies, or to bid up their stock prices
rather than investing in more capital or hiring more employees.” HUDSON,
supra note 10, at 251.
388
Duffy’s view does, however, resemble the “Burkean” view. See supra
Part I.
389
LOCKE & SPENDER, supra note 74, at 8.
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institutions a free pass, assuming that any of their activities must
inherently be academic in nature due to their institutional status as
“universities.”390 Yet the history of business schools shows a clear
tendency towards wealth- and prestige-seeking activities among
universities and colleges that is at odds with the somewhat naïve
view of such schools as having purely academic motives. Veblen
wrote an entire book on this topic, The Higher Learning in
America: A Memorandum on the Conduct of Universities by
Business Men.391 Moreover, even though there is now a
professional organization—The International Association of
Financial Engineers—that seeks to bolster the field of quantitative
finance,392 it is difficult to see how “financial engineering” bears
any relation to technology as it is commonly understood. The term
“financial engineer” seems no more credible than a description of a
homemaker as a “domestic engineer.”393 That is not meant to
denigrate homemaking but rather emphasize that it is entirely
different from engineering as the term is commonly understood.394

390

For further criticism of Duffy’s views here, see BEN KLEMMONS,
TECHNOLOGICAL ARTS 2 (2009) (“John Duffy proposed that we should take an
‘I know it when I see it’ sort of approach: if it’s taught at a technical college
then it’s a technological art.”), available at http://ben.klemens.org/blog/pdfs/
012-bilski_v_kappos.pdf.
391
THORSTEIN VEBLEN, THE PLACE OF SCIENCE IN MODERN CIVILISATION
AND OTHER ESSAYS, supra note 29, at 186.
392
INT’L ASS’N FIN. ENGINEERS, http://iafe.org (last visited Feb. 9, 2014).
393
Kate Lorenz, Six Ways to Embellish Your Resume Without Lying,
EXPERIENCE,
http://www.experience.com/alumnus/
article?channel_id=Resumes&source_page=additional_articles&article_id=artic
le_1203709417499 (last visited Mar. 4, 2012) (explaining that to “[a]void halftruths and gross exaggerations,” job applicants are advised that “[m]ost hiring
managers and recruitment professionals have had their share of resumes pass
across their desks during their career. So they are usually adept at deciphering
embellishments in a resume. They know that spending the last 10 years as a
'domestic engineer' means you simply were home with your kids.”).
394
Much as noted by LEWONTIN ET AL., supra note 39, this is generally an
attempt to acquire credibility through association with “engineering,” a
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Economists in the tradition of Veblen view “financial engineering”
not as a form of engineering like mechanical, chemical or electrical
engineering, but rather as synonymous with speculation and debt
leveraging.395 So while today’s “financial engineers” may have
backgrounds in actual science and engineering, a distinction should
still be drawn in the Veblenian sense regarding the unproductive
functional nature of their current financial activities.
X. CONCLUSION
The present proposal offers a new perspective on patent subject
matter eligibility, and one that is sharply divided from and
considerably narrower than certain other frameworks. Veblen’s
key insights into the sorts of artful deception engaged in by
parasitic, nonproductive economic sectors roughly a century ago is
useful for identifying how the same sophistries are being employed
by business interests today to distort patent law through an
expansion of patent eligibility. In an era when the gravitational pull
of the FIRE sector and related unproductive industries in the
economic field has perhaps even exceeded that of industry,
Veblen’s theoretical framework offers much-needed insights as to
how such a pecuniary/industrial imbalance in the economic field
can influence the conception of patent-eligible subject matter in a
way that has a negative impact on the advancement of general
welfare. Adopting a Veblenian perspective for patent subject
matter eligibility would preclude numerous swaths of “invention”
currently allowed by the USPTO and acceptable under current
judicial tests (e.g., the “coarse filter” approach). However, despite
this retraction in the scope of patent subject matter eligibility, such
an approach would merely restrain patenting within boundaries
more consistent with historical practice, long-standing Supreme

discipline widely acknowledged to serve the public interest, by actors working
in disciplines not widely accorded the same status.
395
Hudson, supra note 223; cf. GALBRAITH, supra note 284, at 19.
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Court precedent, and constitutional limits.396 More generally, the
Veblenian perspective preserves an Enlightenment-era egalitarian
element in patentable subject matter policy that is presently being
eroded in an era in which the values and ideologies of feudalism
increasingly regain traction, and also helps preserve technology’s
positive role as a possibly disruptive social force that can—if
conditions are right—fuel progress.397 Such limits are important
because highly abstracted patent claims directed to invidious,
396

Here it is worth noting with a careful eye the self-interest of the patent
bar, which almost uniformly supports having more patents and patent litigation,
leading Chief Justice John Roberts (echoed by Justice Scalia) to joke—in
Veblenian fashion—during oral arguments for the KSR case that patent bar
support for confusing and low thresholds on the question of nonobviousness
“just indicates that this is profitable for the patent bar.” Transcript of Oral
Argument, KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2006) (No. 04-1350),
available at http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/KSR_20Transcript.pdf; see also
Randall R. Rader, Chief Judge, U.S. Court of Fed. Claims, Address at the E.D.
Texas Judicial Conference: The State of Patent Litigation (Sept. 2011),
transcript available at http://memberconnections.com/olc/filelib/LVFC/cpages/
9008/Library/
The%20State%20of%20Patent%20Litigation%20w%20Ediscovery%20Model%
20Order.pdf (“From the lawyer’s perspective, I can give the state of patent
litigation in two words: NOT ENOUGH.”). Take for instance articles in the
trade publication INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY TODAY, which features many articles
by patent practitioners. The overwhelming majority of articles in that
publication discussing patent-eligible subject matter, and written by practicing
patent attorneys, advocate for expanding patent subject matter eligibility and
criticize limits or adverse rulings by the judiciary. This follows Veblen’s
concept of “trained incapacity,” which referred to the rather self-serving and
often chauvinistic blind spots that professional training often imparts. VEBLEN,
THE INSTINCT OF WORKMANSHIP AND THE STATE OF THE INDUSTRIAL ARTS
(1914), supra note 8. It is akin to Upton Sinclair’s famous saying, “It is difficult
to get a man to understand something, when his salary depends upon his not
understanding it!” UPTON SINCLAIR, CANDIDATE FOR GOVERNOR: AND HOW I
GOT LICKED 109 (U. Cal. Press, 1994) (1935).
397
See DRAHOS WITH BRAITHWAITE, supra note 54, at 198–99; HUDSON,
supra note 10, at 156 (“If economic evolution is to reflect the inner logic and
requirements of society’s technological capabilities, then [neofeudal] finance
capital must be subordinated to serve the [real, productive] economy, not be
permitted to master and stifle it.”).
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pecuniary activities tend to marginalize and dominate over
workmanship and technology, rendering practitioners of the
“useful arts” decidedly subordinate. Too great a slide toward
patents on pecuniary activities may well lead to a feudalistic, preStatute of Monopolies condition in which patents simply divide up
entitlements to economic rents. Moreover, patent claims of a
pecuniary nature, such as those to a business model per se, bestow
preemptive creative monopolies that can potentially discourage
technological efforts under the oft-repeated economic incentive
theory of patent law, whatever the empirical value of that theory,
because claims drawn to more concrete technological activities
will nearly always permit the possibility of alternative
technological solutions that further contribute to collective
knowledge and well-being. The role of technology and industry in
society is not a sole determinant of social well-being, but the
positive role it can play is perhaps obscured to some degree when
an unprincipled expansion of patent-eligible subject matter to
nontechnological activity occurs.

